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
ON MY HONOR
BEST
TO DO MY DUTY TO GOD
AND MY COUNTRY
AND TO OBEY
THE SCOUT LAW
TO
TO KEEP
AND MORALLY

An Erosion of Ethics?

Douglass Cater
John Makin
Robert Nisbet

Opinion Roundup

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Cover: *I Will Do My Best*, by Norman Rockwell
Art from the Archives of Brown & Bigelow and with permission of the Boy Scouts of America.

See
Opinion Roundup
pages 30–40

Generation Myths

Everett Carll Ladd

SOCIAL COMMENTATORS lately have been especially fascinated with the idea of generational change in the United States. We have been told again and again that the experiences of a new generation are somehow changing the face of America—for good or ill. Sometimes these arguments have held a meaty kernel of truth, sometimes they have been sheer nonsense. Almost always, they have been wildly exaggerated.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, the country supposedly faced an acute, unprecedented generation gap, reflecting the youngest generation's inclination to see the world differently than did its predecessors. Charles Reich gave us the most striking version of this Great Transformation in his celebrated "Consciousness III" from *The Greening of America*:

> There is a revolution coming . . . the revolution of the new generation . . . . A key word in understanding its origin is *betrayal*. Older people are inclined to think of work, injustice, and war, and of the bitter frustrations of life, as the human condition. Their capacity for outrage is consequently dulled. But to those who have glimpsed the real possibilities of life, who have tasted liberation and love, who have seen the promised land, the prospect of a dreary corporate job, a ranch-house life, or a miserable death in war is utterly intolerable.

Presumably, there has never been a time when common folk craved miserable deaths in war, but corporate jobs and comfortable one-story homes haven't usually been deemed intolerable. That Reich's editors at the *New Yorker* and Random House didn't burst out laughing when they read this says a lot about their mental state at the time. Within a few years, Reich's analysis seemed comical, even absurd, to everyone.

Commentary on generational change during the last presidential campaign centered on young, upwardly mobile professionals or Yuppies, a group no one ever accused of manifesting revolutionary consciousness. The Yuppies were seen as establishment-aspiring, fashionably liberal in their social outlook but at the same time acquisitive as hell, and generally conservative economically. The suggestion that they were a new social or political generation likely to transform U.S. politics was soon discarded, though. For one thing, keen observers noticed that not all young adults were wearing designer jeans, driving Volvos or BMWs, and writing software for microcomputers. By 1985 we were being introduced to the "new-collar" class, "the middle class of the baby boom generation."[1] After performing its modest corrective of shooting down the Yuppies as major new actors in the generation gap saga, however, the new-collar argument itself died quietly. But new collar is as splendidly imprecise as the familiar white collar, and "young new collars" are patently not a generational force to be reckoned with.

After these false starts and much uncertainty, a proper candidate seems to have been at last found to play the New Generation—the Baby Boomers, in a new guise as the Downtrodden. The argument is quite inventive. Birth rates were high from the end of World War II until the early 1960s, and this large group has had to stand in line for everything. In particular, its swollen numbers have had to queue up for jobs—at the very time, moreover, that increasing numbers of women of all ages have been entering the labor force. The sluggish economy of the past fifteen years has not been able to compensate for the downward pressure thus exerted on entry-level salaries, or for the loss of many high-paying jobs to foreign competition—in autos and steel, for example. Their incomes depressed, the argument continues, boomers have had to confront sticker-shock in car prices and the double whammy of high interest rates followed by surging prices in housing. The result is predictably catastrophic. "Is the Mid-


U.S.News & WORLD REPORT
AUGUST 18, 1986
KEEPING UP IS HARD TO DO
The Middle-Class Struggle to Hold On
The Washington Post
Is the Day of the Yuppies Over?
Democrats Advised to Court Neglected 'New-Collar' Voters
JULY 11, 1985
By Paul Taylor
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.
SEPTEMBER 22, 1986
Growing Gap
U.S. Rich and Poor Increase in Numbers; Middle Loses Ground
Many Families Are Well Off Due to a Working Wife; Single Mothers in Trouble
Business and Politics Affected
By David Wessel
The Economic Future of the Baby Boom
by
Frank S. Levy and
Richard C. Michel
Revised December 5, 1985
THE URBAN INSTITUTE
The New York Times Magazine
IS THE MIDDLE CLASS DOOMED?
SEPTEMBER 7, 1986
By Barbara Ehrenreich

dle Class Doomed?", Barbara Ehrenreich was compelled to ask recently in the *New York Times Magazine*. "Among Americans the baby-boom generation stands most at risk," writes economist Lester Thurow.

> [They] will have to cope with the economic failure of low productivity growth over their entire working lifetimes and at the end will find a noticeably lower American standard of living than that found abroad . . . . According to American conventional wisdom, a healthy middle class is essential to a healthy political democracy. A society of rich and poor with no middle group to mediate between them politically or economically is almost by definition unstable . . . . [If] the middle class really is the social glue that holds society together, then America is in the process of becoming unglued.[2]

Generational Politics

These fascinating efforts at using supposed shifts in generational experience to explain Big Change in American society and politics form the backdrop for the analysis presented in Opinion Roundup (pp. 30–40). We set out to see what could be gleaned from public opinion research bearing on the various arguments about generational distinctiveness.

One learns quickly that, for all the hype about generation gaps, on a great many central political issues and concerns, generational differences are modest or nonexistent (pp. 30–31). The various age groups assign exactly the same priorities, for example, to most public problems. They differ little on questions as diverse as: the proper role of government in assisting those in need; whether current military spending is too high or too low; and the use of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.

On a limited number of issues—examples of which are shown on pages 32 and 33—we find a neat age progression: People who reached maturity in the 1950s are more liberal than those who came of age politically in the 1940s; the 1960s cohort is more liberal than the 1950s group; and those whose formative political experiences came in the 1970s or 1980s are the most liberal of all. These issues all involve matters on which American society has been changing its mind in the years since World War II: race relations, the role of women, certain personal norms and lifestyles. Given continuing change, each succeeding age group has had a different, more liberal generational experience.

On yet another set of questions, we encounter a more complex pattern of generational differences. Charles Reich thought that there really was a sixties generation; it would in the long run have perspectives different from its predecessors' because its formative world—America in the 1960s—was so very different. Reich succumbed to irresponsible hyperbole reducing his writings to self-parody. Still, from a beachhead on the Yale University campus he saw clearly that a new surge of individualism was producing a new rebelliousness. Reich also thought the sixties generation would be followed by others that would enlarge and extend its outlook, but here he was profoundly mistaken. As the data on pages 34 and 35 make clear, those who have come of age in the late 1970s and 1980s have often had second thoughts about the individualistic surge of the sixties. People eighteen to twenty-two years of age, for example, are notably less insistent on an unrestricted right to abortion than those now in

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their thirties and early forties. The experience of succeeding generations by no means always encourages a liberalization of social attitudes. The sixties generation also remains today considerably more critical of and less confident of the leadership of established institutions such as the U.S. military, than either those who came before it or those who have come after.

A given age cohort may have had a distinctive generational experience affecting its outlook in one area of politics or policy but not in others. The party identification graph at the top of page 36, for example, shows that people who came of age during the Great Depression—now in their sixties and early seventies—are more Democratic than any other age group. Experiencing a massive economic collapse that was widely attributed to Republican failures left a lasting mark. On the other hand, those who came of age in the 1930s had no unusual formative experiences on social issues like abortion, and today their views on these issues are not at all distinctive. Americans who have reached maturity with Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan in the White House are unusually Republican—the most Republican age group in the population. What was happening in the electoral arena has left a deep imprint on their party loyalties. But they don't see themselves as especially conservative, nor is the sum of their social and political outlooks especially conservative—no more than the thirties generation was coherently liberal.

Generational Satisfactions and Angst

Turning from political attitudes to confidence, optimism, and satisfaction, we get a fresh perspective on the argument that baby boomers are facing especially acute economic problems and, indeed, being squeezed right out of the fabled middle class. Public opinion surveys can't tell us how the economy is actually performing and different age groups are faring; but they do give us insight into how people think they, and their country, are doing. As to the latter, it is at the very least remarkable that at a time when the economy is supposed to be struggling, and the middle class disappearing in a nation polarized between rich and poor, personal satisfactions and national confidence have remained at notably high levels for several years. Even more surprising is that the group held to be most adversely affected by the new economic problems—the younger half of the baby boom generation— is in most ways the most upbeat and optimistic of all.

We have reviewed survey data on the nation's mood in *Public Opinion* on a number of occasions, most recently in the August/September 1985 issue (pages 21 to 25). A variety of poll questions shows that a low point in confidence and satisfaction was reached in 1979 and 1980. In May 1980, only 21 percent of Americans interviewed in a Yankelovich poll thought that things were going very well or fairly well in the United States. By September 1983, however, the proportion had climbed to 58 percent; and in fourteen Yankelovich polls taken from December 1983 through September 1986, it has not fallen below 60 percent. Similarly, Gallup reported that in March and June 1986, 66 and 69 percent, respectively, of all persons interviewed were satisfied with the way things were going in the country at the time—up rather dramatically from the 12 percent who proclaimed themselves satisfied in a Gallup poll of August 1979. In June 1986, Gallup also found that 70 percent expressed "quite a lot of confidence" in the future of the United States, compared to 19 percent "some confidence," and 4 percent "very little or none at all." These findings and the general progression they show don't fit comfortably with the picture of a country where the economy has been struggling and the middle class badly squeezed. Levels of professed dissatisfaction and pessimism would be higher than they now are if the Thurow-Ehrenreich assessment were sound.

The data on pages 38 to 40 of this issue indicate that baby boomers generally, and young boomers in particular, are more likely than older groups to say things are going well in the United States and to express confidence in the country's future. A much higher proportion of boomers than of people forty-five years old and older think their economic situation is better now than it was a year earlier—and expect it will be better a year hence. Where boomers are less satisfied than the older groups, it seems to reflect a normal response to their current place in the economic life cycle. Most people don't reach their peak in earnings or job status when in their twenties or early thirties. Surveys taken fifteen years ago show exactly the same pattern of responses as recent surveys: In both sets, the young are less satisfied than their elders with *current* earnings, more optimistic about *future* prospects—positions merely reflecting realities of the economic life cycle.

Table 1

PER CAPITA GNP IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES, 1970 AND 1985

Countries	1970	1985
United States	$4,821	$15,356
Canada	4,371	15,198
Germany	3,712	13,265
France	3,464	12,643
Japan	3,066	12,235
Netherlands	3,633	11,710
United Kingdom	3,291	11,068
Italy	2,895	10,044
Spain	2,294	8,279

Note: These data are based on Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), as calculated by economists at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Source: "The OECD Member Countries," *The OECD Observer*, Number 139, March 1986, page 19.

Economic Experience—National and Generational

Public professions of general confidence and satisfaction—even among the boomers, many of whom supposedly are being robbed of their middle-class birthright—might only testify to a problem Marxist scholars have long recognized, *false consciousness*. Or, this condition might indicate that most of the pay due the piper has not yet been delivered. In fact, the explanation is otherwise. The preponderance of economic data shows the same condition that the public opinion findings do.



Figure 1

Question: If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you say you belong in . . .

	Lower	Working	Middle	Upper
1947	4%	45%	47%	4%
1948	4	53	38	6
1952	6	56	36	3
1969	4	51	43	2
1972	6	47	44	2
1973	4	48	46	3
1974	4	47	46	3
1975	5	48	44	3
1976	4	46	48	2
1977	4	49	43	4
1978	5	47	45	2
1980	5	46	45	3
1982	5	48	44	3
1983	6	47	44	4
1984	5	46	46	3
1985	4	45	47	4
1986	7	43	47	3

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization 1947 through 1969, by National Opinion Research Center 1972 through 1986.

Table 2

HALF-DECADE INCREASES IN REAL PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1930–1985
(percent change)

1930–1935	−10	1960–1965	+17
1935–1940	+28	1965–1970	+11
1940–1945	+47	1970–1975	+ 8
1945–1950	− 7	1975–1980	+14
1950–1955	+13	1980–1985	+ 9
1955–1960	+ 3		

Source: Calculated from data published in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, vol. 1, pp. 15 and 228; *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986*, pp. 7 and 432; *Economic Indicators*, November 1985, p. 2; and *idem*, August 1980, p. 2.

Big and complex, and surely with its share of problems, the U.S. economy has performed strongly over the past fifteen years—by both historical and cross-national comparisons. The middle class is not easily demarked in a country like the United States, but by no reasonable definition is it shrinking, much less disappearing. (As figure 1 indicates, Americans are at least as inclined to describe themselves as middle class today as they have been since the advent of polling, and more inclined to do so than they were in the late 1940s and early 1950s.) Boomers who look to a future in which their streets are paved with gold are appropriately frustrated; on the whole, though, the post-World War II generations have fared well and their future prospects are not dim—and they recognize this.

1. *Economic growth*. The baby boom generation has entered the economy at a time when economic growth has been fairly robust. Economists at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found that in 1970 the United States had, per capita, the wealthiest economy among the major industrial democracies; and fifteen years later, that position was fundamentally unchanged (see table 1). The rate of real economic growth in the United States over the past ten to fifteen years—measured by the best available data on per capita GNP adjusted to dollars of constant purchasing power—has been roughly the same as the average for the entire post-World War II period, which isn't bad at all (see table 2).

2. *Middle-class consumption*. It is sometimes argued that high rates of price increase for key items long associated with middle-class lifestyles, like owning one's own home and automobiles, have made it harder for Americans, boomers in particular, to live up to middle-class standards. The data don't agree. In 1970, 62.9 percent of all occupied housing units in this country were owner-occupied; by 1983, the last year a comprehensive housing survey was conducted, the proportion had risen to 64.7 percent. Louise Russell has found that overall "the older members of the baby boom generation appear to have encountered a more favorable housing market than preceding generations, rather than a less favorable one, and to have been quick to respond to the opportunities presented."[3] She notes that "recent trends suggest that the situation may be different for the younger members of the generation." The latest available data do not show, however, that the younger half of the baby boom cohort are less able to purchase their own homes than were comparable age groups in the past. In 1983, for example, 53 percent of married-couple families ages twenty-five to twenty-nine owned their own homes, while in 1970 the homeowner figure for this group was 48 percent.

In 1970, about 85 million passenger vehicles were in use in the United States. By 1983 the total had risen to 127 million. Despite a big relative increase in the number of one-adult households, the proportion of all households owning two or more vehicles jumped from 34.8 percent in 1970 to 49.7 in 1983 (again, the last year for which data have been collected). In 1970, 5.3 million Americans traveled abroad (not counting travel to Canada and Mexico); in 1984 the number was 12.1 million. The number of recreational boats owned climbed from 8.8 million in 1970 to 13.5 million in 1984. Ninety percent of those interviewed in Roper Organization surveys in 1986 said they owned at least one color TV set, 69 percent stereo equipment, and 51 percent a microwave oven. Virtually every indicator of discretionary mass consumption in the United States shows a big increase over the past fifteen years. The total picture of mass consumption contradicts the argument of a shrinking middle class.

3. *Income distribution*. It is possible, however, for an economy to be growing and mass consumption expanding, even while income distributions are becoming bipolar. Both Barbara Ehrenreich and Lester Thurow have argued strongly that the country is in fact becoming sharply polarized between haves and have-nots. Ehrenreich writes that "no one . . . denies that there has been a profound change in the class contours of American society." This is simply not true. The fact is that almost no one maintains that a profound change has occurred. The only real argument is over whether a *small* change has occurred in income distribution.

In one approach to this question, Neal Rosenthal of the Bureau of Labor Statistics arranged all the detailed occupations by average earnings and then divided them into thirds. He noted that "if the earnings distribution of the bottom third remained at the 1973 level in 1982 [the two years in his comparison], but the top third increased, it could be said that bipolarization occurred . . . ." Rosenthal found that "the data do not indicate that this [polarization] has occurred . . . although the increase was slightly larger in the top third and slightly lower in the bottom third than in the middle."[4]

Rosenthal appropriately cautions that the data on which his study was based are *survey* data, and thus subject to both sampling and response error. Indeed, we should remember that *all* of the commonly cited income data are drawn from surveys; while the methodology employed in the Current Population Surveys,

(Continued on page 56.)

AN EROSION OF ETHICS?

RANKING OCCUPATIONS

Question: How would you rate the honesty and ethical standards of people in these different fields—very high, high, average, low, or very low?

Honesty and ethical standards are...



Note: * Indicates the first year the category was asked.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 12-15, 1985.

The Sore Spots . . .

Question: On the whole, would you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied with the honesty and standards of behavior in this country today?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 11-14, 1986

Question: Do you think most American corporate executives are honest or not?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 29-June 2, 1985

Question: There's been a lot of news recently about individuals and corporations committing white collar crimes to make a dishonest profit for themselves and their companies. How often do you think this happens in American business—very often, occasionally, or hardly ever?



Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, April 29-May 1, 1986

Question: (Here are a few statements people make about the income tax system. For each please tell me if you agree or disagree, or if perhaps you have no opinion on it.) . . . Nearly everyone who has the chance cheats somewhat on income taxes these days.



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 11-16, 1985

Question: Generally speaking, when federal officials leave the government and work for big companies, do you think they make improper use of their contacts and inside knowledge?



Note: Sample size = 1,099

Source: Survey by the *New York Times*, April 29-May 1, 1986

Question: There is increasing talk these days about the ethical and moral standards in our society. We'd like to know how widespread you think certain questionable practices are. First (card shown respondent) . . . Do you think that is true of most, fairly many, not too many, or very few people?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 86-4), March 15-22, 1986

Question: I'm going to read a few statements. For each, can you please tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion about the statement. . . . To win elections, most candidates for Congress make campaign promises they have no intentions of fulfilling.



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, June 13-22, 1985

Question: How would you describe the sales people who work for most auto dealers? Are they thoroughly reliable to deal with, the same as most other sales people, or are they types you have to watch like a hawk?



Note: Sample size = 1,343

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for *Business Week*, May 16-20, 1986

And the Bright Ones

Question: Do you think that most people who are honest are honest because they have high moral standards, or because they are afraid of being caught in a dishonest act?



Note: Sample size = 1,201.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, March 7-10, 1983

Question: Here are a few statements people make about the income tax system. For each, please tell me if you agree or disagree, or if, perhaps you have no opinion on it. . . . It's not so wrong to cheat a little on taxes since the government spends too much anyway.



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 11-16, 1985

Question: How serious or not do you think it is for people to (read list) . . . Very serious, fairly serious, not very serious, not serious at all?



Note: Sample size = 1,201
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, March 7-10, 1983

Question: Do you think journalism in America is basically ethical, or not? (If basically ethical) Would you say it's essentially ethical, or it needs some improvements? (If not ethical) Would you say it needs many improvements, or is it basically unethical and needs fundamental overhauling?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, February 23-28, 1985

Question: Here are some statements that are sometimes made about lawyers and the legal profession. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each statement. . . .



Note: Asked of 58% of the sample. Sample size = 1,388
Source: Survey by Gordon Black for *USA Today*, February 17-20, 1984

Question: When it comes to being honest with you about anything that is really important, would you say your spouse is honest with you . . . almost all the time, most of the time, about half the time, only some of the time, or hardly ever?



Note: Sample size = 1,207. "Hardly ever" not shown = less than 1%.
Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, July 11-14, 1983

Question: Overall, how much do you trust your (family/personal) doctor's medical judgment: a great deal, a fair amount, not much or not at all?



Note: Sample size = 1,148. "Not at all" not shown = less than .5%. Asked of those who said they had a family/personal doctor = 79% in a previous question.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 20-24, 1986

Ethical

Question: When they see or know of wrongdoing by others some people feel they should report it so that someone can try to do something about it. Others feel it is better not to get involved—either because it isn't their business or because they feel it wouldn't do any good. I'm going to name some different situations, and for each one would you tell me whether it is something you would be likely to report or not? . . . If a married couple were both good friends of yours and you knew one of them was cheating on his or her spouse, would you be likely to tell the spouse or stay out of it?

If a married couple were both good friends and you knew one of them was cheating...



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-4), March 19-26, 1983.

Question: Do you feel that incidents like these (the recent incident in a New York City subway in which a man shot and wounded four teenagers who demanded money from him)—taking the law into one's own hands, often called vigilantism—are sometimes justified because of the circumstances or are never justified?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 25-28, 1985.

Question: If a lawyer knows that a client is guilty of a crime, should the lawyer still represent the client?



Note: Sample size = 1,004.

Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for *The National Law Journal*, July 21-23, 1986.

Question: I'd like to ask you a few questions concerning medical ethics. . . .

▨ *Should be allowed* ☐ *Should not* ▨ *Don't know/no answer*

In general, do you think that people dying of incurable, painful diseases ... to end their lives before the diseases run their course

Some comatose patients who can't breathe on their own are kept alive by machines such as respirators. Do you believe doctors ... to turn off the machines if it is determined that the patient will never regain consciousness

In general, when a severely retarded infant is born with other defects that will kill that child without surgery, do you think the baby's parents ... to order surgery withheld



Source: Survey by Media General for the Associated Press, February 6-13, 1985.

Question: Now let me ask you some questions about genetic engineering. Some people are worried about this science, arguing that in changing the basic makeup of people's cells, it is like playing God. But let me ask you, if it is possible to cure people with fatal diseases by altering their genes, do you feel they ought to be allowed to go ahead with such treatment, or do you think it is going too far.

If it is possible to cure people with fatal diseases by altering their genes



Note: Sample size = 1,254.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for *Business Week*, November 1-4, 1985.

Dilemmas

Question: (Respondents were asked to pretend they were editors) For each of the following stories, please say whether that story should almost always be reported, whether it should sometimes be reported depending on the particular circumstances, or whether it should almost never be reported.


Story should be reported...

Source: Survey by MORI Research, Inc., for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, December 1984-January 1985

Question: Here are some techniques used in investigative reporting. Please say how you feel about each one.



Source: Survey by MORI Research, Inc., for the American Society of Newspaper Editors, December 1984-January 1985

Question: There is a lot of talk about people cheating on their income taxes in various ways. Some people say everybody takes a few liberties and those things aren't very serious. Others say any kind of misreporting on income taxes is serious. Here are some things that some people might do to cut down on the amount of federal income taxes they pay. (Card shown respondent) For each one would you tell me whether you think it is something the Internal Revenue Service should send people to jail for, or should impose a heavy fine for, or should impose a small fine for, or not even go after people for?


Internal Revenue Service should...

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-5), April 23-30, 1983

Political

Question: Do you think there is more corruption among politicians than among other important people in America, less corruption, or about the same amount of corruption?



Note: Sample size = 1,019 registered voters.

Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen Associates for *The Garth Analysis*, February 19-20, 1983.

Question: (I'm going to read a few statements. For each, can you please tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement.)



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, June 13-22, 1985.

Question: I am going to mention a few of the problems and issues facing the country. Regardless of how you personally feel about the two parties, I'd like you to tell me which one, the Republican party, or the Democratic party, would do a better job of handling each particular problem or issue. Which party . . .?



Note: "No opinion" (not shown) was 21%, 18%, and 5%, respectively. "Neither" (volunteered and not shown) was 12%, 23% and 17%, respectively. "Both" was a category in 1981 (6%) and 1985 (8%) only.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of February 22-26, 1985.

Question: Overall, how would you rate the ethical standards of top Reagan administration officials? . . .



Note: Sample = 1,503 registered voters.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 7-11, 1984.

Ethics

Question: (I'd like to ask you about the last nine presidents of the United States. Please keep in mind Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan). If you had to choose one, which president do you think . . . Set the highest moral standards? . . . Set the lowest moral standards?

Set the highest moral standards



Note: "Not sure" not shown. Sample size = 1,254.

Set the lowest moral standards



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, April 1-3, 1985.

NIXON

Question: What do you like best . . . about Richard Nixon?

1965
Characteristics/qualities people like best about Richard Nixon



Note: A total of 49% named at least one characteristic they liked. Multiple responses per respondent. Characteristics cited by fewer than 6% not shown.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, December 11-16, 1965.

Question: Which of these two statements comes closer to your point of view about Watergate? It's a very serious matter because it reveals corruption in the Nixon administration; or it's just politics—the kind of thing that both parties engage in.

Watergate is...



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of June 1974.

Question: Thinking back to Watergate, do you think Richard Nixon's actions regarding Watergate were or were not serious enough to warrant his resignation?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, latest that of April 30-May 1, 1976.

FRIENDS AND FAMILY

Question: Do you think James Roosevelt has made improper use of his relation to the president to get insurance business?



Note: Asked of those who had followed the discussion about James Roosevelt and his insurance business in a previous question = 40%. James Roosevelt served as secretary to President Roosevelt concurrently with his job in private industry. There was speculation that the son's success in the insurance business was due to his White House connections.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 18-23, 1938.

Question: (Asked of those who were aware of the Bert Lance controversy = 75%) As a result of the controversy over Bert Lance, do you have a better or worse opinion of President Carter's ethical standards, or hasn't it made a difference to you?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 16-30, 1977.

Question: (Asked of those who had heard about the president's brother, Billy Carter, dealing with Libyan government officials = 94%) As a result of this, do you have a less favorable opinion of President Jimmy Carter than you had before, or hasn't it had any effect on your opinion?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 1-4, 1980.

Question: (Asked of those who had heard/read about Ferraro family finances = 84%) Do you think that (1984 Democratic vice presidential candidate) Geraldine Ferraro's actions regarding her family's finances have been ethical, or not? Do you think that's an important issue, or not?



Note: "Not sure/refused" recalculated = 18%.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, August 25-30, 1984.

Question: (Asked of those who said that the issue of Geraldine Ferraro's family finances and the way she handled it affected their opinion of her = 36%) Has it made you more favorable or less favorable toward her?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 12-16, 1984.

Question: (Now I want to ask you about the case of Michael Deaver, who is a Washington lobbyist but used to be one of the top aides to President Reagan in the White House. He has been accused of conflicts of interest. Let me read you some statements. For each, tell me if you agree or disagree.) . . . It is wrong for Deaver to have left the White House and immediately take on a whole group of foreign governments as clients, such as South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and others. . . . Because Michael Deaver is a long time and close friend of President and Mrs. Reagan, the political enemies of the Reagans are trying to embarrass them by making charges about Deaver.



Note: Sample size = 1,243.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, May 16-20, 1986.

If the Congressional Elections Were Held Today . . .



LATE POLLS: Gallup has not repeated this question since July. In a Gallup poll for the Joint Center for Political Studies (Aug. 8-14), 85% of blacks said they would like to see the Democratic party win in their district, 7%, the Republican. Among whites, the responses were 46% Democratic, 41% Republican. In a Roper poll for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, 39% said they would vote for the Democratic candidate, 38%, the Republican (Aug. 22-26). In an ABC News/*Washington Post* poll (Sept. 19-29) among 8,645 registered voters, 52% responded that they would vote Democratic, 48% Republican. The CBS News/*New York Times* poll (Oct. 14-15) found 48% preferring the Democratic candidate and 46% the Republican. The wording for these questions varied.

	Dem.	Rep.
July 27-30, 1946	50%	50%
Aug. 17-20	52	48
Aug. 31-Sept. 3	52	48
Sept. 14-19	49	51
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	44	53
July 11-14, 1950	53	47
July 30-Aug. 4	53	47
Aug. 21-24	62	38
Sept. 18-21	54	47
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	49	49
July 17-20, 1954	59	41
Aug. 6-9	59	41
Aug. 27-30	57	44
Sept. 16-20	55	45
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	53	47
July 11-14, 1958	63	37
July 30-Aug. 4	58	42
Aug. 20-25	60	41
Sept. 10-15	61	39
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	56	43
June 28-July 3, 1962	64	36
July 26-31	59	41
Aug. 23-28	63	37
Sept. 20-25	62	38
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	52	47
July 8-13, 1966	62%	38%
July 29-Aug. 3	64	36
Aug. 19-22	57	43
Sept. 8-13	61	39
Sept. 30-Oct. 6	59	41
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	51	48
July 10-13, 1970	58	42
Aug. 1-4	61	39
Aug. 25-Sept. 1	58	42
Sept. 11-14	58	42
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	53	45
Aug. 2-6, 1974	68	32
Aug. 16-19	65	35
Sept. 6-9	64	36
Sept. 27-30	65	35
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	58	41
July 21-24 and Aug. 4-7, 1978	57	43
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	54	45
Feb. 29-Mar. 3, 1980	59	41
June 13-16	58	42
Aug. 1-4	59	41
Aug. 15-18	63	37
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	50	48
June 16-19, 1981	52%	48%
Sept. 18-21	57	43
Oct. 2-5	55	45
Oct. 30-Nov. 2	59	41
Jan. 8-11, 1982	54	46
Jan. 22-25	57	43
Feb. 5-8	60	40
April 2-5	61	39
April 23-26	61	39
April 30-May 3	58	42
May 14-17	58	42
June 11-14	56	44
June 25-28	60	40
July 23-26	61	39
July 30-Aug. 2	59	41
Aug. 13-16 and 27-30	56	44
Sept. 17-20 and Oct. 15-18	55	45
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	56	44
April 6-9, 1984	55	45
Sept. 7-10, 21-24 and Sept. 28-Oct. 1	51	49
ACTUAL VOTE ✱	50	50
Oct. 11-14, 1985	48	42
Jan. 10-13, 1986	54	46
April 11-14	50	40
June 9-16	49	43
July 11-14	54	40

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 11-14, 1986.

SORTING OUT A

ON MANY POLITICAL ISSUES, GENE



Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, and 1986 combined.



Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, and 1986 combined.

3. Sex with a person other than your spouse is always/almost always wrong



Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1984 and 1985

4. Favor death penalty for persons convicted of murder



Source: NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 combined

Questions: (1) Now look at card RR. Some people think that (blacks/Negroes) have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to (blacks/Negroes). (2) I'd like to talk to you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at card OO. Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (3) What is your opinion about a married person having sexual relations with someone other than the marriage partner—is it always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? (4) Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for

GE DIFFERENCES

ATIONAL DIFFERENCES ARE MODEST

5.



Natl.= 21%/41%/38%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, and 1986 combined.

6. Most people get ahead by...



Natl.= 67%/19%/15%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1984 and 1985.

SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES . . . TOGETHER

7. Extremely important issue



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, August 22-26, 1986.

persons convicted of murder? (5) We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First, are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on the military, armaments and defense? (6) Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work, others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important? (7) There are a number of issues facing the nation. I'd like to ask you about some of them. For each one please tell me if you regard it as an extremely important issue, a fairly important issue, or a relatively unimportant issue. The first one is cutting the federal deficit.

On Some Questions, The Youn

As we have seen on pages 30 and 31, on many policy questions differences by age are insignificant. The population as a whole may be split about whether we are spending too little (21%) or too much (38%) on defense, but these divisions aren't age related: for example, 19 percent of eighteen to twenty-six year olds say we are spending too little on defense compared to 23 percent of those fifty-seven and over.

On these two pages, we show another aspect of the discussion of age. On certain issues, the younger you are, the more liberal. These straight age progressions are most common on social issues and matters of lifestyle.

1. Favor the busing of white and black school children



Natl = 26%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1985, and 1986 combined

2. Premarital sex is always/almost always wrong



Natl = 37%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1985, and 1986 combined

3. Homeowner cannot refuse to sell home to someone because of his race or color



Natl = 48%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, and 1986 combined

Questions: (1) In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of black and white school children from one district to the other? (2) There has been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? (3) Suppose there is a community wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to even if he prefers not to sell to blacks. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law would you vote for? (4) Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography laws? There should be laws against the distribu-

ger You Are, the More Liberal

4. Feelings about pornography



Natl.= 42%/54%/4%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, and 1986 combined

5. Marijuana should be made legal



Natl.= 21%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, and 1986 combined

On other issues, World War II was the watershed. Those who came of age before the war differ from all those who reached maturity after it when a new outlook prevailed.

6. It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself



Natl.= 37%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1985 and 1986 combined.

7. It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of home and family



Natl.= 48%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1985 and 1986 combined.

8. Favor sex education in the public schools



Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1985, and 1986 combined.

tion of pornography whatever the age. There should be laws against the distribution of pornography to persons under 18. There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography. (5) Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal or not? (6) Now I'm going to read several more statements. As I read each one please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. For example, here is the statement: It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself. (7) It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family. (8) Would you be for or against sex education in the public schools?

Generationa

On yet another set of questions, we see a more complex pattern of generational differences. Distinctive generational experiences sometimes shape views on issues and politics. Those who came of age during the Great Depression, for example, tend to be more Democratic than the age group that preceded or followed them. Today the youngest age cohort is substantially more Republican than either the Depression or the sixties generation (see figure on page 36).

Issues such as abortion show a somewhat different pattern of generational change. Here the youngest group looks less like their older brothers and sisters and more like their parents and grandparents. The eighteen to twenty-six year olds appear to have some second thoughts about the changes embraced strongly by those who came of age in the 1960s. They don't necessarily disagree, they are simply less supportive of the attitudes of that group.

1. Great deal of confidence in the military



Natl. = 33%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, and 1986 combined.

2. Disagree, a legal abortion should be possible if the woman is married and does not want any more children



Natl = 59%

Source: Survey by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, and 1985 combined.

Questions: (1) I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? The military. (2) Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children. (3) Here are different opinions about social differences in this country. Please tell me for each one whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree. America has an open society. What one achieves in life no longer depends on one's family background, but on the abilities one has

Differences

3. Strongly agree, what one achieves in life no longer depends on one's family background, but on the abilities one has and the education one acquires



Natl.=40%

Source: Survey by NORC-GSS, 1984.

4. Agree differences in social standing reflect what people made out of opportunities they had



Natl.=74%

Source: Survey by NORC-GSS, 1984.

5. Homosexual sex relations between two adults are always/almost always wrong



Natl.=79%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1984 and 1985.

6. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work



Natl.=62%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1985 and 1986 combined.

and the education one acquires. (4) ... Differences in social standing are acceptable because they basically reflect what people made out of the opportunities they had. (5) What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? (6) Now I am going to read several more statements. As I read each one, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with it. For example, here is the statement: A working mother can develop just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.

Politics

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?

Republican minus Democrat



Natl.=34%R/37%D/29%I

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January-July 1985

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?

Approve of way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president



Natl.=58%

Question: Which political party today best represents your ideas about how the United States should be governed—the Democratic party, or the Republican party, or neither of them?

Republican party best represents your ideas about how the U.S. should be governed



Natl.=36%R/30%D

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, August 22-26, 1986.

Question: Since the Republicans control the White House and the Democrats are favored to keep control of the House of Representatives, this year's major election battle will most likely be over control of the Senate. Which party do you prefer to see win control of the Senate?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, August 22-26, 1986.

Question: Without naming any one candidate, would you generally prefer to see a Democrat or a Republican win the White House in 1988?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, June 11-15, 1986.

Question: I want to ask you about certain words that we hear a lot in political talk. For each one would you tell me whether it has a favorable connotation to you, or a negative meaning to you, or is it just descriptive without either a favorable or unfavorable association. This first one is a senator. . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, August 22-26, 1986.

Status and

Are young people today notably dissatisfied? Do they believe there is less opportunity in America than in their parents' time? Do they feel they are doing less well than their parents? These important questions are part of a larger debate going on in American society. The baby boom group and the eighteen to tweny-four year olds represent 52 percent of our adult population. How they are faring, and how they *believe* they are doing both reflect and influence the health of the American economy and the vigor of the American idea. Some observers have contended that our society is becoming polarized between rich and poor, and that many of the young in particular are getting squeezed out of the middle class. Here we try to deal with some of the attitudes about status and satisfaction. On page 10 Everett Ladd examines the arguments in more detail.

In many areas—particularly with regard to their future prospects—the young are more optimistic than any other group in the population. They are not pessimistic about opportunity or about the country's economic future, or about their children's chances. When they express concern, it seems to reflect a normal response to their current place in the economic life cycle. Not many people reach their peak in earnings or job status when they are in their twenties. They aren't particularly happy about their current earnings, for example, but they are optimistic about their future prospects.

The Gross National Spirit Index is a composite of the following six questions:

1) In general, how satisfied are you with the way things are going in the United States today? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

2) Over the next year or so, do you think things will go better for the United States, go worse, or stay about the same?

3) Over the next year or so, do you think the U.S. economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?

4) How satisfied are you with the way things are going for you personally? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

5) How satisfied are you with your family's financial situation: Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

6) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



Note: For scoring methodology, see *Public Opinion*, December/January 1982.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, August 22-26, 1986.

Satisfaction

Question: How do you feel things are going in the country these days—very well, fairly well, pretty badly or very badly?

Things are going well/fairly well in the country these days



Natl.=67%

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, April 15-17, 1986

Question: Now I'd like your opinion on a number of different things. In spite of what people say, the lot (situation/condition) of the average man is getting worse, not better.

Agree the lot of the average man is getting worse



Natl.=53%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1984 and 1985 combined

Question: In the future, what do you think the economic situation will be for your children or other people's children? Do you think they will be better off than you and your generation or worse off?

Economic situation for your children will be better than for your generation



Natl.=52%

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, April 15-17, 1986

Question: Do you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, or no real confidence that in a few years from now our country will be strong and prosperous?

No real confidence that the country will be strong and prosperous a few years from now



Natl.=17%

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, April 15-17, 1986

Question: Now I would like your opinions on a number of different things. It's hardly fair to bring a child into the world with the way things look for the future.

Agree it is not fair to bring a child into the world



Natl.=37%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1984 and 1985 combined

Question: During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, worse, or has it stayed the same?

Financial situation has been getting better during last few years



Natl.=38%

Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 combined

THE PROMISE OF YOUTH

Question: How would you compare your personal economic situation today with one year ago—is it much better today, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse today than it was a year ago?

Personal economic situation is much better than a year ago



Question: Looking ahead, what do you think your own economic situation will be in about one year from now—do you expect it to be much better than, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse or much worse then than now?

Personal economic situation will be much better one year from now



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network, August 22-26, 1986.

Question: We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?

Pretty well satisfied with present financial situation



Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 combined.

Question: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do—would you say your are very satisfied, moderately satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

Very satisfied with work you do



Source: Surveys by NORC-GSS, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 combined.

Question: How would you compare the economic situation of your generation with that of your parents' generation? Would you say your generation is better off or worse off?

Your generation is better off than parents' generation



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, April 15-17, 1986.

Question: How would you compare your personal economic situation with that of your parents? Would you say you are better off than your parents or worse off?

Personally better off than parents economically



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, April 15-17, 1986.

An Absence of Malice: Young People and the Press

Michael J. Robinson

A DOZEN YEARS AGO Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein's *All The President's Men* (first the book and then the movie) captivated a nation. One didn't need to be Sam Ervin to figure out what the message was. Any kid could see that it was the press that saved the nation.

Millions of young Americans read the book or saw the movie, and lots of them took it to heart: thousands enrolled as journalism majors or went on to "J" School. Back then these youthful enthusiasts were called the "Woodstein" generation.

But that was then. These days books and movies are giving us the other side of the story. Nora Ephron is now trying to tell the world what Carl Bernstein was really like, in *Heartburn* (first the book and now the movie), although the new wave of media bashing actually began with *Absence of Malice*, a movie that treated the press the way *The China Syndrome* had treated the nuclear power industry a few years before. Sandwiched between *Malice* and *Heartburn* came *The Right Stuff*, a book and movie combination that prompted mild-mannered Walter Cronkite to complain publicly about Hollywood's denigration of the American press.

And it's been going on since the start of the 1980s. Even if one ignores the *real* news—stories about Janet Cooke's vivid imagination, for example—media portrayals of the press haven't been so nasty since Orson Welles played the loathsome lead in *Citizen Kane*.

So what's the younger generation supposed to think now? Has the average twenty-five year old (who was thirteen when Nixon resigned) taken the new and negative cases to heart? Does the post-Woodstein generation think like a post-Woodstein generation should?

In a word, "No." Young adults' opinions do *not* reflect the new wave of bad news and criticism. There *is* a relationship between youth and press opinion, but it goes in precisely the opposite direction one would predict if recent media portrayals of the press had had an effect. The post-Woodstein generation is actually *more* favorably disposed toward the news media than any other age group under the age of fifty.

"People and the Press" Surveys

The pattern emerged last year when the Times Mirror "People and the Press" survey showed a negative relationship between age and beliefs about media credibility, that is, the older one is, the less credible one finds the press. This year's second round of "People and the Press" surveys confirmed it: the Reagan youth movement is actually more "Woodsteinian" in many of its attitudes toward the press than the real Woodstein generation is. The young, whether defined as those under thirty or those under twenty-four, prove to be the least critical of press performance, the least likely to doubt what the news media say, and—above all—the most certain that the news media matter.

Press Performance

Performance issues have always been the Achilles heel of press opinion. People are more willing to say they approve of the press than approve of its practices. The youngest portion of the adult population (the under-thirty set) is most likely to regard news reporting in the United States as unbiased, highly professional, and independent. That was true in last year's poll, but it's more the case this time around.

What may be the bigger surprise is that the youngest adults are the least likely to see the press as too critical of America, the one place you'd guess that the Reagan youth movement would be most willing to express doubts. When asked whether the media "stand up" for America, 60 percent of the young say "yes"; among the Woodstein generation it's 50 percent.

Even on questions about press coverage of terrorism, the young generally take a more charitable position on media performance. In this year's survey,

Table 1

OPINIONS ABOUT PRESS PERFORMANCE

	Post-Woodstein Generation (18-29 Years)	Woodstein Generation (30-40 Years)	Seniors (50 and Over)
The press is:			
Not politically biased	46%	41%	36%
Highly professional	75	72	68
Independent	44	37	32

when asked if the press gives too much attention to terrorist incidents, well over half (56 percent) of the senior respondents (fifty years or older) said "too much." Among those under thirty, that figure was 39 percent. When asked to evaluate press coverage of terrorism, 67 percent of the young gave good or excellent marks to the media. People in their thirties and forties weren't quite so enthusiastic (59 percent approval). "Seniors" were the least likely of any to approve (56 percent).

Table 2

MEDIA'S COVERAGE OF TERRORISM

	Post-Woodstein Generation (18-29 Years)	Woodstein Generation (30-49 Years)	Seniors (50 and Over)
Press gives too much coverage to terrorism	39%	56%	56%
Very/mostly satisfied with the way news organizations cover international acts of terrorism	67	59	56

Believability

Table 3 represents believability scores (grouped by age) for about a dozen major news organizations. The young are most likely to regard the media as believable.

One might expect that people under thirty would consider *Rolling Stone* or *People* magazine the most believable news sources. But the post-Woodstein generation gives higher marks to a bevy of news organizations generally thought of as aimed at older audiences. The young give their highest believability scores to the *Wall Street Journal*, *Time* magazine, and to three commercial networks (local news tied CNN for fifth place). In fact, they rated the *Wall Street Journal* higher by about 10 percentage points than the other two age groups did.

How about the eastern establishment papers like the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*? Even for papers like these, the highest scores are given by people who were high school or college age during the 1980s.

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

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Table 3

MEDIA BELIEVABILITY

	Post-Woodstein Generation (18-29 Years)	Woodstein Generation (30-49 Years)	Seniors (50 and Over)
Always or nearly always believable:			
USA Today	28%	20%	28%
Associated Press	31	29	24
Time	42	35	30
Newsweek	33	31	31
People	18	9	8
Reader's Digest	30	30	39
Parade	9	11	15
Nationally influential papers	28	25	23
Wall Street Journal	52	43	42
Rolling Stone	12	5	4
National Enquirer	5	5	7
NBC	39	30	31
ABC	41	30	32
CBS	42	31	33
McNeil-Lehrer	34	44	46
CNN	40	39	34
Local TV	40	31	38
Radio	29	29	32
Average	32	27	28

The Top Five

Post-Woodstein Generation	Woodstein Generation	Seniors
1. *Wall Street Journal*	1. McNeil-Lehrer	1. McNeil-Lehrer
2. CBS	2. *Wall Street Journal*	2. *Wall Street Journal*
Time	3. CNN	3. *Reader's Digest*
4. ABC	4. *Time*	4. Local TV
5. CNN	5. CBS	5. CNN
Local TV	Local TV	
	Newsweek	

Media-Sensitive Youth

The post-Woodstein generation is perhaps most distinctive in its attitudes toward the news media's impact. It's clear from these surveys that the youngest respondents see the press as more *consequential* than do their elders. Not necessarily more *powerful*, mind you, but surely more consequential.

In this year's "People and the Press" survey, Gallup asked twelve questions that touched on attitudes toward the impact of the news media, whether beneficial or harmful. On eight of these twelve items, the youngest respondents were most likely to attribute "consequence" to the media.

That pattern is particularly evident in questions about the media's impact on terrorism. The under-thirty age group is most likely to think that media coverage of hostages will protect hostages; but that same group is also most likely to think that media coverage of hostages will force the government to give in to terrorists' demands.

Youth is telling us two things at once. First, the under-thirty set is more willing than its elders to be media oriented in the way it views the world: young people see more happening as a consequence of the press. And, second, the young are letting us know they aren't Pollyannas about the press. They say the news media can be, and are, negative in impact as well.

Ultimate Questions

There isn't much doubt that the post-Woodstein generation sees pluses and minuses flowing from press behavior. But when it comes to ultimate "effects" questions, the post-Woodstein generation typically winds up sounding supportive.

This year, Gallup asked four questions that could be considered acid tests of "press opinion." On three of the four, younger respondents turn out most positive about the media.

When asked whether the press protects or hurts democracy, the Woodstein and post-Woodstein generations are essentially tied; only the seniors are more negative.

Table 4

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MEDIA'S TERRORISM COVERAGE

	Post-Woodstein Generation (18-29 Years)	Woodstein Generation (30-49 Years)	Seniors (50 and Over)
% believing that media coverage of terrorist situations affects:			
Likelihood of future terrorism	72%	72%	65%
Length of time hostages are held	64	60	60
Speed at which government responds	67	52	51
Chances our government will give in to terrorists' demands	34	24	21
Safety of hostages	71	62	59

But when asked whether press coverage of terrorism helps or harms the public interest, young people are significantly more likely to say that it helps. Gallup also asked about the consequences of news leaks—one of the Reagan administration's pet peeves and a frequent source of complaint from media critics. Once again, the under-thirty crowd is most likely to say that the impact is beneficial; half of them, in fact, believe that news leaks serve the public interest. That's a real surprise for the post-Woodstein pro-Reagan generation.

But perhaps the most interesting generation gap develops from a question Gallup asked about how much news coverage respondents would want if *they* were being held hostage. Would they want to maxi-

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mize or minimize coverage under those circumstances?

Remarkably enough, fewer than half the total sample (47 percent) said they'd want to maximize coverage of their plight. But the young are clearly the most likely to opt for maximum coverage (see table 5). So in this case the young are not merely more likely to see media making a difference; they're also more likely to want the media there, making that difference on their behalf.

Table 5

BENEFITS OF THE NEWS MEDIA

	Post-Woodstein Generation (18-29 Years)	Woodstein Generation (30-49 Years)	Seniors (50 and Over)
% believing that:			
News organizations protect democracy	62%	63%	48%
News coverage of terrorism helps the public interest	71	64	60
News leaks serve the public interest	50	44	36
Respondent would want to maximize coverage, if held hostage	56	47	42

Is This the Reagan Youth Movement?

Are these kids supposed to be the Reagan youth movement? Aren't conservatives and Reagan supporters supposed to be more hostile to the press?

One thing is certain: these kids are Reagan's. According to this year's "People and the Press" survey, 80 percent (!) of the respondents under thirty held a favorable opinion of the president—ten percentage points more favorable than the rest of the population.

This just shouldn't happen. Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider proved not too long ago that presidential approval scores are almost always *inversely* related to approval scores for the press. When one "side" does better in the polls, the "other side" is supposed to do worse: it's the public playing out in its own mind the adversarial relations between press and government. But here we have a real shocker—Reagan's kids are the most supportive of Reagan *and* the press.

How Come?

Why does the post-Woodstein generation believe what it does? I can suggest three plausible explanations.

Anything that's TV: It could be that this has nothing to do with "the press," but that the TV generation likes anything associated with "the tube."

Not bad. There must be some truth to this explanation. It should be pointed out, however, that the Woodstein generation is also a TV generation. People aged forty today were four when the "Today" program began.

Remarkably, the very young do *not* give higher credibility scores to TV anchorpersons than their elders do. In addition, daily *print* sources earn higher scores from them than the Woodstein generation. What may be the best counterargument to the TV theory is that it doesn't really matter much. If TV is giving the news media a public relations advantage, that's an advantage that is here to stay.

Maybe they don't know any better: Youthfulness isn't the only predictor of press approval. So is ignorance—especially ignorance about the press. People who know less about the news media give higher grades to the media.

And the young know the least about media technology, about press law, and even about news celebrities. So it may not be youth that's producing these opinions so much as their naiveté. That the youngest are most supportive of the press might just be more evidence that ignorance is bliss. That explanation has its utility, but knowing that ignorance is bliss doesn't help explain why ignorance is bliss. And that is at least as important in this case.

Calling Bill Bennett: If you've ever taught high school civics (as I have), you know that most textbooks treat the news media as democracy's friend. So my guess is that the younger generation likes the press because they've been taught to feel that way. By definition, young people are the ones who have most recently been exposed to formal education. They haven't had as much time to forget (or transcend) what they learned in school about the beneficial role of a free press in democratic society. Call it a media conspiracy between textbook writers and the press; call it civics; call it education; call it indoctrination. But you might also want to call Bill Bennett over at the Department of Education, because my guess is that the schools *are* teaching values, and one that seems to stick is the value of a free press.

In a way, ignorance is part of it, too. Young people haven't had enough real world experience to temper what they've learned in civics or American history. But mostly the post-Woodstein generation is probably expressing what every younger class of voters is likely to feel when coming fresh into the electorate—that the news media are good, or at least beneficial.

Conclusion

The first conclusion is easy. Neither best-selling books nor top-rated movies have much impact on public opinion. Any content analysis worth a nickel would show that the popular media have turned against the press during the last dozen years. But it hasn't mattered much.

The young go to the movies; they spend lots of time with TV. Some of them even read. But the images of the press in the media are *not* the images that dance in the minds of youth.

Second, public opinion is less volatile than the media. Movies, books, and television can jump from *All the President's Men* to *Absence of Malice* within half a dozen years. Attitudes toward institutions change more slowly.

Third, "Youth for Reagan" will not be rushing out to sign up for internships with Accuracy in Media. More than the rest of the public, young Americans wind up approving of both Reagan and the press.

But then there's the other side. America's youth won't be interning with the ACLU either. The Reporters' Committee for the Freedom of the Press won't find too many free press absolutists in this bunch of young people. The young tend not to translate positive attitudes about the press into libertarian opinions about the First Amendment.

On questions of "press freedom versus government control," the young are all over the place. But the young do show some consistency when it comes to believing the press and appreciating its role. As long as our schools teach that the press is the watchdog of our democracy, this pattern should continue to hold. ☑

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HOW MUCH ARE WORKING MOTHERS WORKING?

Douglas J. Besharov
Michelle M. Dally

WE HEAR A GREAT DEAL about working mothers these days. Widely cited is the Bureau of Labor Statistics report that 62 percent of all mothers with children under the age of eighteen work outside the home.[1] One prediction is that, by 1990, 86 percent of mothers will be working.[2]

Everyone knows that record numbers of women—including mothers—have entered the labor force; the evidence of this major social change is all around us. From Geraldine Ferraro to female construction workers, from advertisements for convenience foods to maternity business wear, we are bombarded with images of "supermoms"—those who pursue careers and raise families.

Questions about the immediate and long-term consequences for the family and the work place, about the well-being of children, and about how working women cope with the emotional and physical demands of motherhood are matters of great concern. Meeting the needs of working mothers—and of their families—is now a major public policy issue.

Fueled by the general statistic that tells us 62 percent of all mothers work outside the home, our political leaders have focused on working mothers, on the assumption that the "stay-at-home mother" is a thing of the past. In Congress now, for example, a major bill to require employers to provide paid maternity leave is gaining support. Increased public spending for day care has become a political issue in most communities.

But a closer look at the data is necessary before we rush headlong toward new policies. For, while there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of mothers who work, the 62 percent figure is more complicated than it first appears. First, statistics on mothers' labor force participation include part-time working mothers. Actually, 41 percent of all mothers work full time; 16 percent work part time.[3] Another 6 percent are actively seeking a job. Mothers with children under age six work less: 33 percent work full time; 15 percent work part time.

Even these numbers are misleading. "Full time" means full time for any period during a calendar year. Only 29 percent of married mothers work full time for a full year. About 8 percent of them work twenty-seven to forty-nine weeks a year; 7 percent work full time from one to twenty-six weeks a year.[4] And "part time" means anything from a few hours a week during the Christmas season up to thirty-four hours a week year round.

The difference is significant. A mother working part time, or part of the year, has substantially fewer career prospects than one working full time the year round. Seniority, experience, responsibility, and promotion are all affected. Mothers working part time, therefore, should not be lumped in with mothers working full time. They have some of the same needs of both "stay-at-home mothers" and full-time working mothers.

Looking at mothers who do work full time, the picture is still complex. As the accompanying table demonstrates, whether and how much mothers work differs according to their marital status, the age of children, and welfare status.

The statistics on working mothers with young children that we hear most often can distort policy because they mask deep differences among four groups of mothers: married mothers who work, married mothers who stay home to care for their children, divorced mothers, and never-married mothers.

"Traditional" Mothers

Married mothers living with their husbands make up three-quarters of the "Mother-with-child-under-eighteen" population[5]; 39 percent of them work full time. Whatever government policy we have should certainly address their very real needs, but it should also address the needs of the 60 or so percent of mothers who aren't working full time, which includes the 40 or so percent who aren't working at all.

Table 1
WORKING MOTHERS' WORK

		With children 0-17	With children under 6
All mothers	**Total number**	**32,837,000**	**15,694,000**
	Full time	13,527,000 (41%)	5,229,000 (33%)
	Part time	5,395,000 (16%)	2,373,000 (15%)
Married, spouse present	**Total number**	**25,003,000**	**12,217,000**
	Full time	9,834,000 (39%)	4,054,000 (33%)
	Part time	4,564,000 (18%)	2,018,000 (17%)
Divorced	**Total number**	**3,294,000**	**890,000**
	Full time	2,087,000 (63%)	449,000 (50%)
	Part time	353,000 (11%)	123,000 (14%)
Never married	**Total number**	**2,269,000**	**1,604,000**
	Full time	660,000 (29%)	373,000 (23%)
	Part time	200,000 (8%)	125,000 (8%)
Mothers with children on welfare	**Total number**	NA	
	Full time	NA (12%)	NA
	Part time	NA (8%)	NA

Women who stay home at least part of the time to care for their children do so at no small personal cost; the time and effort they devote to raising families reduces their job experience, seniority, and, therefore, their earning potential. If we are to have a family policy, it should recognize their contribution and the career costs that result.

Child care credits, the 10 percent standard deduction on a second earner's income, and larger IRA deductions were all designed to aid working mothers. Combined, these benefits in effect subsidize mothers who work outside the home.[6] A similar subsidy is not given to households in which the mother stays home and cares for the children. So these benefits for working mothers create, at the margin, an incentive for mothers to enter the labor force. The tax reform bill just passed almost doubles the personal exemption deduction (from $1,080 to $2,000), and raises the minimum standard deduction for married parents (from $3,670 to $5,000), but this goes only part way to making things even.

Divorced Mothers

Most people don't realize that liberalized divorce laws all but require divorced mothers to work—or go on welfare. In all but a few states, alimony is a thing of the past.[7] The law now assumes that a divorced mother can—and should—support herself regardless of the family's pre-divorce work arrangements and regardless of her actual earning capacity. (The only exception is older women, usually over fifty-five, deemed too old to begin working.)

The divorced mother's financial situation is further worsened by the often empty promise of child support. The modern law of child support assumes that a mother should work to help support her children. In all states, child support is now a mutual obligation of both parents, with the amount to be paid by the father reduced by the mother's earnings. According to the Census Bureau, only about 46 percent of all divorced mothers are granted child support in their separation agreements or by court order. Enforcement is so weak that only half receive the full amount; in fact, the average annual payment to mothers who actually receive child support payments is only $710. That's less than $14 a week.[8] Between 1978 and 1983, the mean amount of child support for all women who received some payment went down 15 percent in real dollars.[9] A California study determined that, at the time of divorce, the father's average standard of living went up 42 percent, while that of his ex-wife and her minor children went down 73 percent.[10] A disproportionate burden of the cost of child raising, thus, is thrust upon the divorced female. If divorced mothers are to have food and shelter for themselves and their children, they must work—or go on welfare.

About 22 percent of all divorced mothers with children were receiving AFDC in 1982.[11] In the California study mentioned earlier, 14 percent of the divorced mothers were forced to go on welfare within the first year after the divorce, while a much larger number moved in with their parents in order to feed themselves and their children.[12]

Those who can find work that pays, do. Sixty-three percent of all divorced mothers work full time. Fifty percent of divorced mothers with children under six work full time. Only 11 percent of divorced mothers work part time, compared to 18 percent of married mothers. Economic self-sufficiency for a divorced mother is an appropriate goal, but it must be pursued with common sense. Some of these mothers find themselves thrown, unprepared, into the labor force—while having the added burden of caring for their children alone. If given a choice, a higher percentage would probably work part time rather than full time, at least until their children are older.

"Never-Married" Mothers

"Never-married" mothers, the Census Bureau's name for what are commonly called "unwed mothers," work substantially less than the other two groups of mothers. Only 29 percent of never-married mothers work full time, and only 8 percent work part time. When contrasted to the divorced mothers, their closest counterpart as female-headed households, never-married mothers work 54 percent less than divorced mothers.

Why are so many unwed mothers not working, especially compared to divorced mothers? Unwed mothers are, for the most part, ten years younger than divorced mothers. The average age range of unwed mothers is twenty to twenty-nine; for divorced mothers the average range is thirty to thirty-nine. And unwed mothers are also, on the average, less educated. Fifty-four percent of unwed mothers have a high school diploma—73 percent of divorced mothers do. Thus, age, education, and other demographic factors combine to give these mothers much poorer job prospects. So, unlike divorced mothers, these mothers, in large proportion, tend to go on welfare—more than 50 percent[13]—and stay there[14].

Their labor force participation reflects this difference. Only about 20 percent of welfare mothers work, about 12 percent full time and about 8 percent part time.[15] Their full-time work rate is only a little more than a fifth the rate of the divorced mothers working, and two-fifths the rate of married mothers working full time.

Many believe that—for these mothers—AFDC and other welfare benefits (upon which most unwed mothers rely)[16] establish a disincentive to work. With low job-related skills, the best that many of these mothers can expect is a minimum wage subsistence. Putting aside whether this is enough money to live on, these mothers can often do better by staying at home on welfare. A recent government report explains: "The total income from cash assistance payments, which are based on family size, often exceeds the income that could be earned in entry-level, low-skilled employment."[17] The potential loss of medicaid eligibility is seen by most welfare experts as an even more powerful reason why welfare mothers do not work. The disincentive argument gains even greater credibility in regard to adolescent females living at home, for whom welfare provides the opportunity to escape from the supervision of parents and to set up an independent household.

Just how much of a work disincentive welfare benefits create remains a matter of controversy. But even if welfare benefits do not discourage work, they certainly do not encourage it. There is no work requirement attached to the receipt of AFDC; nor is there any programmatic incentive to gain employment voluntarily.

In fact, for these mothers with children under six, we have what amounts to a no-work policy. Welfare policy is now in the throes of a controversy over whether these welfare mothers should be required to work or pursue education or job training. A key argument in the debate is that, since so many mothers are now working, there is nothing wrong with expecting mothers on welfare to work. And, in keeping with the careless way that the statistics are used, the assumption is that welfare mothers should work full time. But, as we have seen, except for divorced mothers, most mothers are not working full time, and for divorced mothers full-time work is more a question of economic necessity, bred, in part, by current alimony and child support policy.

There are ample reasons to conclude that welfare policy should mandate work, education, or job training. The welfare mother's situation is more closely akin to that of a divorced mother, and it is reasonable to expect her to strive for economic self-sufficiency. A work and training requirement may well be the only thing that breaks the cycle of her long-term welfare dependency. But in adopting a workfare program, we should remember that welfare mothers have parental responsibilities. This does not mean that welfare mothers should not work; they should. But, as we rightly push them into the labor force, we need to remember that they are, after all, still mothers.

There are many differences in the labor force participation of American mothers. Will public policy address the different needs of mothers who stay at home to care for their children as well as those who work outside the home? Will it do something to relieve the one-sided burden placed on divorced mothers? Will it adopt work requirements for welfare mothers that instill the work ethic while respecting their role as parents? Only if politicians and policy makers recognize the differing work arrangements and needs of American mothers. One policy will not do. ☑

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[1] Bureau of Labor Statistics, *NEWS*, September 19, 1985 (citing a study of March 1985.) Hereinafter, "mother" connotes only those mothers with children under the age of eighteen.

[2] J. Guidubaldi, et al., *Maternal Employment and Child Adjustment: Results of a Nationwide Study* (Paper presented at the 94th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C. August 1986).

[3] Statistic derived from an unpublished Census Bureau report, "Advance Data from March 1986 Survey." Full-time work is defined as thirty-five or more hours per week. Part-time work is defined as thirty-four hours or less.

[4] Statistics derived from an unpublished Census Bureau report "Advance Data from March 1986 Survey."

[5] "Married mother" is used to denote the "Married mother, spouse present" category as described by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Divorced mother" and "Never-married mother" are also terms derived and defined by the newsletter.

[6] See Douglas Besharov and John Weicher, "Return the Family to 1954," *Wall Street Journal*, July 8, 1985, Op Ed page.

[7] In 1983, only 4.6 percent of ever-divorced or currently separated women were supposed to receive alimony payments. Only 3.5 percent did. For those with children, 6.1 percent of ever-divorced or currently separated women were supposed to receive alimony payments. Only 4.8 percent did.

Of those women recently divorced or separated (1975 or later) in 1983, 6.5 percent were supposed to receive alimony in 1983. Only 5.2 percent did.

Statistics derived from U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, *Child Support and Alimony: 1983*, Series P-23, No. 141, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office.

[8] United States Department of Commerce, *News*, July 11, 1985, reporting on Census Bureau statistics from 1983.

[9] U.S. Bureau of Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 141, *Child Support and Alimony: 1983.*

[10] *Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution*, (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. xii.

[11] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1986* (106th edition) Washington, D.C., 1985. (Latest year reported: 1982.)

[12] Weitzman, *The Divorce Revolution*, p. 340.

[13] It is estimated that 59% of all unwed mothers were receiving AFDC in 1983. 63% were reported receiving AFDC in 1985. These statistics include those mothers who reported themselves as separated. See Nick Eberstadt, paper being prepared for The Working Seminar on Family and American Welfare Policy, American Enterprise Institute and Marquette University, 1986.

[14] See Charles Murray, "According to Age," paper prepared for The Working Seminar on Family and American Welfare Policy, American Enterprise Institute and Marquette University, September 1986.

[15] Estimates derived from U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare/Health and Human Services, *AFDC Studies For 1967-1979*, which reports a monthly work rate of 8.8 percent full time and 5.4 percent part time. Best estimates are that the annualized figure would be one-third to one-half higher.

[16] See notes 12 and 13.

[17] Office of Refugee Resettlement, Social Security Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Report to the Congress on Alternative Projects for Refugees Under Section 412 (c)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act*, October 31, 1985 p. 5.

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TERRORISM AND TRUST: HOW WE SEE THE MIDDLE EAST

Eytan Gilboa

IN JUNE 1985, Lebanese-Shiite terrorists hijacked a TWA passenger plane to Beirut; in October, Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*; in December, terrorists attacked waiting passengers in the Rome airport. Americans were killed and injured in all these incidents. After another attack on Americans at a discothèque in West Berlin in April 1986, the United States responded with military force and bombed targets in Libya. In September, Arab terrorists took over a Pan Am plane in Karachi, Pakistan, and this incident also ended with several Americans killed and injured.

In an April 1986 CBS News-*New York Times* poll, terrorism was named the "most important problem facing the country." Although cited by only 15 percent of those surveyed, terrorism ranked higher than any other problem, including the economy, unemployment, or the budget deficit. Not since the controversial 1982 Lebanon war had American public opinion been so fixed on problems in the Middle East.

Americans blamed several Middle Eastern countries for international terrorism. In the Roper poll of January 1986, the largest number of respondents (68 percent) selected "professional terrorists sponsored and financed by radical countries such as Libya, Syria, and Iran" as the major reason for the increase in terrorism. In an April CBS-*NYT* poll, 74 percent believed that Libya was responsible for bombing the nightclub in West Berlin. In response to another question in the same poll, 67 percent thought that other Middle Eastern countries (primarily Syria, Iran, and Lebanon) were responsible for international terrorism.

President Reagan's actions against international terrorism and its sponsors have enjoyed substantial support. In the ABC News-*Washington Post* poll of October 1985, 80 percent approved of Reagan's actions against the hijackers of the *Achille Lauro*. Only 17 percent disapproved. In a Roper poll of the same period, an overwhelming majority, 83 percent, thought the interception of the hijackers "was a good thing to have done." Similarly, the bombing of targets in Libya in April 1986 was approved by substantial majorities: 72 to 22 percent (Harris), 77 to 14 percent (CBS-*NYT*), and 67 to 16 percent (R.H. Bruskin). Moreover, according to an ABC News-*Washington Post* poll, 67 percent of the public approved of military actions against Syria or Iran "if it can be proved that either country was behind terrorist acts against Americans."

General Perceptions of Mideast Countries

Terrorism appears to have damaged Americans' general perceptions of Middle Eastern countries. During the 1982 war in Lebanon, Gallup had found a majority of 55 percent expressing highly or mildly favorable feelings toward Israel. Israel's image had deteriorated from 75 percent favorable in 1981. In the same poll, Egypt scored an identical 55 percent favorability rating, also a decline from the 1981 score.

Table 1

GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

Question: I would like to rate your opinion of several Mideast countries. Using a scale of one to seven, where seven represents a country you *like* very much, and one represents a country you *dislike* very much, how would you rate your opinion of the following countries? Remember, the higher the number, the more you like the country and you may choose any number between one and seven.

Country	April 1983	March 1985	Change
	Median Scores		
1. Israel	4.7	4.7	0.0
2. Egypt	4.8	4.5	-0.3
3. India	4.3	4.2	-0.1
4. Jordan	4.2	4.0	-0.2
5. Saudi Arabia	3.8	3.7	-0.5
6. Afghanistan	3.7	3.2	-0.5
7. Pakistan	3.5	3.1	-0.4
8. Syria	3.3	2.9	-0.4
9. Lebanon	3.6	2.8	-0.8
10. Iraq	2.7	2.3	-0.4
11. Iran	2.0	1.8	-0.2
	(n = 1,025)	(n = 1,018)	

Source: *Gallup Report International*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (May 1985): p. 1

In April 1983 and March 1985, Gallup asked respondents to rate Mideast countries in terms of *liking* or *disliking* them on a scale of one to seven. Seven represents the most positive rating and one, the most negative (see table 1). Egypt received the highest median score (4.8) and Israel the second highest (4.7) in 1983. Table 1 shows that by 1985, only Israel retained its high rating. All the others lost ground.

The 1985 results reveal an unusual downturn in American opinion about the Middle East; six countries dropped at least three-tenths of a point. Not surprisingly, Iran continued to occupy the last place on the list with a median score of only 1.8. Egypt's decline is probably related to the continuing slide in the Egyptian image that began after the assassination of the popular Anwar Sadat. Lebanon registered the largest drop, clearly a reaction to anti-American terrorism, including the devastating attack in October 1983 on the Marines' headquarters in Beirut.

Evaluation of American Allies

The erosion of favorable American opinion about Middle Eastern countries is also visible in questions about their status as U.S. allies.

In 1976, only Israel was perceived—by a substantial majority—as a close ally of the United States. Egypt joined Israel in 1980, following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. The ratings of two American Arab allies, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, are consistently below Israel's and Egypt's but in the middle of the figure. The pro-Soviet Arab countries, Syria and Libya, received the lowest ratings and are at the bottom of the figure, along with Iran whose rating declined after the Khomeini revolution.

In a December 1985 survey by the Roper Organization, Israel was perceived as the closest ally of the United States (50 percent). The comparable scores for the Arab countries were: Egypt, 33 percent; Saudi Arabia, 25 percent; Jordan, 14 percent; and Libya, 4 percent.

The erosion in perceptions of the Arab states could be related to anti-American terrorism. Israel's dimin-

Figure 1

FRIENDLINESS OF MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

Question: I am going to read you the names of some countries. For each, tell me if you feel that country is a *close ally* of the U.S., is *friendly* but not a close ally, is *not friendly* but *not an enemy*, or is unfriendly and an *enemy* of the U.S.



Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of January 31–February 3, 1986.

ished stature might be attributed to the Pollard spying affair and the accusations of unauthorized technology transfers. But there seems to be more to the story. ABC News and the *Washington Post* asked whether a country "is a reliable ally of the United States—one that can be trusted to cooperate with the United States in almost any circumstances—or not"? In April 1986, Israel's score remained high while those of Egypt and the other Arab states went down sharply. Fifty-four percent said Israel was a reliable ally of the United States, compared to 44 percent in August 1982 and 54 percent in March 1982. But the score for Egypt was only 24 percent in 1986, compared to 39 percent in August 1982 and 52 percent in March 1982. Israel's reliability is seen as substantially greater than Egypt's, and there appears to be no decline in Israel's support.

Sympathies for Israel and the Arab Nations

The "sympathy" question was asked frequently in polls taken during the 1982 war in Lebanon. As indicated in table 2, Israel lost standing after the massacre of Palestinians in Beirut. Various polls differed, however, on the size of the change in the distribution of sympathies. The Gallup-*Newsweek* poll found a substantial drop in the Israeli column and a considerable increase in the Arab column. But polls by Roper and ABC News-*Washington Post* revealed much more moderate fluctuations in the scores of both sides.

By early 1983, all the major polls showed Israel's support similar to the pre-war levels. As early as January 1983, Gallup found a plurality of 49 percent in favor of Israel. This matches the one reported for January 1982 (49 to 14 percent). An ABC News-*Washington Post* survey, also taken in January 1983, found an almost identical score for Israel compared to its previous poll of September 1982, but as aftereffects of the Sabra and Shatila massacre waned, the Arab side lost 10 percentage points.

The special Israeli committee investigating the

Table 2

SYMPATHIES FOR ISRAEL AND THE ARAB NATIONS

Questions:

(a) Have you heard or read about the situation in the Middle East? If "yes": In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations? (Gallup)

(b) With regard to the situation in the Middle East at the present time do you find yourself more in sympathy with Israel, or more in sympathy with the Arabs? (Roper)

(c) At the present time, do you find yourself more in sympathy with Israel or more in sympathy with the Arab nations? (*Los Angeles Times*)

(d) In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations? (*WP*-ABC)

(e) In the dispute between Israel and the Arabs, which side do you sympathize with more, Israel or the Arabs? (Harris)

Q	Date	Poll	Israel	Arab Nations	Neither	Don't Know	Both	(n)
War in Lebanon (June–September 1982)								
(a)	June 11–14, 1982	Gallup	52%	10%	29%	9%	—	(1,399)
(b)	June 1982	Roper	39	9	23	17	12%	
(c)	July 4–8, 1982	*L.A. Times*	48	17	22	13	—	(1,102)
(a)	July 11–14, 1982	Gallup	41	12	31	16	—	(1,389)
(d)	Aug. 17, 1982	*WP*-ABC	52	18	16	14	—	(913)
(b)	Sept. 1982	Roper	40	15	20	16	9	
Beirut Massacre (September 16–17, 1982)								
(a)	Sept. 22–23, 1982	*Newsweek*-Gallup	32	28	21	19	—	(605)
(d)	Sept. 24–26, 1982	*WP*-ABC	48	27	12	13	—	
(b)	Oct. 1982	Roper	38	14	21	18	9	(2,001)
(a)	Jan. 1983	Gallup	49	12	22	17	—	(1,515)
(d)	Jan. 1983	*WP*-ABC	47	17	15	21	—	
Kahan Report-Sharon's Resignation (February 1983)								
(d)	Feb.–Mar. 1983	*WP*-ABC	52	16	13	19	—	(1,504)
(a)	July 1983	Gallup	48	12	26	14	—	(853)
(b)	July 1983	Roper	37	9	21	22	10	
(d)	Sep. 1983	*WP*-ABC	49	13	14	24	—	
(b)	Jan. 1984	Roper	44	8	21	14	12	(2,000)
(b)	Mar. 1984	Roper	39	8	21	23	9	
TWA Hostage Crisis (June 1985)								
(d)	July 1985	*WP*-ABC	49	11	18	22	—	(1,208)
Achille Lauro Incident (October 1985)								
(e)	Oct. 1985	Harris	64	14	10	9	3	(1,252)
(d)	June 1986	*WP*-ABC	62	13	13	12	—	(1,505)

Sources: Gallup: *Gallup Report International*, vol. 1, no. 6 (August 1983), 6–7. Roper: *Roper Reports*, April 1984. *Los Angeles Times*: *L.A. Times*, July 11, 1982. *WP*-ABC: *Washington Post*, August 20, 1982, March 9, 1983, August 5, 1986. Harris: *The Harris Survey*, No. 92, November 14, 1985.

massacre (Kahan Committee) issued its report on February 8, 1983. The committee exonerated Israel from participation in the massacre, although Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's performance was faulted, and he was forced to resign. At the end of February, ABC News-*Washington Post* found a ratio of 52 to 16 percent in favor of Israel, similar to the 55 to 18 percent pre-war March 1982 score. Polls by the Roper Organization revealed a similar pattern. The July 1983 score represents a drop of 5 percentage points in the Arab column.

The TWA hostage crisis of June 1985 led to some tension between the United States and Israel. American media were critical of Israel's refusal to release Shiite prisoners in exchange for American hostages. According to the media's own polls, the public held similar views. Following the hostages' release, sympathies returned to normal—49 to 11 percent in favor of Israel in a July ABC News-*Washington Post* poll.

In October 1985, following the *Achille Lauro* incident, Harris registered a substantial increase in sympathy for Israel—64 to 14 percent, up from 52–12 percent in the previous Harris poll (July 1980). According to an ABC News-*Washington Post* poll, this high ratio continued to hold and stood at 62 to 13 percent in June 1986. Compared to the previous ABC News-*Washington Post* poll of July 1985, Israel gained 13 percentage points while the Arab side gained only 2 percentage points.

Arab-Israeli Peacemaking

The Arab-Israeli peacemaking process has progressed little since the 1982 war. During this period, as in the past, the polls have inquired about three specific peacemaking dimensions: peace intentions of the relevant parties; the role of the PLO; and the appropriate forum for negotiations.

During the 1982 war, the ABC News-*Washington Post* poll found that 42 versus 22 percent thought the war and the removal of the PLO from Lebanon "will change things for the better in the Middle East." A poll taken by the same organization in February-March 1983, however, revealed reservations about the peace intentions of both Israelis and Arabs. In response to the question: "Would you say the leaders of Israel sincerely want to be at peace with the Arab nations, or not?", 44 percent said "no," and 38 percent said "yes," with 18 percent expressing no opinion. The public was more skeptical about the peace intentions of Arab leaders. Only 29 percent said the Arab leaders "sincerely want to be at peace with Israel," while 52 percent held the opposite view.

Polls taken by Louis Harris on the same issue have a different emphasis. In 1976, when asked whether the leadership of various countries "is reasonable and will really work for a just peace settlement in the Middle East," respondents ranked Israel first, with 60 percent giving an affirmative answer. The scores for the Arab states were as follows: Egypt, 52 percent; Saudi Arabia, 33 percent; Jordan, 31 percent; and Syria, 21 percent. The same question was repeated in July 1980 and October 1985. A comparison of the results in the three polls demonstrates a gradual increase in the number of respondents who believe in the peace intentions of both Israeli and Arab leaders. In the 1985 poll, Israel was ranked first, with 72 percent saying it has a reasonable leadership. The comparable scores for the Arab countries were: Egypt, 69 percent; Saudi Arabia, 55 percent; and Jordan, 51 percent. The leadership of Syria and the PLO was viewed as reasonable by only 30 and 10 percent respectively.

Even during the unpopular 1982 war, the PLO was never popular in America. In November 1982, 79 percent said in a Harris poll that the PLO is *unfriendly* or an *enemy* of the United States. After the PLO-sponsored terrorist attack on the *Achille Lauro*, 86 percent held the same view.

Polls that were conducted before the 1982 war demonstrate that most Americans perceived the PLO as a terrorist organization uninterested in peace. In the October 1985 Harris poll a substantial 82-10 percent majority said the PLO has "unreasonable leadership that probably will make it impossible to work out a peace settlement."

Americans also have objected to including the PLO and the Soviet Union in an international peace conference. In his October 1985 poll, Harris found that majorities opposed the participation of the PLO (54 percent) and the Soviet Union (69 percent). A majority of 64 to 29 percent did favor including "Palestinian leaders not affiliated with the PLO." United States participation was favored by 71 to 25 percent.

Conclusions

The 1982 war in Lebanon led to no fundamental alteration in the contours of American public opinion toward the Middle East. Trend analysis of several polls, however, suggests that Americans look less favorably on many key Mideast countries, perhaps because they have tired of Mideast violence and terrorism.

The picture of American attitudes is as complicated as the situation itself. What is clear, though, is that the expected decline in support for Israel after the 1982 war never occurred. While Americans still view the leadership of Israel and several other Mideast allies as reasonable and sincerely interested in peace, there is some evidence here that Americans—responding to terrorism—are forming less favorable views toward that region. ☑

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the core database, has minimized *sampling* error, it is much less able to cope with *response* error. People grossly underreport income, sometimes intentionally, or because they truly don't know what their total family income is, or by confusing take-home pay with total income. Still, we can be confident enough in the data to assert that nothing like "polarization" has taken place.

Data specifying the proportions of money income received by families, ranked by fifths and then the top 5 percent, are often used in assessing income distribution. Census Bureau tabulations extending back to 1929 suggest that income inequality was substantially reduced from the Depression through to the end of World War II—presumably in response both to the New Deal policies and the war mobilization. Since World War II, changes in distribution have been modest.

Reviewing the data shown in table 3, the editors of the *Wall Street Journal* concluded recently that "the trend is as flat as Lake Placid . . . . The richest and poorest have kept their relative shares perfectly constant since 1960." I wouldn't quite agree. On their face, the data show a small *decrease* since 1970 in the proportion of money income received by the poorest 40 percent of families, no change in the share of the middle 40 percent, a small *increase* in the share of the top 20 percent, and no change in the proportion received by the top 5 percent. If the *Wall Street Journal* erred in its summation, however, that error pales in comparison to Ehrenreich's in her claim of a "profound change in the class contours of American society."

The surface conclusion sustained by the data may be somewhat misleading. Rosenthal observes that "increasing numbers of single-person families [a development since 1970] can lead to an increase in the proportion of families with low income." But such a development has nothing to do with income inequality, as that condition is normally construed. Similarly, "increasing numbers of dual earning families can lead to an increase in the proportion of families with high earnings . . . ." The position of the rich is not thus affected, but the relative economic position of all families in the top 20 percent is enhanced.

4. *Jobs*. The economy confronted conditions in the 1960s and 1970s that could easily have led to massively high rates of unemployment: an unprecedentedly large number of people were entering the labor force. By the 1970s large numbers of the baby boom generation were looking for jobs. Between 1946 and 1955 alone, more than 34 million people were born in the United States; by 1980 the youngest among them were twenty-five years old, and most were in the labor force.

A second reason for the steep rise in the number of people seeking jobs was the jump in what economists call the "labor force participation rate" of women. Between 1960 and 1964, the number of women in the work force more than doubled.

These statistics tell a simple story (and several complicated ones; see Besharov/Dally p. 48): If the United States had not created millions of new jobs in a short time, the unemployment rate would have gone up like a rocket. Jobs *were* rapidly created, however—at a rate high even by America's historical standards. Between 1970 and 1980, the United States achieved a net increase of about 20 million new jobs, and since 1980 another 10 million net have been added. This dwarfs the European experience in job creation and far surpasses Japan's record.

Our performance since 1970 in creating new jobs is properly seen as an extraordinary achievement. It could not have been cost free, of course. Such a great expansion of the number of entry-level jobs had some dampening effect on entry-level salaries. Still, the huge increase has *not* come disproportionately in low-paying service positions—"McJobs" in Amitai Etzioni's derisive dismissal. On the contrary, as Neal Rosenthal's careful analysis shows, the proportion of total employment *climbed* between 1973 and 1982 in the top and

Table 3

DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY INCOME BY FAMILIES, RANKED BY FIFTHS ACCORDING TO INCOME RECEIVED, 1929–1985

(Percent of aggregate income)

	1929	1935–36	1941	1944	1947	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
Lowest 40%	12.5	13.3	13.6	15.8	16.8	16.4	17.0	17.0	17.4	17.6	17.2	16.7	15.7
Next 40%	33.1	35.0	37.6	38.4	40.1	40.8	41.1	41.8	41.7	41.4	41.7	41.8	41.4
Highest 20%	54.4	51.7	48.8	45.8	43.2	42.8	41.8	41.3	40.9	40.9	41.1	41.6	42.9
Top 5%	30.0	26.5	24.0	20.7	17.5	17.3	16.8	15.9	15.5	15.6	15.5	15.3	15.8

Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States*, 1961 edition, p. 166; *Historical Statistics*, 1976 edition, p. 292; *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1986, p. 452; and *Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States*, 1985, p. 5. It should be noted that the Census Bureau employed a somewhat different methodology for 1929–1944 than for 1947–1985; hence, the two sets of data are not directly comparable.

middle thirds of jobs (arrayed by average weekly earnings) and *decreased* in the bottom third. "This calculation does not show a trend toward bipolarization, but instead indicates a shift of workers from the low to the middle and high earnings levels, with the middle having the greatest increase." Moreover, projections through 1995 suggest that professional, technical, managerial, and skilled craft employment is likely to increase as a proportion of total employment; while the low-income cluster of operatives, laborers, service workers, and farmworkers is projected to decline as a proportion of all employment.

Musings

A kind of Gresham's law seems to apply in social commentary, as shrill and spectacular assessments circulate more freely than more prosaic analyses and often crowd the latter out. How else can one account for the spate of articles on the disappearance of the middle class and the special plight of boomers?

Economic analyst Robert J. Samuelson has observed that, naturally, some of the advocates of the disappearing middle-class view have "their own political agendas; if they could prove the impending collapse of the middle class, then they could justify political actions—trade protectionism, industrial policy—to save the middle class." But Samuelson doesn't think this helps us understand the attention their patently flawed argument has received—and neither do I. We are anxious about our social and economic condition, and surely have plenty of real problems; given this, a neat, coherently extreme interpretation provides a kind of catharsis. And the mass media almost always prefer bold hues to grays.

This Gresham's law extracts its price. As Samuelson put it, "poor information can breed poor government policies." The myth of a disappearing middle class and suffocating baby boomers is just that—a myth—and it is never going to spur constructive attention to the real problems that abound. ☑

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[1] See, for example, Kenneth T. Walsh, et al., "The New-Collar Class," *U.S. News & World Report*, September 16, 1985, pp. 59–63.

[2] Barbara Ehrenreich, "Is the Middle Class Doomed?" *New York Times Magazine*, September 7, 1986, pp. 44 ff., and Lester C. Thurow, *The Zero Sum Solution* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 66, 64–65. Other facets of the argument have been handled by Bob Kuttner, "The Declining Middle," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1983, pp. 60–72; Barry Bluestone and Bruce Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), and Frank S. Levy and Richard C. Michel, "The Economic Future of the Baby Boom," a report prepared at the Urban Institute for the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, December 1985.

[3] Louise B. Russell, *The Baby Boom Generation and the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 119.

[4] Neal R. Rosenthal, "The Shrinking Middle Class: Myth or Reality?" *Monthly Labor Review*, March 1985, p. 4.

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hended and punished. Further, the markets themselves will help to correct the problems associated with insider trading. It is important to remember that every transaction has a buyer and a seller. Dennis Levine's alleged $12 million in profits on insider trading is mirrored by losses of those investors who sold him shares of takeover candidates at prices below their true worth. If the large body of investors in securities markets can become convinced that the terms are too unfair, with a small group of investors holding most of the cards and the information, the cost of putting together such takeover deals will rise to a point where the rich profits are no longer present.

There never seems to be speculation about a possible *rise* in standards of ethical conduct in business. It is, however, interesting to note that were rules of conduct to remain the same while ethical standards rose, the proximate symptoms would be the same—more discussion of unethical behavior—as those that would appear given a fall in ethical standards. I am inclined to believe that something as fundamental as true ethical standards is likely to be constant over time. The amount of talk about ethical standards is not necessarily related to changes in the level of ethical standards.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines ethics as pertaining to morals, and moral as pertaining to character or disposition considered as good or bad, virtuous or vicious. This definition reminds us that it is difficult to escape the conviction that ethical standards are an individual matter.

As the collection of individuals who make up the financial world becomes more heterogeneous, ethical standards are bound to be tested. The immense growth and rapid internationalization of financial markets, along with an unusually large influx of young workers and managers, have provided plenty of new ingredients for the human stew from which ethical standards are distilled.

There is no way to measure something as subjective as ethical standards. It is impossible to know, therefore, whether such standards are rising or falling. The outcry over coruppies and insider trading is a reassertion of limits on behavior. While we cannot say with confidence whether standards are higher or lower, we can certainly say they are still present. Just as the man who cannot experience sadness cannot feel joy, the society that never sees any behavior that is wrong cannot define what it thinks is right. Perhaps the great outcry about current ethical standards is a heartening reminder that those standards are still very much with us. ☑

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
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From Political Poverty to Parity: The Restoration of the Republican Party?

by Richard Wirthlin and John White

The president was extremely disappointed as he listened to the election returns. After six tumultuous years in office, his party had suffered its worst defeat. Senate contests were especially discouraging, with the majority party losing eight seats. In the House of Representatives, nearly every congressional candidate the president endorsed had been rejected. The opposition rejoiced, believing that the president's party had reached its plateau. Talk of a partisan realignment became muted, and several members of the opposition—having won landslide victories—envisioned themselves as the next occupant of the Oval Office. That's the way it was—*in 1938*.

Nearly fifty years later, another election has passed and, once again, Republican and Democratic analysts are jousting for position in their own postelection "mini-balloting": namely, who won? Both sides have claimed victory. Democrats are elated by their return to power in the U.S. Senate, while Republicans tout their successes in the gubernatorial elections.

Midterm elections have frequently coincided with challenges to incumbent presidents. The 1938 contest, for example, coincided with a decline in Franklin Roosevelt's popularity and a major domestic crisis—the so-called packing of the Supreme Court. As this is written (in early December 1986), Ronald Reagan faces the most serious crisis of his presidency. The eventual effect of America's arms sales to Iran and the diversion of some proceeds to the Nicaraguan Contras is unknown. In the immediate aftermath of these disclosures, Ronald Reagan's job approval rating declined to 47 percent, its lowest point in three years. A Decision/Making Information (D/M/I) survey taken on December 14, 1986 shows Reagan's job rating at 54 percent. (See Opinion Roundup, p 37.)

On the other hand, Reagan retains considerable political capital. A November 28, 1986 D/M/I poll showed that nearly eight in ten Americans continue to like Reagan personally. Moreover, a majority approve of his policies generally. The White House crisis, with its potential for reversing Republican fortunes, complicates our analysis. But the Iranian/Contra arms affair occurs after six years of dramatic change in American politics.

"You've Come A Long Way, Baby"

Both parties can find reason to be pleased by the 1986 election results but neither can claim victory. A late October D/M/I poll gave the GOP a 37 percent share of the electorate, the Democrats, 42 percent, and Independents, 21 percent. Thermometer readings taken just prior to this year's midterm election, where zero degrees represents very cold and negative feelings and 100 degrees very warm and positive feelings, placed the Democrats at 56 degrees and the Republicans at 55 degrees.

This is an impressive accomplishment given the parties' positions little more than a decade ago. In 1974, Republican identifiers numbered about a quarter of the electorate, while Democratic backers totaled nearly half of it. Voters, particularly after Watergate, were skeptical about the Republican party's future. When asked how the GOP would fare in the next five presidential elections, nearly a third believed the Republican nominees would win none or just one of the contests.[1] (They have won two of the three so far.)

A 1974 Market Opinion Research poll provided some grim news about specific issues, too: only one in five respondents selected the GOP as the party best able to control government spending and hold down taxes; one in ten thought the Republicans could reduce inflation and unemployment. A Gallup poll found nearly half the Republicans believing that neither party could control inflation. The GOP, it seemed, was following the Whig party on the road to oblivion.

Two factors changed the course and set the party on a path toward parity with the Democrats.

The Indispensable Man

Evaluating the Democrats' selection of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, H.L. Mencken wrote: "Here was a great convention . . . nominating the weakest candidate before it." In 1980, many Democrats said the same about Ronald Reagan. Jimmy Carter welcomed his nomination, believing he could portray the ex-actor as dumb, dangerous, and deceptive. Voters refused to cast Reagan in that role, however, choosing him over Carter by a substantial margin.

Like Franklin Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan has not conformed to expectations. Reagan's approval scores rose markedly from January 1983, when a plurality disapproved of his handling of the presidency, to a 69 percent favorable rating in D/M/I's 1986 postelection study. (See Opinion Roundup, page 37.)

Ronald Reagan's enormous popularity has provided the Republican party with an extraordinary resource. When a national convention designates its candidate for president, that person automatically becomes associated in the voter's mind with the party he or she represents. That can have positive or negative connotations, depending on that leader's performance. A 1980 postelection D/M/I survey, for example, found 16 percent of the respondents saying they disliked the Democratic party because of Jimmy Carter's poor record. Only one percent felt ill-disposed toward the Republican party because it had selected Ronald Reagan.

A poll conducted by William Hamilton last June found that 54 percent of all Americans associate Ronald Reagan with the Republican party. Reagan's heretofore extraordinary popularity, then, has been a major asset for the Republicans. The same survey reveals that the association game doesn't work nearly so well for the Democrats. Forty-six percent link that party with its martyred leader John F. Kennedy, but fewer than 10 percent connect it to a current Democratic spokesman.

This association has had a significant impact upon the very young. Those aged seventeen to twenty years give the GOP an impressive 16-point edge over the Democrats. Much of this is undoubtedly because the nation's young, simply because of their youth, have fewer and different memories. A teenager who turned seventeen in 1986 was *born* during Richard Nixon's first year as president in 1969. Watergate occurred when that teen was a toddler. Democratic analyst Mark Siegel argues that young people "identify the Democratic party with Jimmy Carter and the Republican party with Ronald Reagan." And when they compare the two chief executives, young voters prefer Reagan.

Reagan's ability to recruit makes him the Republican party's indispensable team player. Keeping the new recruits will hinge on the continued effectiveness of that party's leadership, its decisions about future spokesmen, and, above all, its ability to sustain a new national agenda.

A New National Agenda

In the United States, changing the menu of issues that separate the two parties' visions is not easy. Even a popular president cannot do it alone. Dwight D. Eisenhower, for example, received substantial backing from voters in 1952 and again in 1956. Yet he left almost no imprint on the party.

Establishing a new political dialogue requires an aura of crisis, an action-oriented president, an electorate that desires change, and an opposition party reluctant to sacrifice previous principles of governance. During the 1930s, for example, the Great Depression seared a generation of Americans. Elected to the presidency with a mandate for change, Franklin Roosevelt cobbled together the New Deal—an array of federal programs designed to enhance the self-esteem and power of the "little guy." Subsequent Democratic presidents faced different circumstances, yet preserved the essence of his programs.

Franklin Roosevelt's dramatic transformation of the relationship between citizen and government, and the predilection of his successors to continue his policies created a frame of reference by which the parties were judged. Voters associated the Democrats with the "little guy," while Republicans were seen as "fat cats." A 1951 Gallup poll found most respondents would tell a new voter that the Democratic party stood for the "working man" while the Republican party promoted "the privileged few."

For nearly two generations, FDR's framework held. Just after Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, 23 percent said what they most disliked about the Republican party was its support for the well-to-do. When asked why they liked the Democrats, 33 percent answered "they care more about people."

Today, the standards by which Americans judge the parties have changed dramatically. The origins of the change were a series of shocks that jarred the American psyche: the assassination of a president; a war that ended in failure; a political scandal at home; an economy strangled by an oil embargo and battered by inflation. Public opinion surveys tracked the disturbing consequences of each shock—a rise in cynicism, a crisis of confidence, and diminished support for the presidency.

For these reasons, Reagan's victory in 1980 coincided with a moment in history when the public was

(Continued on page 58)

OPINION ROUNDUP

1986 ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

December 17, 1986

One of the most important resources of any American president is his standing with the people. Even when his standing is high (as Reagan's was before the November 1986 election), he doesn't always get what he wants. The loss of eight Senate Republicans attests to that. But when that standing is depleted, he finds it exceedingly hard to lead, especially given the opposition he must always confront in our system of separation of powers.

It isn't surprising then, that the drop in President Reagan's approval ratings over the past month, since the Iranian arms controversy broke with such fury, has been so much discussed—or that the magnitude of the drop is seen as a significant political issue. Nor should it be surprising that we see in the new poll results a familiar pattern of seemingly contradictory impulses in Americans' minds.

Unfortunately for those who like their answers neat and tidy, the polls of the last month give us fairly complex answers to the question of how much Reagan's standing has been diminished. One regularly asked question—Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?—yields results that seem a model of clarity. The president's ratings have dropped 20 percentage points or so from their October highs—a huge proportion by any standard of comparison. Other questions give significantly different readings, however, and we need to look at the total mix.

The survey taken December 9-11 for *U.S. News* and Cable News Network included the standard overall approval question cited above, and it got answers in line with what other respected national polls are showing. Forty-six percent of those interviewed said they approved of Reagan's performance, down from the 68 percent he received after the Iceland summit and 66 percent in the October 21-24 poll by the same news organizations. Even here, however, the story is more complicated. The current approval rating of 46 percent is 12 points under the level the poll found in August of this year, and only 7 or 8 points below what Gallup was recording for the first six months of 1984—a time when the prevailing view had Ronald Reagan striding across the American political scene like a Colossus. In general, Reagan's current approval ratings are not out of line with those of the first term.

Other questions suggest that even the October to December drop may not be as great overall as what the standard approval/disapproval question alone indicates. Surveys show, for example, that the proportion of Americans now saying they like Ronald Reagan personally (about 75 percent in a December Gallup poll) is down only slightly (5 points or so) from what it was in the summer and early fall. Similarly, the proportion saying they support "most of his policies" has declined only modestly. The *U.S. News*/CNN survey asked respondents to rank Ronald Reagan in comparison to other presidents since the New Deal, Roosevelt through Carter: 35 percent called Reagan "the very best" or "better than average," 40 percent "about average," and just 23 percent "worse than average" or "the very worst." The only previous national asking of this question I have found was by Louis Harris and Associates way back in February 1982, when 34 percent ranked Reagan above average, 35 percent average, and 29 percent below par. This was too early in the Reagan presidency, though, to permit meaningful comparison. One state survey, the Connecticut Poll, that asked the question in September 1985, July 1986, and then in December, found only a slight shift on this comparison measure: from 39 percent rating Reagan above average, and 19 percent below average in September to 37 and 19 percent, respectively, in the December survey.

A key to understanding the somewhat contradictory public evaluations of the Reagan presidency is recognizing many people have mixed views about the seriousness of the Iranian disclosures. One group is outraged, another thinks the controversy has been blown out of proportion, but a huge middle group is being tugged in both those directions. They clearly are not happy about what they have been hearing of administration action in the affair or the president's personal role. But they are not now outraged, and they have not been led to wholesale revisions of their views about Reagan's worth as president.

The *U.S. News*/CNN survey provides new information on how intensely different segments of the public are reacting to what they hear. Respondents were asked to tell surveyors from the Roper Organization how upset they were about the Iran/Contras developments. "If you think it is one of the most serious and shocking things in your memory, give it a ten, if you think it is rather minor, a tempest in a teapot, give it a one." Twenty-four percent ranked the disclosures low in importance (points 1-3), 41 percent in the mid range, while 33 percent said the disclosures were very serious (points 8-10). The partisan differences here are only moderately strong now. Twenty-five percent of Republicans, 26 percent of Independents, and 44 percent of Democrats described the disclosures as very serious.

The big middle moves back and forth depending on precisely what they are being asked to assess. For the most part, they don't think the president has been telling them the whole truth. The *U.S. News*/CNN survey included a question that began by noting that Senator Ernest Hollings "said last week that President Reagan knows a lot more than he has been admitting. Do you think Senator Hollings is right, or that President Reagan is telling all he knows?" Sixty-five percent said that Hollings is right, yet many who doubt Reagan on this still give him generally high marks for integrity. Thus, when the CBS News/*New York Times* poll of December 7-8 asked respondents whether they believed that "Ronald Reagan has more honesty and integrity than most people in public life?", 54 percent said that he does, just 35 percent said he does not.

About two-thirds of those interviewed in the *U.S. News*/CNN poll disagreed that "it is time to put this behind us and move on to other critical issues facing the nation." They want the issue examined and the truth revealed. But many at the same time want to see the controversy kept within bounds and a sense of proportion maintained. This helps explain some of the emerging frustration over press coverage. "President Reagan has blamed press coverage for creating much of this controversy. Do you agree that it is largely the press's fault, or don't you agree that it is due to the press?" Forty-six percent said that it was due to the press. Forty-eight percent said that it wasn't.

Right now Americans in the ambivalent middle are controlling the overall shape of public response to the Iranian disclosures and they account for the contradictions the polls are showing. They don't think the president has done well with any facet of the matter. And they don't think he has given them a full and straight accounting. As a result, Reagan's job performance ratings have dropped sharply. But they still like this president, still support his general approach to governing, and of course, still want him—as they want every president—to succeed.

Everett Ladd
Senior Editor

THE SENATE



	1932	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	48	50	52	54	56	58
Democratic	68%	72%	79%	72%	69%	60%	59%	47%	56%	51%	49%	50%	51%	65%
Republican	36	26	16	24	29	39	40	53	44	49	50	49	49	35

	60	62	64	66	68	70	72	74	76	78	80	82	84	86
Democratic	65%	67%	68%	64%	57%	54%	56%	60%	61%	58%	46%	46%	47%	55%
Republican	35	33	32	36	43	44	42	37	38	41	53	54	53	45

Source: For 1932 to 1984, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1986; for 1986, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 8, 1986, p. 2803.

WINNERS . . . AND LOSERS

	WINNERS . . .	LOSERS	
74%	Ford (D-KY)*	Andrews (R-KY)	26%
74%	Inouye (D-HI)*	Hutchinson (R-HI)	26%
73%	Garn (R-UT)*	Oliver (D-UT)	27%
70%	Dole (R-KS)*	MacDonald (D-KS)	30%
66%	Grassley (R-IA)*	Roehrick (D-IA)	34%
66%	Rudman (R-NH)*	Peabody (D-NH)	34%
65%	Dixon (D-IL)*	Koehler (R-IL)	34%
65%	Dodd (D-CT)*	Eddy (R-CT)	35%
64%	Leahy (D-VT)*	Snelling (R-VT)	35%
64%	Hollings (D-SC)*	McMaster (R-SC)	36%
63%	Packwood (R-OR)*	Bauman (D-OR)	37%
62%	Bumpers (D-AR)*	Hutchinson (R-AR)	38%
62%	Glenn (D-OH)*	Kindness (R-OH)	38%
61%	Mikulski (D-MD)	Chavez (R-MD)	39%
61%	Quayle (R-IN)*	Long (D-IN)	39%
60%	McCain (R-AZ)	Kimball (D-AZ)	40%
57%	D'Amato (R-NY)*	Green (D-NY)	41%
57%	Specter (R-PA)*	Edgar (D-PA)	43%
55%	Graham (D-FL)	Hawkins (R-FL)*	45%
55%	Murkowski (R-AK)*	Olds (D-AK)	45%
54%	Nickles (R-OK)*	Jones (D-OK)	46%
53%	Bond (R-MO)	Woods (D-MO)	47%
53%	Breaux (D-LA)	Moore (R-LA)	47%
52%	Kasten (R-WI)*	Garvey (D-WI)	48%
52%	Daschle (D-SD)	Abdnor (R-SD)*	48%
52%	Sanford (D-NC)	Broyhill (R-NC)*	48%
52%	Symms (R-ID)*	Evans (D-ID)	48%
51%	Reid (D-NV)	Santini (R-NV)	45%
51%	Adams (D-WA)	Gorton (R-WA)*	49%
51%	Cranston (D-CA)*	Zschau (R-CA)	49%
51%	Fowler (D-GA)	Mattingly (R-GA)*	49%
51%	Shelby (D-AL)	Denton (R-AL)*	49%
51%	Wirth (D-CO)	Kramer (R-CO)	49%
50%	Conrad (D-ND)	Andrews (R-ND)*	50%

COMING UP IN 1988
14 Republicans
19 Democrats

Note: * = incumbent.

Source: *Washington Post*, November 6, 1986, p. A52.

THE HOUSE



	1932	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	48	50	52	54	56	58	60	62	64	66	68	70	72	74	76	78	80	82*	84	86*
Democratic	55%	54%	56%	49%	51%	46%	51%	44%	52%	49%	50%	53%	51%	56%	54%	52%	57%	51%	50%	53%	52%	58%	56%	54%	50%	56%	50%	53%
Republican	41	42	40	47	46	51	47	53	46	49	49	47	49	43	45	47	42	48	48	45	46	41	42	45	48	44	50	47

Source: 1932-1970: *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975), p. 1084. 1972: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1977* (p. 500). 1974-1978: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979* (p. 505). 1980: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981* (p. 484). 1982: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 6, 1982 (Unofficial results). *Based only on contested races. 1984: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 10, 1984, pp. 2923-30. For 1986, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 15, 1986, p. 2896 (unofficial returns in opposed races only).



Note: In 1982 in 10 unopposed races where figures were unavailable, we have estimated the vote to avoid serious distortion. For 1986, results are based on unofficial returns in opposed races only.

Source: For 1978, *Public Opinion*, November/December 1978, p. 25. For 1982, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 6, 1982, and Secretaries of State offices and Election Boards. For 1986, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 15, 1986, p. 2896.

Polling the

CBS
1978

Question: Who did you just vote for in the election for U.S. House of Representatives?

CBS/*NYT*
1982

Question: In the election for U.S. House of Representatives in this district, who did you just vote for?



Note: Sample size = 8,933 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News, November 7, 1978.

Note: Sample size = 5,785 voters in opposed districts as they left voting booths.
* = less than .5%.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 2, 1982.

Voters

CBS/*NYT*
1986

Question: In the election for U.S. House of Representatives, who did you just vote for. . . . the Democrat, or . . . the Republican?

ABC
1986

Question: Which candidate for Congress did you vote for?



Note: Sample size = 8,997 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1986.

Note: Sample size = 14,846 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

Election Boxscore

	1976		1978		1980		1982		1984		1986	
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES												
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
Total	292	143	276	159	243	192	269	166	252	182	258	177
Women	13	5	11	5	10	9	12	9	11	11	13	11
Blacks	15	0	15	0	17	0	21	0	20	0	23	0
SENATE												
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
Total	61	38	58	41	46	53	46	54	47	53	55	45
Women	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	2	0	2	1	1
Blacks	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GOVERNORS [1]												
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
Total	37	12	32	18	27	23	34	16	34	16	26	24
MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES [2]												
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
Total	5,128	2,370	4,762	2,680	4,483	2,918	4,643	2,734	4,404	3,057	4,474	2,924
Women	688		774		887		966		1,087		NA	
Blacks	295		307		318		337		384		405	
PROPORTIONS OF STATE LEGISLATORS [3]												
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
	68	31	64	36	60	39	63	37	59	41	60	40
CONTROL OF STATE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS BY PARTY [3]												
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
National	80	18	68	27	63	35	71	26	65	31	66	29
Northeast	13	5	12	6	10	8	12	6	11	7	12	5
South	32	0	32	0	31	1	32	0	31	1	31	1
North Central	17	5	11	10	10	12	14	7	11	11	12	10
West	18	6	13	11	12	14	13	13	12	12	11	13
STATES WITH BOTH LEGISLATIVE HOUSES AND GOVERNOR OF THE SAME PARTY												
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
	29	1	20	4	17	7	23	4	18	4	14	6

Note: [1] **For 1986,** in Vermont, Madeleine Kunin is counted as a Democratic victory. Because no contestant received a majority, the election will be decided by the state legislature.

[2] Nebraska excluded from legislative house calculation because it is a unicameral nonpartisan legislative system. The data on state legislatures are the latest available at time of publication. They were provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Women's Education Fund/UPI, and the Joint Center for Political Studies.

[3] **For 1984,** excludes Montana lower house which is split evenly 50 Democrats, 50 Republicans; and New Mexico upper house which is split evenly 21 Democrats, 21 Republicans. **For 1986,** excludes Montana upper house which is split evenly 25 Democrats, 25 Republicans; New Mexico upper house split 21 Democrats, 21 Republicans; and Vermont lower house which split 75 Democrats, 75 Republicans.

Source: For 1976 and 1978, *Public Opinion*, Nov./Dec. 1978, p. 25; **For 1980 and 1982,** *Public Opinion*, Dec./Jan. 1983, p. 26; **For 1984,** *Public Opinion*, Dec./Jan. 1985, p. 26; **For 1986,** Members of Congress—*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Nov. 8, 1986, p. 2803; Governors—*National Journal*, Nov. 8, 1986, p. 2713; Members of State Legislatures—*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Nov. 15, 1986, p. 2894-95 and the Joint Center for Political Studies and The Center for American Women and Politics, Rutgers University; Proportions of State Legislators and Control of State Legislative Chambers by Party—*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Nov. 15, 1986, p. 2894-95; States with both Legislative House and Governor of the same party, *National Journal*, Nov. 8, 1986, p. 2713.

1954-1986: HOUSE RACES DECLINE IN COMPETITIVENESS



Note: Seats in the House (1954) = 106 South, 329 Non-South; (1986) 116 South, 319 Non-South.

Source: For 1954, *America Votes*; for 1986, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 8, 1986.

TURNOUT

Once again after the 1986 election, a spate of articles on voter turnout appeared. The weakening of party loyalties is part of the reason for low turnout as is the decline in competitiveness of House races shown above. We won't know the turnout for contested races until spring when absentee ballot tallies are completed. Our calculation is based on methodology described below.



	President	House		President	House
1932	52%	50%	1960	63%	59%
1934	—	41	1962	—	45
1936	56	54	1964	62	58
1938	—	44	1966	—	45
1940	59	55	1968	61	55
1942	—	33	1970	—	44
1944	56	53	1972	55	51
1946	—	37	1974	—	36
1948	51	48	1976	54	50
1950	—	41	1978	—	35
1952	62	58	1980	53	47
1954	—	42	1982	—	38
1956	59	56	1984	53	48
1958	—	43	1986*	—	35

Note: *Based on contested races only. Population is resident population 21 years and over, 1932-1970, and 18 and over thereafter, including Armed Forces. Prior to 1960, excludes Alaska and Hawaii.

Source: For 1932-1984, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1985*, p. 255; for 1986, calculations made by the Roper Center using voting figures from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 8, 1986.

Residents of voting age	177,673,000
Not eligible	
District of Columbia residents	— 480,000
Voting age population in uncontested districts	— 25,191,000
Population eligible to vote in contested districts	152,002,000
Actual vote in contested races thus far	53,464,000

Note: An accurate picture of turnout is a complex matter. Even this calculation does not give a complete picture. The base widely used by the Census Bureau and others includes, for example, at least 14 million people (mostly aliens) who by law can't vote.

Gender



Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1986.

In only one state, Oregon, were female voters significantly more likely to vote for a female candidate.

	Male		Female	
	D	**R**	**D**	**R**
	Vote for Governor			
NE				
CT	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
MD	83	17	85	15
NH	31	69	42	58
NY	38	62	45	55
PA	50	50	54	46
VT*	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
NC				
IL	38	62	43	57
IA	51	49	48	52
SD	51	49	45	55
SO				
AL	42	58	45	55
FL	45	51	52	48
GA	70	30	80	20
TX	44	56	50	50
WE				
AZ*	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
CA	37	63	46	54
CO	61	39	62	38
ID	44	56	50	50
NV	72	28	79	21
OR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Vote for Senator			
NE				
CT	64%	36%	74%	26%
MD	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
NH	46	54	53	47
NY	65	35	74	26
PA	40	60	47	53
VT	63	37	67	33
NC				
IL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
IA	33	67	34	66
MO	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
ND	46	54	54	46
SD	52	48	54	46
SO				
AL	47	53	51	49
FL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
GA	48	52	51	49
LA	50	50	57	43
NC	50	50	54	46
WE				
AZ	40	60	46	54
CA	49	51	55	45
CO	49	51	55	45
ID	47	53	52	48
NV	48	52	58	42
OR	38	63	34	66
WA	49	51	53	47

Note: *All numbers here are recalculated except those where a third party candidate was involved.

Source: Survey by CBS News, November 4, 1986.

Age

WHAT THEY SAID IN SEPTEMBER

☐ Democratic ▨ Republican ☐ Independent





Party ID	Democratic	Republican	Independent
18-29	28%	32%	39%
30-39	36%	30%	34%
40-49	37%	26%	37%
50-59	36%	31%	33%
60 and over	45%	30%	24%

Note: Survey = 8,648 registered voters.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 18-27, 1986.

WHAT THEY DID IN NOVEMBER

☐ Democratic ▨ Republican ☐ Independent









Party ID	Democratic	Republican	Independent
18-29	43%	37%	20%
30-39	44%	33%	23%
40-49	43%	35%	23%
50-59	46%	33%	21%
60 and over	48%	36%	15%

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

Income



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1986.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

Region by Race



Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

ABC News

Vote for Governor

	White		**Black**	
	D	**R**	**D**	**R**
AL	27%	73%	97%	3%
AR	61	39	96	4
FL	46	54	79	21
GA	66	34	90	10
OK	46	54	81	19
SC	35	65	96	4
TN	52	48	93	7
TX	45	55	93	7

Vote for Senator

	White		**Black**	
	D	**R**	**D**	**R**
AL	37	63	94	6
AR	58	42	95	5
FL	54	46	82	18
GA	46	54	87	13
KY	77	23	96	4
LA	39	61	92	8
NC	44	56	94	6
OK	43	57	71	29
SC	57	43	98	2

CBS News

Vote for Governor

	White		**Black**	
	D	**R**	**D**	**R**
AL	31	69	96	4
FL	44	56	89	11
GA	71	29	90	10
TX	40	60	78	22

Vote for Senator

	White		**Black**	
	D	**R**	**D**	**R**
AL	38	62	93	7
FL	53	47	83	17
GA	40	60	81	19
LA	39	61	88	12
NC	43	57	92	8

Source: Surveys by ABC News and CBS News, November 4, 1986.

Vital Signs,

	House Vote				Senate Vote				Governor Vote			
	ABC		CBS/*NYT*		ABC		CBS/*NYT*		ABC		CBS/*NYT*	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
By education:												
Less than high school	68%	32%	60%	40%	64%	36%	54%	46%	66%	34%	60%	40%
High school graduate	59	41	56	44	53	47	50	50	57	43	55	45
Some college	53	47	51	49	50	50	48	52	51	49	51	49
College graduate	49	51	51	49	48	52	51	49	48	52	52	48
Postgraduate	57	43			54	46			57	43		
By ideology:												
Liberal (17%)*			73	27			72	28			77	23
Moderate (46%)			59	41			56	44			59	41
Conservative (34%)			35	65			30	70			33	67
(from checklist): **												
Politically liberal (13%)	82	18			83	17			80	20		
Politically conservative (23%)	30	70			27	73			51	49		
By special groups:												
Born-again Christian (20%)	48	52			46	54			46	54		
Strong feminist (9%)	74	26			74	26			71	29		
Strong environmentalist (15%)	65	35			64	36			66	34		
Factory worker (6%)	67	33			62	38			64	36		
Young professional (22%)	55	45			53	47			55	45		
Retired (15%)	57	43			53	47			54	46		
Union household	72	28	65	35	68	32	57	43	69	31	64	36
By religion:												
Protestant	48	52	48	52	47	53	46	54	47	53	44	56
White Protestant	44	56	44	56	43	57	41	59	43	57	42	58
Black Protestant	92	8	87	13	92	8	81	19	91	9	86	14
Catholic	62	38	55	45	55	45	53	47	61	39	59	41
White Catholic	60	40	53	47	53	47	51	49	59	41	56	44
Jewish	80	20	69	31	72	28	69	31	71	29	63	37
No religion (7%)	66	34			65	35			67	33		
Evangelicals (8%)			31	69			30	70			29	71
By ethnicity:												
German/Austrian (25%)	48	52			44	56			47	53		
English/Scottish/Welsh (30%)	48	52			46	54			45	55		
Irish Protestant (5%)	52	48			52	48			51	49		
Irish Catholic (6%)	61	39			55	45			60	40		
Polish/Slavic (7%)	68	32			59	41			66	34		
Italian (5%)	56	44			53	47			60	40		
Scandinavian (5%)	52	48			49	51			53	47		
Hispanic (3%)	74	26			67	33			71	29		
Afro-American/Black (7%)	94	6			91	9			89	11		
By occupation:												
Professional/Managerial (29%)			51	49			51	49			53	47
White collar (14%)			55	45			53	47			54	46
Blue collar (14%)			57	43			54	46			59	41
Farmer (2%)			57	43			52	48			44	56
No job (2%)			64	36			61	39			72	28
Housewife												

Note: * Numbers in parentheses are percent in the sample. ** The categories "politically liberal" and "politically conservative" and all the special groups were obtained from the following ABC exit poll question: "Do any of the following describe you? Check all that apply."

Source: Surveys by ABC News and CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1986.

Vital Statistics

	Party best able to handle main problem		Party ID					
	ABC		ABC			CBS/NYT		
	D	R	D	R	I	D	R	I
By education:								
Less than high school	65%	35%	65%	25%	11%	54%	22%	24%
High school graduate	54	46	51	31	18	44	31	26
Some college	45	55	41	37	22	36	35	28
College graduate	40	60	35	43	22	32	44	25
Postgraduate	49	51	40	34	26	40	32	28
By ideology:								
Liberal (17%)*						63	14	22
Moderate (46%)						42	26	31
Conservative (34%)						24	55	21
(from checklist): **								
Politically liberal (13%)	82	18	65	9	26			
Politically conservative (23%)	18	82	19	61	21			
By special groups:								
Born-again Christian (20%)	41	59	42	41	17			
Strong feminist (9%)	72	28	58	19	23			
Strong environmentalist (15%)	59	41	46	25	29			
Factory worker (6%)	62	38	57	25	18			
Young professional (22%)	46	54	41	36	23			
Retired (15%)	52	48	49	34	17			
Union household	65	35	59	21	20	47	28	25
By religion:								
Protestant	41	59	39	43	19	32	45	23
White Protestant	37	63	35	45	20	29	46	24
Black Protestant	88	12	84	6	10	77	9	14
Catholic	54	46	52	27	21	45	26	28
White Catholic	53	47	50	29	22	43	28	30
Jewish	71	29	61	17	22	54	13	33
No religion	63	37	44	24	32	40	22	38
Evangelicals (8%)								
By ethnicity:								
German/Austrian (25%)	41	59	36	42	22			
English/Scottish/Welsh (30%)	39	61	36	44	20			
Irish Protestant (5%)	46	54	44	37	20			
Irish Catholic (6%)	56	44	51	26	24			
Polish/Slavic (7%)	60	40	53	23	24			
Italian (5%)	48	52	47	31	21			
Scandinavian (5%)	46	54	39	39	22			
Hispanic (3%)	66	34	70	18	12			
Afro-American/Black (7%)	90	10	86	4	9			
By occupation:								
Professional/Managerial (29%)						35	37	28
White collar (14%)						40	33	27
Blue collar (14%)						45	26	29
Farmers	47	53	43	42	15	41	36	23
No job (2%)						55	20	25
Housewife						41	37	21

Split Ticket Voting

Question: In thinking about how you vote in elections, would you describe yourself as a loyal Republican who votes mostly for Republican candidates, a loyal Democrat who votes mostly for Democratic candidates or as switching between the two parties?



Note: * = less than .5%. "Do not vote" and "Not sure" are calculated out.
Source: Survey by Time/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, September 8-10, 1986.









Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

IN 1986...

Twenty-five states had races for both senator and governor. In eleven, the public elected a governor from one party, and a senator from the other.

A number of these showed significant splits:

- In New York, 57% voted for Republican D'Amato for Senate, 65% for Democrat Cuomo for governor.
- In California, 62% voted for Republican Deukmejian for governor, only 49% voted for Republican Zschau for Senate.
- In Illinois, 57% voted for Republican Thompson for governor, 65% voted for Democrat Dixon for Senate.
- In South Carolina, 52% voted for Republican Daniel for governor, 64% for Democrat Hollings for senator.

In Florida and Alabama, incumbent Republican senators were defeated by Democrats, while control of the governor's mansions in both states switched from the Democrats to the Republicans.

AT THE STATE LEVEL, DIVIDED CONTROL TOO

[illegible]

Note: In 1952, Nebraska excluded because it has a nonpartisan legislature. In 1986, Minnesota and Nebraska excluded because they have nonpartisan legislatures.

Source: "Elections Dash GOP Dreams of Realignment," Walter Dean Burnham, *Wall Street Journal*, November 26, 1986.

Party ID

Question: In politics today, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?



1986	Dem.	Rep.	Ind.
Jan.	34%	32%	34%
Feb.	32	32	36
April	34	34	32
June	34	35	30
July	34	35	31
Aug.	33	33	34
Sept.	31	36	33
Oct.	34	35	31
Nov.	35	31	34
Dec.	34	28	38

Note: "Other (vol.)" and "Not sure" calculated out. For April, we averaged the results of two surveys; for October, we averaged the results of three surveys.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, latest that of December 1-2, 1986.

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, an Independent, or what?



1986	Dem.	Rep.	Ind.
Jan.	39%	31%	31%
Feb.	38	28	34
April	42	29	29
June	39	31	30
Aug.	34	32	34
Sept.	37	30	33
Oct.	35	30	36
Dec.	37	30	33

Note: "Other" is coded with "Independent." Normally "Other" = 1 or 2%. "Don't know/No answer" calculated out. For April survey, sample size = 704.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of December 7-8, 1986.

Question: Are you a Democrat, Republican, or what?



1986	Dem.	Rep.	Ind.
April	46%	31%	24%
May	42	26	27
July	43	24	28
Sept.	35	25	40
Oct.	38	32	30
Nov.	41	25	35

Note: For the April survey, "Independent" was a volunteered response and "Other" was 13%. "Other" was calculated out for all the surveys. Sample size = 806 for October survey.

Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, latest that of November 10-12, 1986.

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



1986	Dem.	Rep.	Ind.
Jan.	39%	33%	28%
April	40	32	27
July	40	32	28
Aug.	42	31	27
Sept.	39	28	33
Oct.	39	33	28
Dec.	33	30	37

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of December 4-5, 1986.

How the Parties Measured Up in 1986

WHERE THE DEMOCRATS LEAD . . .

Handling problems of farmers[1]	+29	52D	23R
Handling problems of farmers[2]	+18	43D	25R
Cares about needs and problems of farmers[2]	+25	42D	17R
Cares about needs and problems of people over 65[3]	+27	53D	26R
Controlling defense spending[4]	+26	57D	31R
Cares about needs and problems of people like yourself[1]	+26	52D	26R
Cares about needs and problems of people like yourself[3]	+10	44D	34R
Increasing rights of women and minorities[5]	+23	38D	15R
Giving women better breaks on jobs, pay, opportunities[4]	+20	51D	31R
Providing jobs for unemployed[5]	+17	37D	20R
Cares about needs and problems of women[3]	+17	42D	25R
Protecting the environment[4]	+17	49D	32R
Traditional family values[1]	+12	45D	33R
Controlling the nuclear arms race[4]	+11	47D	36R
Toxic waste[1]	+ 9	33D	24R
Cares about needs and problems of people under 30[3]	+ 8	38D	30R
Out of war/World War III[4]	+ 5	45D	40R
Give taxpayer a better break[4]	+ 3	45D	42R
Handle unemployment[1]	+ 3	40D	37R
Best represents your views and interests in state capital[6]	+ 3	47D	44R
Out of war/World War III[5]	+ 2	28D	26R

WHERE THE DEMOCRATS DON'T

Handle religious problems and decline of moral values[7]	— 1	25D	26R
Cut unemployment rate[4]	— 2	42D	44R
Dealing with the deficit[8]	— 2	41D	43R
Dealing with the deficit[5]	— 5	23D	28R
Dealing with the deficit[4]	— 9	38D	47R
Dealing with the deficit[9]	—10	32D	42R
Out of war/World War III[10]	— 3	36D	39R
Out of war/World War III[11]	— 5	29D	34R
Out of war/World War III[1]	— 9	31D	40R
Best represents your views/interests in Washington[6]	— 4	43D	47R
Cutting social spending[4]	— 5	39D	44R
Best represents your ideas about how U.S. should be governed[12]	— 6	30D	36R
Party best able to handle main problems[8]	— 6	40D	46R
Party best able to handle main problems[19]	— 6	40D	46R
Party best able to handle main problems[20]	— 6	38D	44R
Most important problems facing the country[13]	— 5	28D	33R
Most important problems facing the country[3]	— 5	30D	35R
Most important problems facing the country[1]	— 7	30D	37R
Problems facing country[5]	— 7	21D	28R
Inspiring confidence from people[4]	— 8	39D	47R
Protect American industry against foreign competition[1]	— 2	35D	37R
Protect American industry against foreign competition[3]	—16	28D	44R
Cares about the needs and problems of men[3]	—11	28D	39R
Prosperity[1]	—10	35D	45R
Prosperity[11]	—11	30D	41R
Prosperity[4]	—11	38D	49R
Prosperity[5]	—14	23D	37R
Prosperity[14]	—18	33D	51R
Drug problem[15]	—12	17D	29R
Drug problem[1]	—20	18D	38R
Dealing with the Soviet Union[5]	—17	20D	37R
Inflation[5]	—14	18D	32R
Inflation[4]	—22	33D	55R
Reform income tax system[16]	—18	24D	42R
Reform income tax system[17]	—19	25D	44R
Reduce deficit[18]	—20	27D	47R
Build up defenses[4]	—31	29D	60R

Source: 1 = CBS/*NYT* 9/28-10/1/86 (probable electorate); 2 = CBS/*NYT* 2/19-20/86; 3 = CBS/*NYT* 4/6-10/86; 4 = Harris 4/5-8/86; 5 = *Time*/YCS 9/8-10/86; 6 = ABC/*Post* 4/24-28/86; 7 = *LA Times* 7/9-14/86; 8 = ABC/*Post* 2/6-12/86; 9 = *LA Times* 2/20-25/86; 10 = Gallup 4/7-10/86; 11 = Gallup 10/24-27/86; 12 = *U.S. News*/CNN 8/22-26/86; 13 = Gallup 1/10-13/86; 14 = Gallup 3/7-10/86; 15 = CBS/*NYT* 8/18-21/86; 16 = NBC/*WSJ* 6/2-3/86; 17 = NBC/*WSJ* 8/11-12/86; 18 = NBC/*WSJ* 2/6-7/86; 19 = ABC/*Post* 3/20-24/86; 20 = ABC/*Post* 9/18-27/86 (registered voters).

PARTY ID AND PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: DECISION/MAKING/INFORMATION DATA



	Dem.	Rep.	Ind.
Jan. 1980	51%	28%	21%
June 1981	43	38	19
Jan. 1982	45	37	18
Jan. 1983	52	36	12
May	48	37	15
Jan. 1984	49	41	10
June	49	42	9
Jan. 1985	42	43	15
June	44	41	15
Jan. 1986	43	41	16
June	41	39	19
Nov.	44	39	17

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?

	Approve	Disapprove
June 1981	67%	27%
Sept.	60	33
Jan. 1982	60	33
June	52	40
Sept.	51	43
Jan. 1983	46	49
June	53	41
Sept.	50	45
Jan. 1984	62	33
June	64	33
Sept.	63	34
Jan. 1985	72	26
Mar.	62	36
Mar.	61	38
Apr.	62	37
May	60	39
May	65	34
June	63	35
July	69	30
Aug.	65	35
Sept.	63	35
Oct.	68	31
Nov.	65	34
Nov.	65	32
Nov.	75	25
Nov.	71	28
Dec.	68	30
Jan. 1986	74	25
Feb.	70	29
Mar.	67	33
Apr.	71	28
Apr.	75	23
May	74	25
June	70	29
July	71	27
Aug.	70	30
Sept.	69	30
Oct.	64	34
Oct.	70	29
Oct.	69	30
Nov.	47	50
Dec. 14	53	44

Note: "No opinion" not shown.

Source: Surveys by Decision/Making/Information (D/M/I), latest that of December 14, 1986.

Economic Reality

In the table below, voters in selected states describe the national economy and the economy in their state. Note the substantial differences between Texans' and Floridians' perceptions of their states' economies. But the variations in perceptions tied to actual differences in state economic performance didn't seem to have much of an im-

Question: These days, is the condition of the U.S. economy very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?

Question: These days, is the condition of your state's economy very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?

Voters as they left voting booths

Very/ Fairly good	Fairly/ Very bad		Very/ Fairly good	Fairly/ Very bad
73%	27%	EAST	80%	19%
71	30	NY	74	25
54	35	PA	62	38
61	38	MIDWEST	59	40
66	32	IL	63	36
57	42	MO	66	34
46	55	SD	—	—
64	35	SOUTH	61	39
73	27	FL	88	12
75	24	GA	83	17
41	59	LA	13	87
74	16	NC	80	19
55	44	TX	37	63
67	33	WEST	68	31
68	30	CA	84	17
55	46	CO	53	46
50	50	ID	—	—
68	31	NV	85	15
51	49	OR	31	69

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times* (national) and CBS News (state), November 4, 1986.



Note: To identify states as "Boom," "Neutral," or "Bust," ABC News developed a scale using the difference between a state's unemployment rate and that of the nation, *and* the results of earlier state-wide polls on local economic conditions.

Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986.

and the 1986 Vote

pact on voting in the 1986 election (see figure on bottom of page 38). Voters' perceptions of the national economy appear to correlate more strongly with their Senate and House votes than did their sense of their state's economy. Finally, contrary to expectations, farmers were a pretty good group for the GOP.

Question: These days, is the condition of the U.S. economy/your state's economy . . .



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1986

Question: Would you describe the state of the nation's economy these days as . . .



Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1986

FARMERS



1988: None Should Run But Nunn

Question: Should Paul Laxalt run for president in 1988?



Note: Among Nevada Republicans, the response was 68%/28%/4%. Sample size = 1,048 Nevada voters as they left the polls.

Question: Should Dick Gephardt run for president in 1988?



Note: Among Missouri Democrats, the response was 34%/34%/32%. Sample size = 1,208 Missouri voters as they left the polls.

Question: Should Bruce Babbitt run for president in 1988?



Note: Among Arizona Democrats, the response was 41%/51%/8%. Sample size = 1,107 Arizona voters as they left the polls.

Question: Should Gary Hart run for president in 1988?



Note: Among Colorado Democrats, the response was 64%/28%/8%. Sample size = 1,233 Colorado voters as they left the polls.

Question: Should Jack Kemp run for president in 1988?



Note: Among New York Republicans, the response was 35%/51%/14%. Sample size = 1,438 New York voters as they left the polls.

Question: Should Mario Cuomo run for president in 1988?



Note: Among New York Democrats, the response was 61%/32%/6%. Sample size = 1,438 New York voters as they left the polls.

Question: Should Sam Nunn run for president in 1988?



Note: Among Georgia Democrats, the response was 58%/35%/6%. Sample size = 646 Georgia voters as they left the polls.

Question: Who do you want the Democrats to nominate for president in 1988?



Note: Babbitt, Gephardt and Nunn were each the choice of 1%.

Question: Who do you want the Republicans to nominate for president in 1988?



Note: Dupont was chosen by 1%.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1986.

REFERENDUMS AND

by Austin Ranney

In the elections of November 1986, at least one referendum measure appeared on the ballots in forty-three states, for a total of 226 propositions. As in previous years, the majority of the propositions (184 in 1986) dealt with constitutional amendments, bond issues, and other matters referred to the voters by the state legislatures; but forty-two propositions were *initiatives* placed on the ballot by voter petitions.

Fifty propositions in twenty-one states seem to have attracted the most national attention in 1986, and I shall concentrate on those here. The average turnout on those propositions was 41.2 percent of the voting-age population—slightly above the turnouts on referendums in the two preceding off-year elections (40 percent in 1978 and 40.2 percent in 1982). North Dakota mustered the highest turnout, when 58.2 percent of the age-eligible voters (North Dakota has no voter registration) voted on a proposal to allow retail stores to be open on Sundays (60 percent voted No). Connecticut had the lowest turnout: 24.6 percent of the voting-age population voted on a constitutional amendment to eliminate the use of party levers (they gave another boost to party dealignment by approving the amendment with 50.4 percent of the votes).

The issue most often raised was the legalization of gambling. Six states had propositions authorizing state-operated lotteries; they won in Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and South Dakota, and lost only in North Dakota. Three states had propositions authorizing privately operated gambling; they won in Kansas and Oregon, and lost in Florida.

A moral issue of greater national interest came up in Arkansas, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Rhode Island, which voted on proposals to prohibit abortions and/or the public funding of abortions for poor women. The proposals lost in all four states.

Another moral issue that attracted national attention was the Oregon proposition to legalize the growing and possession of marijuana for personal use; it was supported by only 26.5 percent of the voters.

The "tax revolt" touched off by California's Proposition 13 in 1978 was still alive in 1986, but it lost about as often as it won. All told, there were five proposals to cap tax revenues or require majority popular votes or extraordinary legislative majorities to increase taxes; three won and two lost. In addition, there were two proposals to cap state spending; one lost in California (much to the relief of the state university faculties), and one won in Alaska. Oregon had two propositions to lighten the tax burdens of renters and lower-income people while increasing the burdens on upper-income people; both lost by large majorities.

Measures for political reform had mixed success. Connecticut, as we have seen, voted to remove party levers from voting machines, and Arizona voted for greater restrictions on campaign contributions. On the other hand, Massachusetts rejected a proposal for voter registration by mail, Michigan defeated a proposal to permit legislative vetoes of administrative regulations, and Rhode Island rejected a constitutional amendment to establish the popular initiative.

There was only one state-wide nuclear freeze proposition—one that won in Alaska's earlier primary election. Oregon voters, on the other hand, rejected a proposal to ban the production of nuclear weapons after 1990. Voters in Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington voted for measures to restrict the sites for disposal of nuclear and other toxic wastes.

There was a wide variety of proposals for both regulation and deregulation of businesses, unions, and individuals. Massachusetts and Nebraska voted not

INITIATIVES 1986

to retain laws requiring the wearing of seat belts. Idaho voted to keep its right-to-work law. California voted for stiffer restrictions on toxic discharges into sources of drinking water.

Several propositions dealt with civil liberties and civil rights. California's voters approved a measure to make English the state's official language and rejected a measure to quarantine persons with AIDS. Massachusetts voters defeated a measure to permit the expenditure of state funds on private schools. And voters in Vermont narrowly rejected an equal rights for women amendment to the state constitution.

Finally, my efforts to identify each and every measure that offered a clear choice between conservative and liberal alternatives have not improved noticeably over my efforts in previous years, and thus my "conservative-liberal scorecard" for 1986 is no more meaningful than its predecessors for 1978, 1980, 1982, and 1984. For what it is worth, however, in my opinion twenty-six measures in 1986 posed such choices, and the conservatives won on fourteen while the liberals won on twelve. Also as before, I conclude that "the failure of either ideology to win clear and consistent victories may be merely an artifact of my coding but is more likely the result of the fact that most voters are less concerned with whether a particular measure represents a 'liberal' or a 'conservative' position than with whether it is right or wrong." ☑

Austin Ranney
AEI adjunct scholar, and
adjunct professor of
political science at the
University of California, Berkeley

I am grateful to Graham Hueber and the Elections Research Center for their assistance in compiling these data.

RL = referred by legislature
I = initiative
☑ = passed
☒ = not passed

Government Political Reform

☑ **Arizona** (I) Limit campaign contributions

Yes 526,545 65.0%
No 284,077 35.0%
810,622 Turnout = 33.8%

☑ **Connecticut** (RL) Prohibit use of party lever on voting machines

Yes 302,899 50.4%
No 297,827 49.6%
600,726 Turnout = 24.6%

☒ **Massachusetts** (I) Voter registration by mail

Yes 483,130 38.2%
No 782,084 61.8%
1,265,214 Turnout = 28.0%

☒ **Michigan** (I) Authorize state legislature to approve or reject administrative rules (legislative veto)

Yes 647,140 36.4%
No 1,132,011 63.6%
1,779,151 Turnout = 26.8%

☒ **Rhode Island** (RL) Establish popular initiative for constitutional amendments and laws

Yes 125,657 48.2%
No 135,198 51.8%
260,855 Turnout = 34.8%

Public Morality

☒ **Arkansas** (I) Prohibit abortions and state funding of abortions

Yes 317,984 49.96%
No 318,503 50.04%
636,487 Turnout = 36.7%

☒ **Florida** (I) Allow casino gambling (county option)

Yes 1,036,250 31.7%
No 2,237,555 68.3%
3,273,805 Turnout = 35.9%

☑ **Florida** (I) Allow state lottery

Yes 2,039,437 63.6%
No 1,168,858 36.4%
3,208,295 Turnout = 35.2%

☑ **Idaho** (I) Allow state lottery

Yes 226,816 60.0%
No 151,132 40.0%
377,948 Turnout = 53.6%

☑ **Kansas** (RL) Allow sale of liquor by the drink

Yes 489,646 59.9%
No 325,505 40.1%
815,151 Turnout = 45.1%

☑ **Kansas** (RL) Allow parimutuel betting on horse and dog racing (county option)

Yes 483,944 59.9%
No 324,143 40.1%
808,087 Turnout = 44.6%

☑ **Kansas** (RL) Allow state lottery

Yes 515,893 59.9%
No 291,411 40.1%
807,304 Turnout = 44.6%

☒ **Massachusetts** (RL) Prohibit abortions

Yes 554,388 42.2%
No 760,220 57.8%
1,314,608 Turnout = 29.0%

☑ **Montana** (RL) Allow state lottery

Yes 216,706 69.0%
No 97,459 31.0%
314,165 Turnout = 52.8%

☒ **North Dakota** (I) Allow state lottery

Yes 127,136 44.8%
No 156,777 55.2%
283,913 Turnout = 57.3%

☑ **Oregon** (RL) Allow charitable, fraternal, and religious organizations to hold raffles, bingo, and lotto games

Yes 701,067 70.2%
No 287,764 28.8%
998,831 Turnout = 49.0%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Allow growing and possession of marijuana for personal use

Yes 267,730 26.5%
No 742,611 73.5%
1,010,341 Turnout = 50.1%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Prohibit using state money for funding abortions

Yes 454,441 45.1%
No 552,158 54.9%
1,006,599 Turnout = 49.9%

☒ **Rhode Island** (RL) Prohibit abortions and public funding of abortions

Yes 79,512 31.0%
No 177,354 69.0%
256,866 Turnout = 34.2%

☑ **South Dakota** (RL) Allow state lottery

Yes	163,005	59.7%	
No	110,153	40.3%	
	273,158	Turnout	53.7%

Taxes and Expenditures

☑ **Alaska** (RL) Limit increases in state appropriations

Yes	119,775	71.0%	
No	48,909	29.0%	
	168,684	Turnout	45.2%

☒ **California** (I) Limit salaries of state officials

Yes	2,290,184	34.1%	
No	4,428,708	65.9%	
	6,718,892	Turnout	33.9%

☑ **California** (I) New taxes must be approved by 2/3 vote of local governing bodies and by majorities of voters

Yes	3,765,074	57.9%	
No	2,741,297	42.1%	
	6,506,371	Turnout	32.8%

☒ **Colorado** (I) Require voter approval of tax increases and new taxes at each level of government

Yes	312,473	37.6%	
No	518,153	62.4%	
	830,626	Turnout	34.1%

☑ **Massachusetts** (I) Limit growth of state revenue

Yes	696,837	54.7%	
No	576,715	45.3%	
	1,273,552	Turnout	28.1%

☒ **Montana** (I) Abolish real and personal property taxes

Yes	140,090	44.2%	
No	177,016	55.8%	
	317,106	Turnout	53.3%

☑ **Montana** (I) Limit property taxes, require voter approval for substituting sales or other taxes

Yes	166,694	54.9%	
No	136,904	45.1%	
	303,598	Turnout	51.0%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Limit property tax rates and assessed value increases

Yes	424,077	43.1%	
No	559,947	56.9%	
	984,024	Turnout	48.7%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Lower income taxes for poor, increase income taxes for rich, increase corporate income taxes

Yes	282,739	29.1%	
No	688,160	70.9%	
	970,899	Turnout	48.1%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Tax relief for renters

Yes	222,878	22.4%	
No	772,189	77.6%	
	995,067	Turnout	49.4%

Environment

☑ **California** (I) Restrictions on toxic discharges into drinking water

Yes	4,299,207	62.6%	
No	2,573,921	37.4%	
	6,873,128	Turnout	34.7%

☑ **Massachusetts** (I) Limit hazardous waste disposal sites

Yes	924,449	73.4%	
No	335,711	26.6%	
	1,260,160	Turnout	27.8%

Civil Liberties/Civil Rights

☑ **California** (I) English to be declared official state language

Yes	5,016,556	73.2%	
No	1,837,803	26.8%	
	6,854,359	Turnout	34.6%

☒ **California** (I) Quarantine persons with AIDS

Yes	1,991,672	29.0%	
No	4,870,974	71.0%	
	6,862,646	Turnout	34.7%

☒ **Massachusetts** (RL) Allow expenditure of state funds for private schools

Yes	407,952	30.8%	
No	917,854	69.2%	
	1,325,806	Turnout	29.3%

☑ **New Mexico** (RL) Guarantee right to keep and bear arms

Yes	179,716	61.7%	
No	111,517	38.3%	
	291,233	Turnout	28.1%

☑ **Oregon** (I) Increase rights of crime victims

Yes	736,492	75.4%	
No	240,410	24.6%	
	976,902	Turnout	48.4%

☒ **Vermont** (RL) Equal rights amendment to state constitution

Yes	89,109	48.4%	
No	95,053	51.6%	
	184,162	Turnout	45.9%

☑ **West Virginia** (RL) Guarantee right to keep and bear arms

Yes	336,285	83.5%	
No	66,387	16.5%	
	402,672	Turnout	28.1%

Business/Labor/Regulation/Deregulation

☒ **Arizona** (I) Authorize legislature to set limits on liability awards

Yes	415,744	49.1%	
No	430,935	50.9%	
	846,679	Turnout	35.3%

☑ **Idaho** (RL) Retain right-to-work law

Yes	208,248	54.0%	
No	177,069	46.0%	
	385,317	Turnout	54.6%

☒ **Massachusetts** (RL) Retain mandatory seat belts

Yes	616,224	46.5%	
No	707,571	53.5%	
	1,323,795	Turnout	29.3%

☑ **Montana** (I) Allow limit on tort liability

Yes	172,502	55.8%	
No	136,653	44.2%	
	309,155	Turnout	52.0%

☒ **Montana** (I) Recontrol milk prices

Yes	153,293	48.8%	
No	160,835	51.2%	
	314,128	Turnout	52.8%

☒ **Nebraska** (I) Retain mandatory seat belts

Yes	266,944	49.9%	
No	268,127	50.1%	
	535,071	Turnout	45.5%

☒ **North Dakota** (I) Permit retail stores to open on Sunday

Yes	115,422	40.1%	
No	172,577	59.9%	
	287,999	Turnout	58.2%

Nuclear Power and Weapons

☑ **Alaska** (I) Nuclear weapons freeze [in primary election]

Yes	80,326	58.4%	
No	57,125	41.6%	
	137,451	Turnout	36.9%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Prohibit nuclear power plants until federal goverment licenses a disposal site

Yes	357,859	35.8%	
No	640,923	64.2%	
	998,782	Turnout	49.5%

☒ **Oregon** (I) Ban production of nuclear weapons after 1990

Yes	382,530	40.5%	
No	561,857	59.5%	
	944,387	Turnout	46.8%

☑ **Washington** (I) Urge Congress to disapprove of a nuclear waste site in Washington

Yes	937,998	82.5%	
No	198,451	17.5%	
	1,136,449	Turnout	34.3%

CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL SCORECARD, 1986

Issue	*Conservative Wins*	*Liberal Wins*
Government political reform		Ariz.
Public morality	Ore.	Ark., Mass., Ore., R.I.
Taxes and expenditures	Alaska, Calif., Mass., Mont., Ore. (2)	Calif., Colo., Mont., Ore.
Civil liberties civil rights	Calif., N.M., Vermont, W. Va.	Calif., Mass.
Business labor regulation deregulation	Idaho	
Nuclear power and weapons	Ore. (2)	Alaska

The Changing Dynamics of Race and Class

by Diane Colasanto and Linda Williams

One of the most important controversies among observers of American race relations involves the relative importance of race and class. Are opportunities for economic advancement for blacks affected more by their class position or by their race? If class is the main determinant of progress, what, if anything, does this imply for the cohesiveness of the black community? Is the black community becoming polarized between an underclass and a middle class that are characterized by increasingly divergent experiences, interests, and values?

The Joint Center for Political Studies and the Gallup Organization conducted a nationwide survey in August 1986 to explore some of these questions. We asked 916 white and 868 black respondents what they thought about recent changes in racial groups and social classes, about the extent of racial competition and commonality, and about their own class identification.

Both blacks and whites view class divergence as greater than racial divergence. Despite this, many respondents of both races still believe that blacks and whites have different interests.

A Touch of Class

We asked respondents two questions about class polarization in the black community. Table 1 shows that blacks are evenly divided on whether class polarization is occurring among black Americans—in both areas (values and living standards) tapped by the questions. About half believe the gap in standards of living between the middle class and the poor has widened in the past decade; half do not. About half think there are

Table 1

ATTITUDES ABOUT CLASS POLARIZATION

Question: Compared to ten years ago, do you think there is a wider gap or a narrower gap between the standards of living of middle-class people and poor people?

In the last ten years, do you think the values held by middle-class people and values held by poor people have become more similar or more different?

	Black Response	**White Response**
Between *middle-class people* and *poor people* . . .		
Gap in living standards:		
Wider than ten years ago	50%	38%
Narrower	34	40
No change (Vol.)	10	10
Don't know	7	11
Values held:		
Have become more similar in last 10 years	39	46
Haven't changed (vol.)	10	10
More different	41	32
Don't know	10	12

Compared to ten years ago, do you think there is a wider gap or a narrower gap between the standards of living of middle-class black people and poor black people?

In the last ten years, do you think the values held by middle-class black people and the values held by poor black people have become more similar or more different? (By values, I mean the things that people view as important, or their general way of thinking.)

	Black Response	**White Response**
Between *middle-class blacks* and *poor blacks* . . .		
Gap in living standards:		
Wider than ten years ago	45	43
Narrower	37	29
No change (vol.)	12	8
Don't know	6	19
Values held:		
Have become more similar in last 10 years	40	31
Haven't changed (vol.)	9	8
More different	44	42
Don't know	7	19

greater disparities than ten years ago in middle-class blacks' and poor blacks' values; half do not.

Blacks hold the same views about class in the society at large. Questions about class polarization—again gauged by standards of living and values—with respect to middle-class people and poor people in general yield black responses that are remarkably similar to their answers about black class polarization. Half think that the gap in living standards between middle-class people and poor people is becoming wider, while 44 percent do not. Forty-one percent think that differences in values of the two classes have grown greater in the past ten years, while 49 percent do not.

It is difficult to determine what underlies the consistency (observed across all demographic subgroups) with which blacks evaluate the trends within their own racial group and within society as a whole. Blacks may feel that they are subject to the same social trends that are shaping white society. Or they may generalize from their own experience to a larger social group.

The views of whites are virtually identical to those of blacks on class polarization trends for the black community, except that the white "don't know" responses are almost three times as high (see table 1). When asked about society as a whole, though, white respondents perceive significantly less divergence in standards of living and values by class than black respondents do.

Table 2

BLACK ATTITUDES ABOUT BLACK CLASS POLARIZATION

Between middle-class blacks and poor blacks . . .	Gap in living standards:		Values held:	
	Wider than 10 years ago	Narrower No change	More similar No change in last 10 years	More different
By education:				
Less than high school graduate	43%	50%	42%	50%
High school graduate	42	52	45	47
Some college	44	52	44	51
College graduate	62	30	47	48
By occupation:				
Professional managerial	58	40	49	45
Other white collar	35	58	42	53
Blue collar	42	53	45	51
Unemployed	50	44	47	46

Note: See Table 1 for question wording.

How Class Acts

Table 2 indicates that the beliefs of blacks about class polarization are related to their own social status. In particular, very high-status and very low-status blacks are more likely than other blacks in our survey to perceive growing economic divergence within the black community. College graduates and professional or managerial workers are most likely to think the gap in living standards for blacks is getting wider. Unemployed blacks (excluding housewives, students, and retired people) also share this view. These groups divide evenly on the values question.

Table 3

ATTITUDES ABOUT RACIAL POLARIZATION

Question: Compared to ten years ago, do you think there is a wider gap or a narrower gap between the standards of living of black people and white people?

In the last ten years, do you think the values held by black people and the values held by white people have become more similar or more different?

	Black Response	White Response
Between *black people* and *white people* . . .		
Gap in living standards:		
Wider than ten years ago	39%	18%
Narrower No change (vol.)	56	71
Don't know	6	12
Values held:		
Have become more similar Haven't changed in last ten years (vol.)	31	18
More different	58	69
Don't know	11	13

These perceptions among higher-status blacks might arise from their personal experiences. Many of them have experienced considerable economic mobility in comparison to their families. As a result, they may be acutely aware of economic differences among classes, yet still see themselves as unified with poorer blacks in more fundamental ways. Higher-status white respondents (data not shown) also show a greater gap on the economic dimension than on the value dimension.

Racial Polarization

Our findings are enhanced by comparing opinions about racial gaps in standards of living and values between whites and blacks. We used the same basic questions:

> (1) Compared to ten years ago, do you think there is a wider gap or a narrower gap between the standards of living of black people and white people?
>
> and
>
> (2) In the last ten years, do you think the values held by black people and the values held by white people have become more similar or more different?

Both blacks and whites are less likely to perceive divergences between the races than among classes, as shown in table 3. Less than one-fifth of whites (18 percent) believe the races are more polarized on standards of living or values. This is approximately half the proportion of whites who see the classes as more polarized. The response pattern for whites on these two questions reveals a broad consensus among subgroups of varying social and demographic characteristics.

Table 4

COMMON INTERESTS OF BLACKS AND WHITES OF SAME SOCIAL CLASS

Question: Do you feel that you have a lot of common interests with (name other race) in the (name respondent's social class), some common interests, or very few common interests?

Interests in common with other race of same social class:	Black Response			White Response		
	Lower	Working	Middle Upper	Lower	Working	Middle Upper
A lot	12%	28%	27%	7%	17%	22%
Some	28	49	51	43	46	38
Very few	51	20	20	44	30	31

Blacks are also less likely to perceive racial polarization than class polarization. They are, however, more prone to see racial polarization than white respondents are.

The respondent's race made a difference in perceptions of racial polarization, and so did the race of the interviewer. On both questions about racial polarization, there was a 10-percentage point difference between black respondents interviewed by a black interviewer (about two-thirds of the sample) and those interviewed by a white interviewer. Blacks interviewed by blacks reported more racial polarization.

There was also an 11-percentage point difference between blacks under thirty years old and older blacks on whether the values of blacks and whites have been polarizing. Thirty-eight percent of the younger blacks thought that black and white values were diverging, compared to 27 percent for blacks age thirty or older. Otherwise, blacks seemed to agree on the extent of racial convergence by standard of living and values.

Nothing in Common?

Even though there seems to be broad agreement that blacks and whites are becoming more alike, other questions in the JCPS/Gallup survey show that there is still considerable progress to be made before race ceases to be a significant social differentiating factor. Two examples show the extent to which blacks and whites perceive each other differently.

After asking respondents how they would identify their own social class position, we asked them to describe the degree to which their interests were similar to those of members of the other race in the same social class:

> Do you feel you have a lot of common interests with (blacks/whites) in the (upper/middle/working/lower) class, some common interests, or very few common interests?

Only 19 percent of whites and 26 percent of blacks thought that they shared "a lot" of common interests with members of the other race in their social class. Almost one-third of whites (31 percent) and one-quarter (24 percent) of blacks reported sharing "very few" common interests with someone of the other race in their social class.

The respondent's social class accounts for virtually all the difference in perceived common interests; race makes no significant difference (see table 4). The lower the status of the respondents, the less they feel they have in common with the other race. For both blacks and whites, a greater percentage of respondents in the upper and middle classes reported "a lot" in common with the other race. Large numbers in these classes, however, still claim to have little in common with members of the other race. Most striking is that half of blacks and almost half of whites who identified themselves as lower class claim to have few common interests with lower-class people of a different race.[1]

To determine how much these attitudes might reflect views about conflicting racial interests, we asked:

> Do you think that further improvements in the standard of living of blacks in general will reduce the standard of living of whites, or do you think that the situation of blacks can improve without hurting the situation of whites?

Seven percent of blacks and 15 percent of whites think that black progress would hurt whites. For whites, but not for blacks, these attitudes are related to region, with those in the South feeling more racial competition (22 percent think that black progress would hurt whites) than those in other regions of the country (13 percent in the East, 15 percent in the Midwest, and 6 percent in the West). Still, most interesting is that so many do *not* believe black economic progress will hurt whites.

Taken all together, the JCPS/Gallup data paint a complex picture of the dynamics of race and class in America. It appears that race defines social cleavages more strongly for blacks than for whites. For blacks, however, the racial cleavage is perceived as a function of different interests between blacks and whites, whereas whites tend more to perceive competition between blacks and whites. Most important, for both blacks and whites, class cleavages are more significant than racial cleavages. Thus, this survey does point to developing class polarization among blacks. About one half of all respondents do see developing class polarization among blacks.

Summing Up

What these data mean for the cohesiveness of the black community is not clear. The high-status blacks who are most aware of growing class polarization see it developing mainly along economic lines and less with respect to values. When we consider how social and political attitudes vary between high- and low-status blacks, we find few differences. There was broad consensus among blacks on a diverse set of issues, including approval of Reagan's job performance in general, approval of Reagan's handling of civil rights and the situation of poor people, whether Reagan's policies have been harmful to blacks, and how much emphasis the federal government should place on spending for social programs and on improving the situation of minorities.

High-status blacks are just as likely as other blacks to identify with the Democratic party, but they are less likely to call themselves "strong Democrats." High-status blacks are also different from other blacks on some economic questions. They are, for example, more likely to approve of Reagan's handling of the economy, and less likely to support job preference programs for minorities.

Our data offer a mixed message for the future of American race relations. On one hand, blacks and whites both see the races becoming more similar on at least two dimensions—standards of living and values. Large majorities of both races also fail to see blacks and whites as competing for economic rewards. On the other hand, only small proportions of blacks and whites see themselves as having many common interests. Among lower-class individuals, the belief that there are *no* common interests is alarmingly strong.

Thus, it appears that relations between blacks and whites will develop differently for individuals at different economic levels. Class is not replacing race as a significant social differentiating factor. Rather, class is interacting with race to produce the social cleavages that are meaningful to American citizens. ☑

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[1] The percentage for lower class whites are based on only thirty-five interviews, and should thus be interpreted with caution.

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Policy Making Information
for Four Presidential Commissions

Four Presidential Commissions appointed to propose long range policy to the three most recent Presidents have turned to Market Opinion Research for public opinion analysis. Both representative national samples and research among special publics have been used by:

- The National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year (1975)
- The Presidential Commission on World Hunger (1979)
- The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) (1986)
- The President's Commission on Americans Outdoors (1986)

One recently completed study on Americans Outdoors used focus groups in all nine Census regions to listen to how American adults talk about outdoor recreation and their reasons for participating in it. A 50 state survey measured participation in 32 activities and the importance of 17 motivations. Important to the Commission's current deliberations has been the public reaction to a number of policy issues concerning the federal role in providing opportunities for outdoor recreation into the 21st century.

The public wants the federal government to preserve the environment, protect wildlife and acquire large natural and scenic acreages for future generations to enjoy. The public is willing to pay taxes for the government to do so.



When it comes to park maintenance, picking up the trash, improving the roads, providing the rangers and life guards, the public feels users should pay. As the accompanying table shows, the public has strong views on who should bear the cost of recreational resources.

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The COLOR GREEN Environmental Leaders in Europe

by Russell Dalton

A green wave is sweeping across Western Europe. New Green parties have carried their themes into the electoral arena, winning seats in several national parliaments. Nearly all European governments have ministries devoted primarily to environmental issues. And now, the Commission of the European Communities has designated 1987 as the *Year of the Environment,* aimed at "convincing every element in our societies . . . that protection of the environment must become a fundamental element in their lives and all human activities." The European environmental movement has apparently come of age.

Despite, or perhaps because of, its new-found legitimacy, the Green movement's political coloration is debated intensely. Environmentalists have been linked to virtually every political tendency imaginable. Many critics look at the Green movement and see red—environmentalism as a vehicle for radical leftists advocating revolutionary political and economic change. Others paint environmentalists in brownish tones—descriptions of German Greens as a revival of the Hitler youth movement have recently appeared in both *Die Zeit* and the *New York Times.* A variety of other labels have attached themselves—romantic, hedonistic, anti-modern, populist, and elitist among them. Will the real environmental movement please stand up?

We decided to explore the political coloration of the European environmental movement as part of a larger study on its structure, goals, and policy activities. During the past year our research team interviewed representatives from sixty-nine leading environmental groups in ten European Community nations. The interviews focused on members of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) and were supplemented with important non-EEB groups in each nation. We spoke with representatives of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth organizations in Europe, as well as most national wildlife protection and nature conservation groups. The groups include a good sample of shadings from the Green political rainbow.

Where They Stand

Despite frequent claims that environmentalists are "neither left nor right, they are out in front," environmental elites display an unmistakable leftward tilt (see table 1). A lopsided majority (79 percent) locate themselves somewhere on the left side of the political spectrum, compared to only 43 percent of the European public. Their partisan preferences follow a similar pattern: 46 percent of environmentalists favor leftist parties; only 11 percent prefer parties on the right.

Table 1
THE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERS AND THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC

	Europeans	
	Environmental Leaders	Public
	% agree	
Left Right Attitudes		
Percentage Left (self-identification)	79%	43%
Traditional Economic Issues		
Control multinational corporations	90	—
Greater efforts to reduce income inequality	85	79
Increase government role in economy	53	62
Expand public ownership of industry	22	33
New Politics Issues		
Postmaterial values	67	14
Stronger measures for sex equality	98	—
Women free to have abortion	88	—
There are limits to growth	85	—
Employees deserve more rights	85	—
No safe way to store nuclear waste	82	—
Nuclear energy should be developed	12	54
Foreign Policy Defense		
Europe should make stronger defense effort	22	44
Disarmament of both superpowers is best way to ensure security	94	—

Note: European public data are from *Eurobarometer* 19 (April 1983).

Distinctions between left and right are based to a large extent on *economic issues*, but this is one area in which environmental leaders look much like everyone else. Most environmentalists seem satisfied with the present scope of government economic activity; only a minority favor expanding government ownership of industry; and a bare majority prefer an increased government role in managing the economy. Many acknowledged that the Old Left image of an interventionist state conflicts with the populist values of the environmental movement. Indeed, where comparable opinion data are available, environmental leaders are slightly more *conservative* than the European public on economic issues!

Where environmentalists' liberalism becomes evident is on issues of individual freedoms, alternative lifestyles, and related matters. The majority of environmentalists give priority to so-called "Postmaterial" values such as quality of life, self-expression, and belonging, while the average European is still primarily concerned with "Material" goals (social order and economic security). Most environmentalists also reject the assumption of limitless economic growth that underlies the industrial welfare state, and they believe that employees deserve more rights in the workplace.

One of the major policy initiatives of the environmental movement—opposition to nuclear power—is endorsed by the environmental leaders we surveyed. Almost all group representatives feel that there is presently no safe way to store nuclear wastes, and very few believe that nuclear power should be developed to meet future energy needs. We also find that groups working to stop the development of nuclear power stations can gain significantly greater approval from environmentalists (82 percent) than from the European public (58 percent).

Environmental leaders express firm support for the women's movement and its concerns. They endorse stronger measures for sexual equality and also support freedom of choice concerning abortion.

Disarmament among environmentalists is equally popular. Most see disarmament of both superpowers as the best way to ensure Europe's security. Environmentalists are less likely than the European public to support a stronger defense effort. More than one representative commented that the cost of a single Trident submarine (or even a Tornado fighter) could finance an entire program of underfunded environmental measures. Furthermore, approval of groups active in the peace movement is higher among environmentalists (81 percent) than among the European public (70 percent).

Great political diversity still exists within the European environmental movement, but these findings suggest that a distinct New Left identity is developing among the leaders of Europe's major environmental groups. At the same time, however, we uncovered differences in how much the group leaders can translate their beliefs into group action. Many traditional conservation and nature protection organizations remain hesitant to take an official stand on issues such as nuclear power and disarmament because of disagreement among their members. But while the groups' members may differ with one another, their leaders' views are clear.

Radical Democrats

Some of the sharpest criticisms aimed at environmentalists focus on their supposed opposition to conventional political methods and, by inference, democratic political norms. Groups that promote direct action methods and challenge conventional social norms are frequently pictured as "environmental extremists" and a societal threat by some defenders of the political establishment.

Our interviews convey a much different image. The leaders of most of Europe's environmental groups are not revolutionaries but reformers. Their discussions of important issues, government actions, and future social needs reflect a belief that political reform can and must occur within the system. When environmentalists call for a change in the nature of society, they think of making the public and government more sensitive to environmental issues.

Several of the survey questions illustrate this orientation. When asked to judge their satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country, most environmentalists are at least fairly satisfied with the functioning of the political system (66 percent); only 52 percent of the public are as satisfied. Another question asked how much social change they desired. Not a single environmental leader in our survey calls for revolutionary change; 5 percent of the European public and European party elites favor such action. Environmentalists prefer social reform, and vary only on the pace and scope of change. Even among the campaigning organizations—Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and similar organizations—positive attitudes toward the democratic process and social reform predominate.

Critics of the Establishment

Positive attitudes toward the political system do not necessarily translate into support for the environmental policies of European governments. A series of questions asked group leaders to evaluate how well various social and political institutions were doing in addressing the nation's environmental problems.

Favorable evaluations of the established political institutions are in exceedingly short supply. Very few leaders (17 percent) say the performance of their national legislature on environmental issues is either "excellent" or "good." Evaluations of the chief executives are even more critical, regardless of left or right control of the government. Not a single governmental leader in Europe receives even one "excellent" rating. The worst evaluations are reserved for Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ruud Lubbers in the Netherlands, who earn consistently "poor" marks for their environmental records.

The environmental leaders gave the highest ratings of governmental institutions to their country's Minister of the Environment, but positive evaluations of their performance are still scarce (28 percent). The common complaints are inaction or poor relations with environmental groups. Environmental leaders see the ministries as ineffective counters to powerful business and agricultural interests. The other central policy actors—the major political parties, other government ministries, labor unions, and business associations—garner even fewer positive evaluations.

From a list of over a dozen institutions, the environmental leaders rank only two above the midpoint of the scale—Green parties earn an 80 percent job rating, newspapers follow with 52 percent. Given generally low performance ratings for most political institutions, the earlier noted expressions of support for the system are even more impressive.

What's Extremist?

It is difficult to know whether environmentalists are extremists, partly because the definition of extremism is imprecise. The leaders accept the welfare state consensus, but they also believe that the political agenda should give more attention to issues such as environmental quality, citizen participation, sexual equality, and greater international cooperation. These policies are far from revolutionary, but they still imply fundamental changes for European societies. Their vision of environmentally conscious growth would upend the Western economic system. Most environmentalists are also products of the pluralism and democratization of postwar Europe. While they criticize government performance on environmental issues, they also strongly support the system and want greater citizen involvement in it. Environmentalists exemplify what Samuel Huntington calls a spirit of "creedal passion"—a belief that Western democracies should live up to their democratic rhetoric. These political orientations represent a challenge to the status quo, but it is a challenge that evolves from the past accomplishments of Western democracies. ☑

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Wirthlin/White

(Continued from page 19)

receptive to a change in the national dialogue. The Reagan Revolution consisted of limiting the expansion of federal responsibilities and returning power to state and local governments and to the individual.

On the eve of his reelection, six in ten Americans believed that "Ronald Reagan had changed things a lot." The fundamental change was in a reconfiguration of citizen and government responsibilities. A 1986 CBS News/*New York Times* survey found 51 percent believing the federal government "creates more problems than it solves." Sixty-three percent believe that state and local governments do the best job of coping with the problems they face. A January 1986 D/M/I survey found majorities willing to turn some important federal tasks over to the private sector, including guarantees for home mortgages, insurance for U.S. companies doing business abroad, and electricity production.

Ronald Reagan's command of the political agenda altered the Democratic course, too. A recent report enunciated a Democratic Creed, whose commandments sound as though they were written by Reagan himself: "the freedom to make personal choices is at the heart of the American dream"; "individuals must be responsible for their own lives"; "basic moral values are the bedrock of individual responsibility"; "strong state and local governments are essential"; "America must be strong to deter aggression and keep the peace."

Democrats seeking office in 1986 followed these commandments. Joseph P. Kennedy III, son of the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy, told voters in his successful bid to replace Tip O'Neill: "The days of taxing and spending, taxing and spending are over." In New York state, Mario Cuomo refused to be branded as a New Deal Democrat:

> What are you when you reduce public employees by 9,000? What are you when you say (that) need should be the criterion (for welfare benefits)? What are you when you can come out for a tax cut? What are you when you refuse to raise the basic taxes? What are you when you spend more on your defense budget, which we call corrections, than any governor in history?

Cuomo's reelection triumph was the largest in New York history—a victory so enormous that the New Deal

Table 1
PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS

1980 Rep.	1980 Dem.	1980 Diff.		1986 Rep.	1986 Dem.	1986 Diff.
			Age			
30%	42%	-12	17-20 years	46%	30%	+16
			21-24 years	42	37	+5
24	51	-27	25-34 years	39	43	-4
33	51	-18	35-44 years	32	45	-13
35	50	-15	45-54 years	33	43	-10
27	57	-30	55-64 years	39	40	-1
36	51	-15	65 years +	36	47	-11
			Ethnicity			
NA	NA	NA	White	41	37	+4
NA	NA	NA	Black	10	71	-61
NA	NA	NA	Other	41	42	-1
			Education			
24	62	-38	Some H.S.	25	51	26
26	63	-37	H.S. grad.	39	40	-1
35	45	-10	Some college	46	37	+9
38	44	-6	College grad.	44	35	+9
38	44	-6	Post-grad.	45	40	+5
			Occupation			
NA	NA	NA	Professional	37	39	-2
NA	NA	NA	White collar	42	41	+1
NA	NA	NA	Blue collar	34	42	-8
NA	NA	NA	Retired	35	48	-13
NA	NA	NA	Unemployed	23	40	-17
			Income			
NA	NA	NA	Under $15,000	29	51	-22
NA	NA	NA	$15,000-$29,999	39	40	-1
NA	NA	NA	$30,000-$39,999	39	44	-5
NA	NA	NA	$40,000 and over	44	35	+9
			Religion			
26	54	-28	Catholic	34	48	-14
33	48	-15	Protestant	46	35	+11
25	51	-26	None Agnostic	30	40	10
NA	NA	NA	Born again fundamentalist	39	41	-2
			Ideology			
35	50	-15	Conservative	47	34	+13
22	56	-34	Moderate	19	46	27
17	63	-46	Liberal	25	53	-28
			Region			
35	38	-3	New England	42	31	+11
31	54	-23	Mid Atlantic	37	41	-4
32	48	-16	Great Lakes	38	42	-4
21	54	-33	Farm Belt	53	26	+27
38	45	-7	Mountain	40	45	-5
34	48	-14	Pacific	45	41	+4
25	58	-33	Outer south	34	45	-11
18	56	-38	Deep south	23	54	-31
			Sex			
29	50	-21	Male	NA	NA	NA
33	52	-19	Female	NA	NA	NA
			Union Member			
NA	NA	NA	Union member	23	57	-34
NA	NA	NA	Non-union member	41	39	+2
			Marital status/Sex			
NA	NA	NA	Male married	38	40	-2
NA	NA	NA	Male single	47	34	+13
NA	NA	NA	Male divorced/separated	15	37	-22
NA	NA	NA	Female married	39	43	-4
NA	NA	NA	Female single	37	42	-5
NA	NA	NA	Female divorced/separated	25	55	-30

Source: Surveys by Decision Making information, latest that of October 20-23, 1986.

refusenik captured nearly half of the votes of those who said they supported Ronald Reagan in 1984.

From Political Poverty to Political Parity?

Many political scientists believe that party identification remains one of the most stable aspects of American politics. Changing the party makeup—either through recruitment of new voters or persuading already committed partisans to switch—is very difficult. But if it is to occur, it begins with new perceptions about the ability of the two parties to govern.

For more than three decades now, George Gallup has asked Americans to evaluate the parties' performance. From 1956 to 1980, the public selected the GOP only *four* times when asked which party could best handle the most important problem facing the country. During the same period, Republicans were chosen only *twice* as the party best able to keep the United States prosperous. By 1986, the Republicans had a decisive margin over the Democrats when respondents were asked to choose which party could tackle the most important problem. Moreover, Republicans posted their largest lead in twenty-five years as the party best equipped to guarantee economic prosperity.

Other polls give similar scores. A 1986 postelection survey taken by D/M/I found the Republicans holding a 14-percentage point advantage over the Democrats on "reducing unemployment," a 15-percentage point lead on "cutting drug usage," a 13-percentage point margin on "controlling inflation," and a 5-percentage point edge on "balancing the federal budget." Democrats are perceived as better able to handle social security by a 36-percentage point advantage, "maintaining the quality of the environment" by 24 percentage points, and "improving the quality of high school graduates" by 8 percentage points.

Similar results occur when voters are asked to assign particular qualities to the political parties. Republicans have an 11-percentage point edge on "getting results on tough problems" and a 4-point lead when it comes to "ensuring economic prosperity." Democrats are seen by a 29-point margin as too often favoring give-away programs, while retaining their historic advantage on their "concern for people like me" by 24 points.

Americans are performance-oriented. In 1980, Ronald Reagan asked every American listening to his only debate with Carter: "Are you better off than you were four years ago?" In the few seconds it took Reagan to utter that remark came the rationale for ousting an incumbent president—only the second time that has happened since Franklin Roosevelt deposed Herbert Hoover in 1932. In D/M/I's postelection poll, 53 percent of those surveyed believed the nation was "better off" than it was in 1980; 47 percent answered "worse off." Moreover, 59 percent believed that their personal situation had improved; 41 percent thought it had deteriorated.

These performance-oriented questions form a crucial element in determining partisan identification. Of those who believe the nation is better off under Reagan, 50 percent are Republican, 30 percent Democratic, 20 percent Independent. Of those who answer that their personal situation had improved, 47 percent are Republican, 35 percent Democratic, and 18 percent Independent. Those who believe the United States is worse off than before gravitate to the out party, with the Democrats at 56 percent and the Republicans and Independents at 22 percent apiece. Respondents who believe their own situation is worse incline toward the Democrats by a margin of 52 to 23 percent.

From 1980 to 1986 Ronald Reagan and his policies

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(Signed) Edward Styles
Director of Publications

have moved the GOP to nearly equal standing with the Democrats. In 1980, Democratic identifiers outnumbered Republicans 51 percent to 28 percent. By September 1984; the gap had closed: Democrats, 48 percent; Republicans, 41 percent. During the 1986 pre-election cycle (January to June) Democratic identifiers averaged 42 percent; Republicans, 39 percent.

Different segments of the American electorate have been more receptive to the new Republican agenda than others (see table 1). The youngest age cohorts, men, college graduates, upper-income groups, single males, Protestants, conservatives, and those who live in New England are strongly Republican. Women, senior citizens, Catholics, those with low incomes, and blacks remain in the Democratic column.

Parity, American Style

While the aggregate results suggest that the two parties have roughly equivalent numbers of identifiers, it is a strange sort of parity. At the presidential level, the Republicans have won four of the last five contests. Of the 2,689 electoral votes cast since 1968, the GOP has captured 2,075 (77 percent); Democrats just 567 (21 percent); third party and other candidates received 47 votes (2 percent).

Yet, the Democrats have had a solid grasp on the House of Representatives—having won seventeen consecutive races for the lower chamber. During the 1980s, voters have added still another "check and balance" to those already in our two-century old Constitution. An April 1986 D/M/I poll found 69 percent believing that it is almost always best for the country when the White House is controlled by one party and Congress by the other, a result confirmed in actual voting.

That pattern continued in 1986. Republicans gained eight new governorships—including Florida, Texas, Alabama, and South Carolina. Of the eight Republican governors-elect, five face state legislatures where the Democrats control both houses.

The electorate's proclivity for Republican executives and Democratic legislators lies in the contrasting perceptions of the parties. Voters have come to associate the Republicans with economic prosperity and peace, yet believe the Democrats will distribute the nation's economic resources more fairly.

A Template for 1988

Political parties form a template for voters from which prospective candidates are judged. The Iranian-Contra arms affair may have some effect upon the political template. To date, party identification has shifted slightly toward the Democratic party since the advent of the Iran-Contra crisis. The partisan template created by Ronald Reagan has been buffeted by recent events, but it hasn't been broken. Young Americans, for instance, still adhere to the Reagan agenda and the Republican party. It appears that the 1988 Republican presidential nominee will still carry into the general election the positive traits now associated with the GOP: economic prosperity and peace—two issues that normally dominate Presidential campaigns.

The Democratic nominee will play to his party's strengths on the fairness issues. Nonetheless, for the first time since the New Deal, the Republican candidate probably will not have to disassociate himself from his party. Whoever wins in 1988, the changed images of both parties have altered the template for the fifty-first presidential election and those that follow. ☑

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[1] Decision Making Information 1974 postelection study. Text of question: "Looking ahead to elections *for president* over the next twenty years or so, there will be five presidential elections. How many elections for president do you think the Republican party candidate will win: none, one, two, three, four or all five?" Responses: None, 10 percent; one, 18 percent; two, 40 percent; three, 15 percent; four, 2 percent; five, 2 percent.

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GLASNOST

RUSSIAN ROULETTE

Gambling on Glasnost, An Interview; How the World Sees the Soviets;
How the Soviets See Us; Do We Need Enemies?

plus— SDI, Tax Reform, Measuring Inflation

Opinion Roundup: Government's Role, An Issue for 1988?; Reagan and Iran; The 1988 Presidential Race

✓

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BAD MARX: HOW THE WORLD SEES THE SOVIETS

by Ben J. Wattenberg

As the West struggles to interpret Soviet glasnost—"openness," and perhaps something more—two schools of thought are developing. One maintains that glasnost is designed to help Gorbachev's government function better internally. The other is that the purpose is to improve the Soviet image abroad. As can be seen from the dialogue among the analysts at Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe (pp. 4–8) it would seem that both ideas are at work at the same time.

I had occasion recently to gain some sense of the external aspects of glasnost. In September 1986, I was in Riga, Latvia as a member of a U.S. delegation that held a series of public discussions and debates with a high-level Soviet group. The event was sponsored by the Chautauqua Institute, which had hosted a similar debate in the United States in 1985, and the Eisenhower Institute.

The relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was particularly strained at the time of the Riga meeting. The Soviets were still preventing Nicholas Daniloff from leaving Russia, though they had just released him from prison. Some prominent members of our group—most notably Jeane Kirkpatrick and Richard Perle—opted not to participate as long as Daniloff was held in the country; most of us decided to take part once the Soviets let him out of jail.

Throughout the week, the American speakers hammered home a number of objections to Soviet conduct: the Daniloff arrest, human rights, dissidents, lack of press freedom, subjugation of Eastern Europe, the illegal incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R., genocide in Afghanistan, to name a few.

In private, informal conversations and more publicly as well, the Soviet group reacted with repeated complaints that the U.S.S.R. was "misperceived." The word kept cropping up. Clearly, the Soviet officials were worried about the impression their nation was creating abroad. From a tactical political point of view, they had good reason to be concerned. When a superpower is regarded as a pariah, or close to it, it has a far more difficult time operating internationally.

It seems obvious that the Soviets' desire to correct such "misperceptions"—surely felt long before the Riga meetings, as well as during them—is one clear reason behind external glasnost.

My speech at the meetings tried to sketch a global attitudinal portrait of the U.S.S.R. My research for the talk taught me that the Soviet view of how they were viewed was right on the mark: in those parts of the world where survey research could assay opinion, the picture of the U.S.S.R. was grim indeed. By comparison, the United States looked pretty good.

The data for the speech came from respected private pollsters working independently or under commission to the United States Information Agency or Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The respondents came from Western Europe, Japan, Eastern Europe, and even from the Soviet Union.

The West European surveys, taken in 1985, included the four biggest nations: Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy, comprising a population of well over 200 million people.

One question asked whether the U.S.S.R. or the United States would be more likely to use military force to attain its goals.

Table 1

MORE LIKELY TO USE MILITARY FORCE
TO ATTAIN GOALS

	Britain	France	Germany	Italy
Soviet Union	60%	53%	53%	55%
United States	14	15	16	18
Don't know	12	27	14	16

Among the Western Europeans who chose either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., almost eight in ten thought the Soviet Union would be more likely to use military force to attain its goals. This is probably one of the supposed misperceptions that Gorbachev's glasnost would like to correct.

There are others. Here are the results of a question about which country seeks domination over other countries.

Table 2

COUNTRY SEEKING DOMINATION OVER OTHER COUNTRIES

	Britain	France	Germany	Italy
Soviet Union	63%	44%	61%	47%
United States	20	28	15	32
Don't know	12	24	14	15

Among those who selected one of the two countries, about 70 percent of the respondents believed that the Soviets seek domination.

Which nation spreads lies in other countries to attain its goals? A similar poll showed more than 75 percent of those with an opinion said the Soviet Union, although the "Don't knows" were particularly high on this question.

The French polling organization, Institut Français de Demoscopie, showed that the Soviets received high rankings, which constitute low opinions, from the French public on the following issues as well: that they support subversive groups in other countries; that they want to achieve superiority in nuclear weapons; that they do not seek peaceful resolution of international conflicts; and that they are unlikely to keep commitments.

Or consider a summary statement from a 1985 poll taken by the Italian public opinion organization DOXA: "Among the major countries of the world, the Soviet Union is the most imperialistic . . . ."

All these negative attitudes toward Soviet actions and characteristics are played back in the broader realm of values. In 1985, sample populations in the four big European nations were asked whether their own nation's values were similar, or somewhat similar, to the values in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

	Britain	France	Germany	Italy
What Americans value is similar or somewhat similar to own country's values	60%	25%	46%	54%
What Russians value is similar or somewhat similar to own country's values	14%	4%	8%	9%

The French, apparently, consider their values unique.

Moving from Western Europe to Japan, an August 1985 poll by the Shin Joho Center shows that Japanese views about the Soviet Union are similar to European views. The Soviet Union, according to Shin Joho, is the major nation most likely to spread lies, support subversives, use military force, and want nuclear superiority. It does not seek peaceful resolution of conflicts, can't be trusted, and has few exemplary qualities.

Well, one may ask, what do you expect? These are American allies.

Polling Behind the Iron Curtain

Let us then turn to Eastern Europe, an area that is under heavy Soviet political influence, not to mention the tanks and troops that are either permanently stationed there, or on call as necessary.

How can we gauge public attitudes in these Communist bloc nations where opinion research on these sorts of issues is not really available? We wait for the people to leave home. More than 2 million travelers from Eastern Europe visit Western Europe every year, typically for a few days vacation, often as a bonus from their place of work. (Many of them, alas, are not permitted to travel with their entire families, for reasons of state security. That is, the states involved fear defections.)

Over the years, nine independent opinion research institutes in different West European nations have interviewed these East European tourists. The results of the polls were tabulated and compiled by Radio Free Europe.

One survey in particular gives the general flavor of East European sentiments about the Soviet Union and its system. The nations polled were Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The tabulations were three-year rolling averages, ending in the early 1980s.

In essence, the poll was a model free election, offering respondents their choice of political parties as they are typically arrayed in a West European election. Here are the results:

Parties	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Conservative	8%	9%	7%
Peasant	3	11	15
Christian Democrat	29	26	34
Democrat Socialist	43	42	35
Communist	3(!)	7(!)	4(!)

Even though all three nations polled are ruled by Communist governments, only about 5 percent of the people would *vote* Communist in a free election.

If there is any doubt that this reflects general dislike of the Soviets as well as of communism as a form of government, consider the answers to another question about whose side Czech, Polish, and Hungarian respondents would take in a serious conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Question: Should a serious conflict develop between the United States and the Soviet Union, would your sympathies be with the United States, the Soviet Union, or with neither side?

In a serious conflict between the two, would side with:

United States	48%
U.S.S.R.	5
With neither	33
Other/No answer	14

What about the views of the Soviet Union among Soviets? Like East Europeans, a substantial number of Soviet citizens visit Western Europe, typically in groups for a few days holiday, without families.

Polling data, gathered in roughly similar ways to the East European methodology mentioned earlier, show that among those taking a position, almost half of the Soviet people are now against the war in Afghanistan.

Polls also show massive numbers of Soviets listening to foreign radio: Voice of America, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio Liberty, and Kol Israel. When asked why, people say one reason they listen is that they are skeptical about what the government of the U.S.S.R. is saying on Radio Moscow.

My debating partner in Latvia, Vladimir Lomeyko, former spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, denounced my remarks and his denunciation was echoed widely in the Soviet media. The line of attack was not that the poll data were wrong: the Soviets know what the Western world thinks of Russia. They do not doubt that they are unloved; in fact, they know they are often despised. And they know this makes their life difficult.

The main point was that this polling material revealed just how perverted the Western media were in conveying such misperceptions to the public.

What could they do about the misperceptions?

Offering a bit of gratuitous advice, I said in Riga that there are two obvious ways for a nation to clear up a misperception. The first is to think about opening up the country. Show the misperceivers that they are wrong. Clear up the easy problems first. Let Sakharov out of Gorki. Let Shcharansky go to Israel. Release political prisoners. Let emigration increase. The second strategy is to consider—actually reconsider—whether

(Continued on page 59)

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STRATEGIC THOUGHTS ABOUT SDI

by Mitchell Bard

Last October, following President Ronald Reagan's meeting with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland, Americans were told that a number of "potential" arms agreements were reached. All of them foundered because of one disagreement: the Russian insistence that the United States abandon its plans to develop and deploy the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as "Star Wars," and the president's unwillingness to accede to the Soviet demand. Four months later, members of his administration are pushing not only to build a space shield, but also to accelerate its development. Opinion polls have consistently shown that Americans want arms control agreements, so it is reasonable to ask whether they also support the president's apparent readiness to allow arms agreements to fall by the wayside in order to preserve SDI.

Polls conducted in late October and early November 1985, before Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva for their first summit, showed substantial support (55-61 percent) for SDI (see table 1). That support held up in two polls taken between Geneva and Reykjavik. In the June 1986 Associated Press/Media General poll, 52 percent approved of SDI research to counter the Soviet threat. The July NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* poll showed that 58 percent of the public thought SDI was a good idea.

Immediately after the Iceland summit, the public reacted favorably to the president's insistence on SDI and a sizable majority—from 55 to 64 percent—believed the United States should go ahead with the program. Was this a reflection of support for the program or for the president? Often a "rally 'round the flag" effect, that is, a tendency for the public to support the president in the midst of a crisis or a diplomatic initiative, appears.

Polls taken since then suggest that public support is genuine. The CBS News/*New York Times* election day poll asked voters to choose between two statements. Sixty-one percent said that Reagan should not have "given up SDI to get a big reduction in Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons." Thirty percent disagreed. Support for SDI itself was more modest—51 to 52 percent—in December 1986 surveys by the *Los Angeles Times* and Gallup. A quick glance at the Gallup figures in table 1 appears to show that support for SDI declined, but this may not be the case. The December Gallup question was asked at the height of the furor over the Iranian arms deal, as part of a survey on Reagan's approval and credibility. In this poll, in fact, support actually increased from earlier surveys, when the identical question was asked and less than half of the respondents supported the program.

In principle, the public does seem to favor the idea of a shield against nuclear weapons. When first proposed in April 1983, support for building a space-based defense system ranged from 54 percent (ABC News/*Washington Post*) to 67 percent (CBS News/*New York Times*). Party identification and gender, though, make a big difference in responses. Although both Democrats and women generally favor SDI, they are much more skeptical than Republicans and men about whether the system will work or have any utility in negotiations with the Russians. These results are not particularly surprising. Democrats and women tend to be more sympathetic to arms control and opposed to the Reagan administration's defense programs than Republicans and men are.

The Price We'll Pay

Most polls show majorities in favor of SDI, but there are exceptions. The July and October 1985 ABC News/*Washington Post* polls and the September 1984, August 1985, and January 1986 Gallup polls are examples. In three, a majority opposed SDI and in the other two, supporters outnumbered opponents by narrow margins. But in all these cases, the questions raised the issue of the program's cost. When Gallup asked whether the U.S. should develop "Star Wars" without mentioning its cost, a substantial majority supported the program.

When Harris asked specifically if people were willing to spend billions of dollars on SDI, majorities in April 1983 (58 percent) and March 1985 (56 percent) opposed the program. On an even more specific question, the November 1985 *Los Angeles Times* poll asked if $26 billion for five years was too much to spend on SDI, given the nation's budget situation. Here, 59 percent agreed, while 27 percent thought the amount was about right, and only 7 percent felt it was not enough. A January 1985 CBS News/*New York Times* poll found that 46 percent did not believe SDI was worth the money, and 40 percent believed it was. The public appears to like the idea of a space defense system, but is less enthusiastic about paying for it. In the only question (June 1986, Associated Press/Media General) that asked whether more money should go to SDI or to conventional weapons, the latter was favored by 51 to 31 percent.

This, however, does not tell the whole story. On the eve of the summit, the ABC News/*Washington Post* poll repeated a question that mentioned SDI's cost; this time 55 percent supported it, and only 38 percent opposed it. Timing probably had an effect as the public rallied around the president on the eve of the summit. A more likely explanation is a change in question wording.

In July, ABC News/*Washington Post* asked: "Supporters [of SDI] say such weapons could guarantee protection of the United States against nuclear attack and are worth whatever they cost. Opponents say such weapons *will not work*, will increase the arms race, and that the research will cost many billions of dollars." In later polls, ABC News/*Washington Post* deleted the italicized clause and support rose 7 percentage points, to a plurality in favor.

These results suggest that people may be willing to pay billions of dollars for a program that might increase the arms race and protect the United States against attack, but not for a program that they think might not work. In fact, public responses to other questions reveal that whether Star Wars will work is a critical issue.

A Safer World?

In general, the public appears to be willing to endorse SDI because it believes that the system will make the world safer, but there are a number of contradictions in the responses. When Gallup asked in October and November 1985 whether "Star Wars" would make the world safer, 58 percent said that it would. A similar question in *Newsweek*'s November poll showed that 53 percent believed the world would be safer. On the other hand, in January 1985, when Gallup found 50 percent believing the world would be safer, 54 percent of the CBS News/*New York Times* poll's respondents believed that the arms race would be more dangerous, and 60 percent would be worried if we had the system. The most peculiar results occurred in the November 1985 *Los Angeles Times* poll. Sixty-one percent of the respondents believed space weapons should be outlawed, even though 54 percent thought SDI increased the chances for peace. Those people were somehow confident, even though only 10 percent believed that SDI would be a leakproof umbrella, 37 percent thought it would be effective against missiles and satellites, and 22 percent did not think it would work.

Polls reveal a lot of confusion about the relationship between SDI and arms reduction. The October and November 1985 ABC News/*Washington Post* polls found large majorities (71 and 74 percent) who believed that an arms reduction agreement was more important than building space weapons, yet a majority in the second survey *opposed* stopping development of SDI in order to obtain an agreement. When given a choice between either SDI or arms reduction, a majority (53 percent) chose arms reduction (CBS News/*New York Times*). Two other polls (ABC News/*Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times*) in 1985 found, however, that over 60 percent of the public favored development of SDI even if it violated a treaty.

The public preference for SDI was even more evident following the Iceland summit. For example, 55 percent said that proceeding with Star Wars was preferable to eliminating "all" strategic nuclear missiles (Harris/*Business Week*), and 54 percent wanted to proceed with SDI "no matter what happened in arms control negotiations," while only 17 percent were willing to use it as a bargaining chip (*Time*/Yankelovich

Clancy Shulman). Sixty percent believed the president "should not have made concessions" on Star Wars to get an arms control agreement (NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*), and 68 percent opposed giving up SDI even for a big reduction in Soviet and American missiles (CBS News/*New York Times*).

The difference between these 1985 and 1986 questions may be explained by the timing of the polls, since the former were conducted prior to the summit when the public was in a relatively conciliatory mood; in fact, narrow pluralities in five 1985 polls believed that SDI would make negotiating with the Soviets easier. During the Iceland summit, however, the Soviets did not appear to make concessions and were subsequently blamed by the public for the summit's failure. Thus, it was not surprising that the percentage opposed to stopping development of SDI in order to get an arms control agreement edged up from 52 to 58 percent in the November 1985 and October 1986 ABC News/*Washington Post* polls.

SDI and the 1986 Elections

Although these poll results show general support for SDI, the issue did not appear to generate much electoral enthusiasm in elections last November. After the summit, one poll found that 53 percent of the voters would be more likely to vote for a candidate who supported Star Wars (NBC/*Wall Street Journal*), but a second survey (*Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman) indicated that only 30 percent were more likely to vote for an SDI supporter, 13 percent were less likely, and 52 percent said the candidate's position made no difference. The CBS News/*New York Times* election day exit poll found that voters' support of SDI was split along party lines with 74 percent of the Republicans opposed to trading SDI for arms reduction and 19 percent favoring a trade-off, while only 49 percent of the Democrats opposed and 42 percent favored it. The GOP loss of Senate control can be attributed to a number of factors, but SDI does not appear to be one of the significant ones.

The Role of Public Opinion

How seriously should we take the poll data on SDI? The vast majority of the public has heard of the program, but only about a fifth know "a great deal" about it. Most people do not understand SDI's purpose. The consequence is that people believe SDI will work, without knowing what SDI is supposed to do. Misunderstanding about SDI's purpose was evident in a November 1985 CBS News/*New York Times* poll, in which only 30 percent of the respondents thought Star Wars was intended to protect the entire population, 28 percent thought it was designed to protect half, 15 percent said less than 10 percent, and 27 percent did not know.

Table 1

SHOULD THE U.S. BUILD A SPACE-BASED DEFENSE SYSTEM?

	Should	Should not	Don't know
April 1983 (ABC/*WP*)	54%	37%	8%
April 1983 (CBS/*NYT*)	67	25	8
Aug. 1984 (Roper)	54	34	12
Sept. 1984 (Gallup)	41	47	12
Jan. 1985 (Gallup)	52	38	10
March 1985 (Roper)	52	36	12
April 1985 (*Time*/YSW)	51	35	14
July 1985 (Roper)	43	35	22
July 1985 (ABC/*WP*)	41	53	5
Aug. 1985 (Gallup)	45	47	8
Sept. 1985 (*Time*/YSW)	54	28	18
Oct. 1985 (ABC/*WP*)	48	46	5
Oct. 1985 (Gallup)	61	28	11
Nov. 1985 (*LAT*)	58	30	11
Nov. 1985 (ABC/*WP*)	55	38	6
Nov. 1985 (*Time*/YSW)	59	34	7
Geneva Summit, Nov. 19-21, 1985			
Jan. 1986 (Gallup)	47	44	9
June 1986 (AP/MG)	52	34	14
July 1986 (NBC/*WSJ*)	58	30	12
Reykjavik, Oct. 11-12, 1986			
Oct. 1986 (*Time*/YCS)	64	26	10
Oct. 1986 (ABC/*WP*)	55	16	27
Oct. 1986 (NBC/*WSJ*)	60	26	NA
Oct. 1986 (Roper)	54	30	16
Dec. 1986 (*LAT*)	51	30	19
Dec. 1986 (Gallup)	52	40	8

ABC/*WP* = ABC News/*Washington Post*
NBC/*WSJ* = NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*
CBS/*NYT* = CBS News/*New York Times*
LAT = *Los Angeles Times*
Time/YSW = *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White
Time/YCS = *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman
AP/MG = *Associated Press*/Media General

Note: Not all surveys cited in this article are listed here

Part of the uncertainty may be attributable to the administration's failure to communicate to the American people just what SDI is meant to accomplish. But even if that is true, a more fundamental concern arises as we review these data. What role should public opinion play on a complex issue where levels of knowledge are not high and the public exhibits contradictory views? When Edmund Burke suggested that "your representative owes you not his industry only but his judgment; and betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion," he was not referring specifically to foreign or defense policy. But his remarks would be particularly appropriate in the case of SDI. Our leaders should not feel bound by public opinion, but they should not feel entirely unencumbered by it either. As Bill Moyers has noted: "When politics and laws outdistance public opinion, or take public opinion for granted, or fail to command respect in the conscience of the people, they lose their 'natural' legitimacy." A true test of leadership, then, is the ability to balance one's own perception of the national interest with that of the public, and to know when to make decisions on the basis of the former. The current debate over arms control and the merits of SDI are just such a test. ☑

Mitchell Bard is a foreign policy analyst at the University of California, Irvine.

OPINION ROUNDUP

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ISSUE FOR 1988?

One of the enduring myths about political life in the United States is that the public is anti-government. It would be equally wrongheaded, of course, to claim that the public is somehow pro-government. The strong individualism that distinguishes so many aspects of American social and political experience shapes our views of government's proper role: we want government programs and initiatives that extend individual opportunity, well-being and security—but not government that stifles the individual or curtails the scope of his personal choices.

Over the last two decades or so, Americans' individual-centered approach to government has pulled them in two opposing directions. On the one hand, the wealth of contemporary society has increased expectations, and the public has made expansive claims for services of all sorts—some of which it wants government to provide (pp. 22-23). On the other hand, the big government that has resulted threatens individual autonomy and causes problems (pp. 24-26). The onset of high inflation in the 1970s clearly did much to strengthen the public's determination that government is as much a problem as a solution: Americans deeply resented high inflation, and they blamed government (pp. 30-33).

Those who want to cut back on domestic government have naturally chosen to emphasize the public's dissatisfaction with government's size and scope; those who want government intervention stress the public's appetite for services. The fact is, though, that both dimensions of American thinking about the state have been prominent over the last two decades; the tensions between the two viewpoints, not their resolution left or right, Democrats or Republicans, is the story. After the events of the 1970s, Americans' main message to their political leaders was "slow down." This judgment helped elect Ronald Reagan and it has sustained his administration over its first six years. Now the public thinks it is safe to push just a bit on the throttle (p. 29). The basic tension or ambivalence in public thinking remains, however, unchanged.

AMERICANS WANT A LOT FROM GOVERNMENT

Question: Do you think that the problem of poverty in the United States can be handled mainly by volunteer efforts, or do you think that there must be substantial government involvement as well?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, April 20-26, 1985.

Question: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements. The federal government should help finance long-term care of the elderly.



Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts for Ethan Allen, Inc., September 24-November 9, 1985.

Question: (There are many problems facing our nation today. But at certain times some things are more important than others, and need more attention from our federal government than others. I'd like to know for each of the things on this list whether you think it is something that government should be making a major effort on now, or something the government should be making some effort on now, or something not needing any particular government effort now.) . . . Taking steps to help American business become more competitive in foreign markets.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 86-6), May 31-June 7, 1986.

GOVERNMENT HAS A MAJOR ROLE IN MANY AREAS

Question: Turning now to the business of the country—we are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we are spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First . . .





Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, latest that of Roper Report 86-1, December 7-14, 1985

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we are spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on . . .





Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1986.

EXPECTATIONS ARE HIGH

Question: On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to . . .



Note: "Can't choose" and "No answer" calculated out. For "Reduce income differences between rich and poor," these responses amounted to 11%.

Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April, 1985.

Question: Here are some things the government might do for the economy. Circle one number for each action to show whether you are in favor of it or against it.


Things the government might do for the economy

Note: "No answer" calculated out.

Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, February-April, 1985.

GOVERNMENT IS NEEDED AS A CHECK ON BUSINESS

Question: I'm going to read a list of activities American business carries out or gets involved in. First, investing money in the development of new products and services. Overall, do you think this is something American business will do on its own without the government getting involved, or do you think it's necessary for the government to keep a sharp eye on business to make sure it does that?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 85-4), March 23-30, 1985.

Big Government Causes Problems

Question: Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person. Others feel the government in Washington has not gotten too strong for the good of the country. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other?



	Government is getting too powerful	Government has not gotten too strong	Don't know
1964	30%	36%	34%
1966	39	27	34
1968	41	30	29
1970	31	33	36
1972	41	27	32
1976	49	20	31
1978	43	14	43
1980	49	15	35
1984	32	23	45

Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, *American National Election Study*, latest that of 1984.

IT'S NOT THE SOLUTION, IT'S THE PROBLEM

Question: Do you think that, in general, the federal government creates more problems than it solves, or do you think it solves more problems than it creates?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 19-23, 1986.

PUBLIC DIVIDED ABOUT ITS IMPACT

Question: There were many government programs created in the 1960s to try to improve the condition of poor people in this country. Do you think these programs generally made things better, made things worse, or do you think they didn't have much impact one way or the other?



	Better	Worse	Not much impact
1978	34%	15%	51%
1980	33	22	46
1984	46	22	32
1986	41	19	40

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 19-23, 1986.

GOVERNMENT DOESN'T KNOW ENOUGH TO SOLVE SOME PROBLEMS

Question: Do you think the government can reduce unemployment to any real extent, or do we just have to wait until the economy works itself out?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 16-19, 1983.

Question: Even if the government were willing to spend whatever is necessary to eliminate poverty in the United States, do you think the government knows enough about how to do that, or not?



Source: Survey by *Los Angeles Times*, April 20-26, 1985.

IT'S A BIG THREAT TO THE COUNTRY'S WELL-BEING

Question: Looking to the future, which would you say is the biggest threat to the well-being of this country—big business, big labor, or big government?



	Big government	Big business	Big labor	No opinion
1959	14%	15%	41%	30%
1967	49	14	21	16
1968	46	12	26	16
1977	39	23	26	12
1978	47	19	19	15
1979	43	28	17	12
1981	46	22	22	10
1983	51	19	18	12
1985	50	22	19	9

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of June 7-10, 1985.

HOW GOVERNMENT STACKS UP TO BUSINESS

Question: Which institution—business, government, or labor . . .

1980	Government	Business	Labor
Is most responsible for causing inflation	52%	18%	15%
Should have its power cut back for the good of the country	43	17	20
Is the most responsible for causing unemployment	46	20	15
Is the most responsible for declining productivity	35	18	28
Has the best leaders	22	40	25
Is best able to get things done	21	39	30

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, September 2-7, 1980.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT DOES BEST JOB OF SOLVING THE PROBLEMS IT FACES

Question: Which level of government—federal, state, or local—does the best job of dealing with the problems it faces?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of January 19-23, 1986.

Question: Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?



	A lot	Some	Not very much
1958	45%	44%	10%
1964	48	45	7
1968	61	35	4
1970	70	26	4
1972	67	31	2
1974	76	22	1
1976	76	21	3
1978	79	19	2
1980	80	18	2
1982	68	30	2
1983	76	22	2
1984	69	28	3
Feb. 1985	71	26	3
Dec. 1985	76	21	3

Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies, the University of Michigan, *American National Election Study*, latest that of 1982; CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of February 1985; and *New York Times*, latest that of December 14-18, 1985.

The Role of Individual Responsibility

Question: In general some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own. . . . Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (If Yes) Do you think that the government . . . (1956-1978). . . . Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this? (1980-1984)



Note: For 1980-1984, respondents were given a scale where 1 meant government should see to it that everyone has a job and a good standard of living, and 7 meant the government should let each person get ahead on his own. Points 1-3 were combined and points 5-7 were combined. "Depends," "Point 4," and "Don't know" are not shown.

Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies, *American National Election Study*, University of Michigan, latest that of 1984.

Question: Which statement comes closest to your position: "The government is responsible for the well-being of all its citizens and has an obligation to take care of people when they are in trouble," or "People are responsible for their own well-being and they have an obligation to take care of themselves when they are in trouble." (Wait for reply) Do you feel strongly about that, or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, January 19-24, 1985.

Question: Some people think that blacks have been discriminated against for so long that the government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe that the government should not be giving special treatment to blacks. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (Respondents shown card with 1 to 5 scale on which point 1 indicates "I strongly agree the government is obligated to help blacks" and point 5 indicates "I strongly agree that government shouldn't give special treatment." Point 3 indicates "I agree with both answers.")



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1986.

Question: I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at card (showing a scale from 1 to 5). Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at point 5. ("I agree with both answers" is at point 3.) Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April 1986.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Where the Public Is Today

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your views about government power today?

	1978	1982	1984	1985	1986
Federal government has too much power	38%	38%	35%	31%	28%
Federal government is using about the right amount of power for meeting today's needs	18	18	25	27	24
Federal government should use its powers more vigorously to promote the well-being of all segments of the people	36	30	34	36	41



Source: Surveys by Opinion Research Corporation (1978, 1982) and the Gallup Organization for the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, latest that of May 17-18, 1986.

Question: Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1986.

Question: Some people think the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think the government should do more to solve our country's problems. Which of these two views is closer to your own?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 15-19, 1987.

INFLATION: THE

Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July-September, 1986.

Question: Here is a list of things people have told us they are concerned about today (card shown respondent). Would you read over that list and then tell me which 2 or 3 *you personally* are most concerned about today?

PROBLEMS THAT CONCERN YOU PERSONALLY
(top five)



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, latest that of January 11-25, 1986.

SLEEPING MONSTER?



	Inflation	Other economic	Foreign affairs/ defense	Social problems
Feb. 60	10%	8%	59%	9%
Feb. 61	2	35	59	7
Apr. 62	8	13	63	9
Sept. 63	8	5	25	52
Sept. 64	6	4	46	35
Sept. 65	5	3	53	37
May 66	16	4	60	14
Oct.-Nov. 67	16	0	50	21
June-July 68	9	3	52	44
Jan. 69	9	3	40	40
May 70	10	0	36	56
May 71	12	11	40	39
June 72	16	13	40	17
May 73	40	8	9	26
May-June 74	48	0	0	11
July 75	51	21	0	10
Apr. 76	38	24	5	18
July 77	32	17	10	14
July 78	61	16	10	10
Aug. 79	50	9	6	18
June 80	59	15	16	4
May 81	59	16	10	13
June 82	35	57	13	7
July 83	14	60	16	6
June 84	14	31	27	10
May 85	11	35	23	16
July-Sept. 86	4	36	22	14

Note: "Malfeasance in government" never more than 8%, except in 1973 when it was 14%; 1974, 26%; 1975, 12%; 1976, 17%; 1979, 13%; 1984, 13%; 1985, 10%; and 1986, 13%. "Energy" was never more than 7%, except in 1977 when it was 15%. Neither category is shown.

IN THE SIXTIES, A DIFFERENT CLIMATE

Question: Some people say that higher prices are caused largely by the demand for higher wages on the part of labor, others say by demand for higher profits on the part of employers. Who do you think are more to blame—employees or employers (1959, 1960, 1962) . . . high wages or high profits (1966)?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 10-15, 1966.

BY THE MID SEVENTIES, DRASTIC ACTION NEEDED ON INFLATION

Question: How concerned about inflation are you? Do you think we must control it even if it means drastic actions, personal sacrifices and serious belt tightening for a year or two, or that we should do what we can to slow inflation as long as the measures used don't cause any serious disruption or sacrifice, or that we ought to just get used to inflation and learn to live with it?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 79-9), latest that of September 22-29, 1979.

GOVERNMENT THE VILLAIN

Question: (Now I'm going to read a list of things which are sometimes mentioned as causes of inflation. For each please tell me if you think it is a very important, somewhat important or not important at all cause of inflation.) . . .

Very important/somewhat important cause of inflation (1981)



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 25-29, 1981.

Question: I am going to mention a few things some people say are causes of inflation. After each I'd like you to tell me whether you think it is a major cause of inflation, just one of many causes of inflation, or not much of a cause of inflation at all.

Major cause of inflation (1981)



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 19-20, 1981.

Question: In your opinion, which is most responsible for inflation —government, business, or labor? (Gallup) Among these three groups which one would you say is most to blame for inflation in the U.S.: government, business, or labor? (ABC News/*Washington Post*)



Note: In 1974, multiple responses were accepted.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 15-18, 1978, and ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 22-30, 1982.

SOME PROGRESS APPARENT

Question: Nobody likes inflation, but different people look at it differently. Which of these statements best describes your feelings about inflation? (Card shown respondent)



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 82-6), June 5-12, 1982.

BY 1984, ONLY ONE THIRD OF FAMILIES SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY INFLATION

Question: In the last few years, do you think you and your family have been more seriously hurt by unemployment, or by inflation, or haven't you been seriously affected by either one?



Note: The April 1984 poll surveyed only registered voters.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of April 23-26, 1984.

REAGAN

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



	Gallup	ABC/Post	CBS/NYT
1/81	51/13		
2/81	55/18	68/15	
3/81	60/24	72/17	
4/81	67/19	73/19	67/18
5/81	68/21	66/25	
6/81	59/29		59/23
7/81	56/30	62/29	
8/81	60/29		
9/81	52/37	64/33	53/33
10/81	53/35	59/33	
11/81	49/40	52/38	
12/81	49/41	52/41	
1/82	47/42	52/39	49/38
2/82	47/43	48/46	
3/82	46/45	50/46	43/42
4/82	43/47	51/45	
5/82	45/44	46/45	43/44
6/82	44/46		42/45
7/82	42/46		
8/82	42/46	49/47	
9/82	42/48	46/50	42/44
10/82	42/48	49/44	48/42
11/82	43/47		
12/82	41/50	45/48	
1/83	35/56	42/54	41/47
2/83	40/50	45/50	
3/83	41/49		
4/83	41/49	49/47	43/45
5/83	46/43	53/42	
6/83	47/44	53/44	47/39
7/83	42//47	52/44	
8/83	43/46		
9/83	48/42	52/42	46/41
10/83	49/41	57/40	48/38
11/83	53/37	63/31	
12/83	54/38	59/37	
1/84	55/37	57/39	57/32
2/84	55/36	59/38	56/35
3/84	54/39		
4/84	52/37		
5/84	54/38	57/37	
6/84	54/36		57/33
7/84	52/37	54/41	
8/84	54/38		54/33
9/84	57/36	58/38	58/29
10/84	58/33		58/32
11/84	62/30		
12/84	59/32		
1/85	64/28	68/28	62/29
2/85	60/31	62/35	59/29
3/85	56/37	60/36	
4/85	52/37	54/42	
5/85	55/37	57/38	59/29
6/85		66/30	
7/85	63/28	65/31	65/24
8/85	65/26		
9/85	60/30	62/34	62/27
10/85	63/29	63/33	
11/85		67/28	65/26
12/85		66/27	
1/86	64/27		65/24
2/86		65/31	
3/86		65/32	
4/86	62/29	70/26	64/27
5/86		70/27	68/21
6/86			67/23
7/86	63/28		
8/86			62/25
9/86			63/27
10/86	63/29		67/25
11/86		57/40	46/45
12/86	48/43	49/47	47/40
1/87	49/42	50/47	52/38
2/87			

Note: When survey organizations asked the approval question more than once in a month, we have used the latest point in the month.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 15-19, 1987; CBS News/*New York Times*, January 18-21, 1987; and the Gallup Organization, January 16-18, 1987.

AND IRAN



NBC News

	Excellent/Good	Only fair	Poor
2/81	56%	21%	5%
4/81	66	22	5
5/81	62	24	9
7/81	55	31	11
8/81	63	26	9
9/81	53	27	16
10/81	51	32	14
11/81	46	35	16
12/81	48	31	19
1/82	46	34	18
3/82	43	34	21
5/82	42	34	21
6/82	43	35	20
8/82	37	38	24
10/82	40	33	24
11/82	42	34	22
1/84	49	34	15
2/84	49	32	17
3/84	50	31	17
6/84	52	32	16
7/84	55	29	17
8/84	52	30	17
9/84	56	27	15
10/84	57	28	13
2/85	59	26	13
5/85	51	31	16
6/85	57	29	12
7/85	64	26	8
10/85	56	29	13
11/85	67	24	8
12/85	60	28	10
1/86	58	31	9
2/86	63	26	10
4/86	65	23	10
6/86	64	25	10
7/86	63	26	10
8/86	62	26	11
9/86	63	26	10
10/86	61	27	11
11/86	57	28	14
12/86	50	29	19
1/87	52	29	18

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of November 1982; NBC News January 1984-July 1985 and NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, latest that of January 1987.

LEVELS OF ATTENTION

Question: How closely are you following the situation involving the shipment of arms to Iran and the attempts to release American hostages held by pro-Iranian terrorists in Lebanon? Are you following it very closely, somewhat closely, not too closely, or not closely at all?



Note: A Gallup question (December 27, 1986-January 4, 1987), for the *Times-Mirror*, found that 20% had been following the arms sales very closely, 47% fairly closely, 23% said not too closely, and 10% not closely at all. When asked about the Challenger shuttle explosion and the nuclear reactor explosion at Chernobyl, the responses were 80%, 16%, 3% and 1%; and 46%, 34%, 15% and 5% respectively.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 15-19, 1987.

THE TRUTH . . .

Question: In your opinion, which of these three things is the worst? Is it . . . (If more than one, probe:) Well, which one is the worst?

Which of these three things is the worst



Note: "Don't know" not shown. Categories less than 7% not shown. In a *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman poll (January 5-7, 1987), 58% of those surveyed said they were bothered most because the "Administration has not told the American people everything that happened," 20% by arms sales to Iran, 11% by money sent to the Contras.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, December 7-8, 1986.

THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT

Question: Generally speaking do you think Reagan has been telling the public the truth about the Iran situation, or not?



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 15-19, 1987.

Question: Do you think Reagan is doing as much as he can right now to bring out all the facts surrounding the Iran affair or not?



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 15-19, 1987.

REAGAN'S LEADERSHIP DIMINISHED . . .

Question: How would you rate Reagan on his understanding of complicated foreign policy problems: excellent, good, not good, or poor?



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 15-19, 1987.

Question: Do you trust Reagan to make the right decisions or not when it comes to what the United States should do in world affairs?



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 15-19, 1987.

. . . BUT NOT DESTROYED

Question: How seriously do you think this incident (the Iran-Nicaragua incident) will affect Ronald Reagan's ability to lead the United States during the last two years of his presidency? Do you think it will destroy his leadership, or do you think it will diminish his power but not destroy it, or do you think this incident will blow over and have almost no effect on the President's ability to lead the nation?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 6-9, 1986.

Question: Which of these two statements best describes your views on the Iran arms sales situation and the way Reagan has handled it?



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 15-19, 1987.

1988: TH

DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE 1988

(Expressed in percentages)

	Babbitt	Biden	Blanchard	Bentsen	T. Bradley	B. Bradley	Bumpers	Coelho	Cuomo	Dukakis	Feinstein	Gephardt	Hart	Iacocca	Jackson	Kennedy	Nunn	Robb	Rockefeller	Schroeder	White
Arthur J. Finkelstein and Associates																					
2/7-10/86[1]	*	*	NA	†	NA	3	1	NA	15	NA	NA	*	24	NA	6	26	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
3/7-10[1]	1	*	NA	2	NA	7	†	NA	16	NA	NA	2	30	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/4-7[1]	†	1	NA	3	NA	6	0	NA	13	NA	NA	2	34	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/4-7[1]	*	1	NA	3	NA	5	1	NA	12	NA	NA	*	27	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/30-6/2[1]	*	†	NA	2	NA	8	1	NA	13	NA	NA	1	28	NA	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
7/3-6[1]	*	1	NA	3	NA	7	1	NA	14	NA	NA	1	30	NA	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
8/7-13[1]	†	*	NA	0	NA	5	3	NA	11	NA	NA	0	19	20	9	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
9/1-5[1]	0	†	NA	0	NA	4	0	NA	15	NA	NA	*	20	13	10	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA
10/4-6[1]	0	†	NA	1	NA	5	1	NA	12	NA	NA	†	20	14	11	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA
1/19-27/87[1]	†	0	NA	0	NA	3	*	NA	11	NA	NA	1	26	10	9	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA
Gallup																					
6/7-10/85[1]	1	1	NA	NA	5	4	2	†	15	NA	2	NA	31	11	14	46	1	3	3	†	1
1/10-13/86[1]	1	1	NA	NA	8	8	2	1	22	NA	3	2	47	18	16	NA	3	3	6	1	5
4/11-14[1]	1	1	NA	NA	7	6	2	†	27	NA	4	1	39	14	18	NA	2	5	6	2	2
7/11-14[2]	‡	‡	NA	NA	7	7	‡	‡	22	NA	3	‡	34	26	17	NA	‡	3	6	‡	‡
10/24-27[2]	‡	‡	NA	NA	7	8	‡	‡	27	3	‡	‡	32	26	14	NA	‡	3	6	‡	3
1/16-19/87[2]	1	2	NA	NA	NA	11	4	NA	23	3	NA	1	53	29	21	NA	5	6	NA	NA	NA
Harris																					
4/1-3/85[1]	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	2	NA	14	NA	NA	*	20	NA	NA	31	2	3	NA	NA	3
4/1-3[2]	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	2	NA	14	NA	NA	1	24	NA	NA	27	2	3	NA	NA	4
2/22-3/3/86[1]	*	*	2	NA	NA	6	2	NA	21	2	NA	2	40	NA	NA	NA	3	3	NA	NA	3
2/22-3/3[2]	1	*	2	NA	NA	8	2	NA	19	3	NA	3	37	NA	NA	NA	3	4	NA	NA	3
Los Angeles Times (7/8-14 is percentage inclined to vote for candidate)																					
2/20-25/86[1]	NA	1	NA	NA	2	3	NA	NA	15	NA	0	NA	23	10	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
7/8-14[1]	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	24	NA	NA	NA	49	36	24	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
ABC News/*Washington Post*																					
2/6-12/86[2]	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	19	NA	NA	1	39	14	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/15-19[2]	*	1	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	16	NA	NA	2	33	19	18	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
1/15-19/87[2]	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	1	39	NA	13	NA	4	3	NA	NA	NA
Yankelovich Clancy Shulman																					
5/20-22/86[2]	1	*	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	11	NA	NA	1	34	18	13	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/5-7/87[2]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	14	NA	NA	1	37	NA	13	NA	4	NA	NA	NA	NA
Des Moines Register and Tribune Company, "Iowa Poll"																					
5/14-20/86[4]	1	0	NA	NA	NA	2	0	NA	24	0	NA	1	44	NA	2	NA	0	1	NA	NA	1
12/8-16[6]	3	1	NA	NA	NA	5	1	NA	13	1	NA	1	56	NA	4	NA	1	0	NA	NA	NA
1/26-2/4/87[1]	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	14	†	NA	3	59	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bannon Research in New Hampshire																					
5/8-11/86[5]	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	16	27	NA	0	42	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
9/10[7]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	26	NA	NA	1	47	NA	6	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA
9/10[7]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	19	27	NA	1	33	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Michigan primary exit poll by Gordon S. Black																					
8/5/86[1]	1	2	23	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	17	NA	NA	1	18	30	NA	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA

(Continued on page 40)

RACE IS ON

REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE 1988

(Expressed in percentages)

	Armstrong	H. Baker	J. Baker	Brock	Bush	Domenici	E. Dole	R. Dole	DuPont	Ford	Gingrich	Haig	Helms	Kean	Kemp	Kirkpatrick	Laxalt	Lehrman	Lott	Lugar	Packwood	Robertson	Rumsfeld	Thompson	Thornburgh
Arthur J. Finkelstein and Associates																									
2/7-10/86[1]	1	8	NA	NA	44	NA	NA	7	1	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	5	4	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
3/7-10[1]	2	5	NA	NA	51	NA	NA	7	†	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	6	3	*	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
4/4-7[1]	2	10	NA	NA	38	NA	NA	9	0	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	10	5	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
5/4-7[1]	2	8	NA	NA	40	NA	NA	9	*	NA	NA	NA	1	NA	7	3	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
5/30-6/2[1]	2	5	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	7	0	NA	NA	2	0	NA	7	4	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
7/3-6[1]	1	8	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	9	0	NA	NA	1	0	NA	7	2	*	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
8/7-13[1]	0	4	NA	NA	42	NA	NA	9	0	NA	NA	2	2	NA	7	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
9/1-5[1]	0	8	NA	NA	38	NA	NA	9	1	NA	NA	5	1	NA	8	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
10/4-6[1]	1	8	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	11	2	NA	NA	4	1	NA	4	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
1/19-27/87[1]	0	5	NA	NA	39	NA	NA	12	1	NA	NA	6	1	NA	7	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
Gallup																									
6/7-10/85[1]	NA	22	5	2	53	2	5	18	NA	NA	†	NA	4	2	10	9	2	2	†	1	1	NA	NA	3	3
4/11-14/86[1]	NA	17	4	1	51	2	2	21	1	NA	†	8	3	1	10	7	2	†	†	3	1	6	1	3	2
7/11-14[2]	‡	12	‡	‡	53	‡	3	16	‡	NA	NA	10	3	9	9	‡	‡	NA	NA	‡	‡	8	‡	‡	4
10/24-27[2]	‡	14	3	‡	57	‡	4	20	‡	NA	NA	9	4	‡	12	6	‡	NA	NA	3	‡	8	‡	‡	‡
1/16-19/87[2]	3	14	5	NA	49	NA	NA	27	1	NA	NA	9	NA	6	13	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	8	1	4	NA
Harris																									
4/1-3/85[1]	NA	16	NA	NA	44	NA	1	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	1	9	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/1-3[2]	NA	17	NA	NA	38	NA	2	12	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	2	9	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
2/22-3/3/86[1]	NA	13	NA	NA	31	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	NA	9	2	3	5	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
2/22-3/3[2]	NA	16	NA	NA	29	NA	NA	15	NA	NA	NA	8	3	3	6	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
1/9-18/87[2]	NA	12	NA	NA	29	NA	NA	20	2	NA	NA	5	NA	3	7	5	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	1	NA	NA
Los Angeles Times (7/8-14 is percentage inclined to vote for candidate)																									
2/20-25/86[1]	NA	8	NA	NA	39	NA	NA	5	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	0	NA	NA
7/8-14[1]	NA	24	NA	NA	61	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	NA	19	NA	NA	21	25	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	NA	NA
ABC News/*Washington Post*																									
2/6-12/86[2]	NA	12	NA	NA	42	NA	NA	13	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	10	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	1	NA	NA
5/15-19[2]	NA	14	NA	NA	58	NA	NA	12	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	5	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
1/15-19/87[2]	NA	13	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	20	3	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
Yankelovich Clancy Shulman																									
5/20-22/86[2]	NA	8	NA	NA	51	NA	NA	13	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	4	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
1/5-7/87[2]	NA	7	NA	NA	40	1	NA	20	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
Des Moines Register and Tribune Co., "Iowa Poll"																									
5/1-13/86[4]	NA	14	NA	NA	34	NA	NA	16	0	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	5	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	0	NA	NA
12/8-16[6]	NA	13	NA	NA	25	NA	1	28	1	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	8	3	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	1	NA	NA
1/26-2/4/87[1]	NA	10	NA	NA	28	NA	NA	33	2	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	0	NA	NA
Michigan primary exit poll by Gordon S. Black																									
8/5/86[1]	NA	10	NA	NA	48	NA	NA	11	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	15	NA	NA	NA
Michigan primary exit poll by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*																									
8/5/86[5]	NA	7	NA	NA	40	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA
NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*																									
8/11-12/86[3]	NA	5	NA	NA	43	NA	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
1/22-23/87[8]	NA	9	NA	NA	32	NA	NA	17	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA

(Continued on page 40)

(Continued from page 38)

DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE 1988

(Expressed in percentages)

	Babbitt	Biden	Blanchard	Bentsen	T. Bradley	B. Bradley	Bumpers	Coelho	Cuomo	Dukakis	Feinstein	Gephardt	Hart	Iacocca	Jackson	Kennedy	Nunn	Robb	Rockefeller	Schroeder	White
NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*																					
8/11-12/86[3]	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	15	NA	NA	NA	32	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/22-23/87[9]	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	2	31	NA	8	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
CBS News/*New York Times*																					
11/4/86[1] exit poll	1	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	20	NA	NA	1	26	NA	7	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
11/4[2] exit poll	1	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	17	NA	NA	1	24	NA	7	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/18-21/87[8]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	17	1	NA	2	33	NA	9	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA
Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network																					
12/9-11/86[1]	†	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	3	32	NA	11	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA
12/9-11[2]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	19	NA	NA	2	31	NA	9	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA

Note: 1 = Self-described Democrats; 2 = Democrats and Independents; 3 = Registered and Leaning Democrats; 4 = Registered Iowa voters; 5 = Likely Democratic voters in New Hampshire (Congressional District 1); 6 = Registered Iowa Democrats; 7 = Likely Democratic primary voters in New Hampshire; 8 = Democratic primary voters; 9 = Democrats and Democratic-leaning likely voters; † = Less than 1%; * = Less than 0.5%; ‡ = 2% or less.

(Continued from page 39)

REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE 1988

(Expressed in percentages)

	Armstrong	H. Baker	J. Baker	Brock	Bush	Domenici	E. Dole	R. Dole	DuPont	Ford	Gingrich	Haig	Helms	Kean	Kemp	Kirkpatrick	Laxalt	Lehrman	Lott	Lugar	Packwood	Robertson	Rumsfeld	Thompson	Thornburgh
CBS News/*New York Times*																									
11/4/86[1] exit poll	NA	9	NA	NA	34	NA	NA	14	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
11/4[2] exit poll	NA	9	NA	NA	28	NA	NA	13	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	8	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
1/18-21/87[7]	NA	9	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	15	1	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	0	NA	NA
Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network																									
12/9-11/86[1]	NA	12	NA	NA	29	NA	NA	20	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
12/9-11[2]	NA	13	NA	NA	25	NA	NA	20	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA

Note: 1 = Self-described Republicans; 2 = Republicans and Independents; 3 = Registered and Leaning Republicans; 4 = Adults in Iowa; 5 = Adult voters in Michigan; 6 = Registered Iowa Republicans; 7 = Republican primary voters; 8 = Republicans and Republican-leaning likely voters; * = Less than 0.5%; † = Less than 1%; ‡ = 2% or less. In the January 1987 Finkelstein asking Pat Buchanan was added and got 1%.

STAYSKAL '86 TAMPA TRIBUNE
GULLUP POLLS INC.

" EARLY SAMPLINGS INDICATE IT'S TOO SOON TO ASK ABOUT THE '88 ELECTIONS ! "

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Tracking Americans' Changing Tastes

by Kenneth Couch

A friend tells me that his wife doesn't understand the value of a dollar. So when questions of money arise, he has to translate: three pairs of Bruno Magli shoes equal one coach fare to London; dinner for two at the Palm equals one top-drawer Perry Ellis shirt; a Burberry trench coat equals a month's rent. With these comparisons, he can impress upon her the tradeoffs involved when she spends.

Most of us don't enjoy the convenience of a personal translator to help us make our financial decisions; we rely on more conventional methods—instinct, experience, and government data like the consumer price index (CPI). Yet, most of us have a more concrete idea than my friend's wife of what living costs—in both dollars and foregone opportunities. We also understand that if our income remains constant as costs escalate, our money buys less. And since prices go up much more easily than our incomes, most of us see the changing cost of living as a source of risk and watch it closely.

But in case our attention wanders, the government reports this vital statistic monthly as the CPI. This indicator has recorded price changes since 1947 and is the product of three monumental surveys that collect and tabulate some one million responses. Because of its incredible detail, the CPI can reveal far more information about the American lifestyle than what it costs. How it yields that information, however, depends on the way the index is computed.

The CPI reflects the change in the prices of a "market basket" of goods each month. Every ten years, two of the surveys are used to reevaluate the contents of the market basket to keep up with changing consumption patterns. The first (the Consumer Expenditure Survey), asks people to record everything they spend money on and what it costs. The result is an accurate picture of literally every item Americans consume and the portion of the average budget it absorbs. The second survey, the Census, weights the market basket according to the geographical distribution of our population.

A third survey, taken monthly, collects the prices of the goods that are included in the market basket. The information is released as the CPI, and this is the number that most people, via the evening news, have come to identify as the inflation rate.

Table 1

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	Percent change
Consumer price index	100	111	126	139	148	153	159	165	168	+ 68
Housing	100	112	130	145	155	159	166	173	178	+ 78
Food	100	111	120	130	135	138	143	146	151	+ 51
Apparel	100	104	112	117	120	123	125	129	130	+ 30
Transportation	100	114	135	151	157	161	168	172	166	+ 66
Medical	100	109	121	134	150	163	173	184	198	+ 98
Entertainment	100	107	116	125	134	139	144	150	155	+ 55
Other	100	107	117	129	142	157	168	178	189	+ 89
Gallup	100	111	124	138	147	147	149	150	174	+ 74

Source: CPI and components from CPIU monthly release, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Gallup line computed from poll data released 2 21 85

Guesses and Measures

Official statistics such as the CPI are often at odds with popular perceptions, but this is not the case with price increases (see figure 1). Every year the Gallup pollsters ask, "What is the smallest amount of money a family of four needs each week to get along in this community?" The answers have been remarkably close to actual price increases. Over the past nine years, people have estimated that they need 74 percent more money to get along. The actual increase as measured by the CPI for the same period was 68 percent. This perception is easily as good as, maybe even better than, many economists' predictions.

Figure 1 also shows that the public is more sensitive to price changes during hard times. The surging inflation of the late 1970s and the lethargy of the 1981–1982 recession both acted like magnets, drawing the public's worried eye to ever-changing prices. During these periods, their predictions of inflation closely followed the actual change. Lately, predictions and the actual change haven't matched as closely, perhaps because economic growth has lulled people into a less attentive state. But that phase is ending. The public once again is watching inflation closely as the nation enters what appears to be another period of sluggish growth, and their estimates of their needs just about match the CPI.

We Are What We Consume

Besides the movement of prices in relation to our income, the relative prices of goods also affect us because of the tradeoffs involved whenever we buy one thing instead of another. Table 1 shows how the prices of the seven broad categories of purchases included in the CPI have changed relative to the overall increase. Medical costs, for example, have increased 30 percentage points more than the CPI from 1978 to 1986. By contrast, the cost of apparel has increased 38 percentage points *less* than the CPI. If we based our behavior on frugality alone, we'd be dressing up more, eating more, amusing ourselves more, but going to the doctor less.

Consumption patterns, however, respond not only to price changes but also to demographic shifts, evolving tastes, and income fluctuations. And as the actual pattern of consumption deviates from the market basket model due to these influences, the CPI loses accuracy—the reason for revising it periodically.

These redefinitions do more than make the index more accurate. By comparing this year's revision to the 1978 market basket it replaces, we can trace changing consumption patterns in America and say something important about how we choose to live. Indeed, a survey of this magnitude must be considered the foremost authority on

Figure 1



Table 2

WHAT'S IN AND OUT IN 1987
(CPI Market Basket)

Out	In
Fuel oil	Electricity
White bread	Meals away from home
Beef	Poultry
Pork	*Indoor plants/Fresh cut flowers
Whole milk	Ice cream
Apples	Bananas
Coffee	Wine
Distilled spirits	*VCRs
Potatoes	Cable TV
Sewing	Fashion
Mass transit	New vehicles
Eyeglasses	Air travel
Smoking	Education
Stationery	Telephones
Carbonated drinks	Home computers
Medical care	*Elderly care/Invalids at home
Baby food	*Child day-care/Nursery school
Books	*Legal services

* = new item

These listings are based on information from Charles Mason and Clifford Butler, "New Basket of Goods and Services Being Priced in Revised CPI," *Monthly Labor Review*, January 1987.

what's in and what's out, *People* magazine notwithstanding. Table 2 lists some items that have won or lost favor in the new market basket.

One thing we can see immediately is that our diets have changed substantially over the past ten years. Primarily for health reasons, poultry is on the way to replacing beef and pork as the meat of preference. Whole milk use is falling, but, strangely enough, ice cream consumption has soared by about 78 percent. Potatoes are out at dinner, and cereal is in at breakfast. And Madison Avenue copywriters take note: we may be becoming a land of banana splits rather than apple pie.

People are also enjoying a number of new material comforts. Seven times as many now have cable television as did a decade ago, and many of those are hooked up to the newly popular VCRs. When we entertain at home, plants and fresh cut flowers (new item) add to the ambiance. Our houses are increasingly heated by electricity rather than fuel oil. We disdain public transit, except for air travel. Snappy dressing is in, but the vogue days of a cigarette and dry martini have passed. Unfortunately, legal services (new item) are now much more common in the average person's life.

Our personal lives have grown a bit more frantic. We eat away from home rather than cook. Smaller families leave the children at day-care centers (new item), and because of the high cost of medical attention, we use it less and instead care for many of our elderly and invalids at home (new item). Even though education costs have risen substantially, we now go to school more than we did a decade ago. We don't write to our friends; we call them. The corn belt is losing people, and the far south and west coast are growing at a rate roughly double that of the nation as a whole.

These images are all familiar: from them, we can construct the lives of those we know. Families with children who have gone off to college now put their elderly relatives in the kids' bedrooms. Some of the elderly are moving to Florida for retirement. Young adults from Des Moines are looking for work in California. Smaller families are dropping the children at day-care centers and eating on the run, paying the price of success and independence. Yuppies, trading their eyeglasses for contacts and Raybans, are wheeling around in new automobiles and swilling wine coolers.

Telling Tales With Numbers

As familiar as these images are now, from some future vantage point, they will be part of the enigmatic past. Even ten years can make a big difference. Remember 1978? Oil prices were soaring, and mass transit was the answer. Most cars were still as big as small boats. The VCR was little more than a gleam in Sony's eye. The IBM/PC was nonexistent. Inflation was a hot political issue. Definitely a different world.

People reconstructing the ancient past spend much of their time digging through entombed cities looking for clues about earlier lifestyles. In the future, archivists will use the CPI as the definitive source of information. I only wonder whether those hard-working data-diggers will be able to unravel the strange tale of my friend's wife's struggle with the choice between three pairs of shoes and a flight to London. ☑

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Strange Bedfellows: Cohabitation in France

by Michel Brulé and Pierre Giacometti

"Tomorrow, the 6th Republic?" This preelection headline conveyed French uncertainties about the future of their political institutions —institutions that had guided the country since the Fifth Republic was established in 1958. What people feared most was the unknown—a divided government, or "cohabitation," with a president from one party and a parliament from another. This month the political arrangement that made the French so uneasy marks its first anniversary.

Until the 1986 elections, presidential majorities during the Fifth Republic had always corresponded to parliamentary majorities. In 1986, the president of the Republic for the first time confronted a National Assembly with a majority opposed to him. The election required Socialist President François Mitterrand to nominate Jacques Chirac as prime minister, a man who had consistently opposed the president's policies. The public's reaction to these novel circumstances is complex, in part because of historical forces that have shaped modern France.

Constitutional Imperatives

Those who drafted the 1958 French Constitution aimed for two overriding goals: to give the president of the Republic a real place in governing; and to give his prime minister the means to manage day-to-day affairs. These objectives were dictated by the chronic instability that had characterized the Fourth Republic (1946–1958). Article 5 of the Constitution describes the role of the president in these terms:

> The president of the republic shall see that the Constitution is respected. He shall ensure, by his arbitration, the regular functioning of governmental authorities, as well as the continuance of the state. He shall be the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity of the French territory, and of respect for community agreements and treaties.

The Constitution provides that the chief of state names the prime minister as the head of the government, and gives him the authority to dissolve the National Assembly. It further stipulates that, for his part, the prime minister "shall direct the operation of the Government." It is the responsibility of the prime minister and cabinet to "determine and direct the policy of the nation."

This two-pronged strengthening of executive authority was predicated on the assumption that the two principal executive authorities would reflect one and the same majority. Charles de Gaulle, however, carried this one step further, and insisted that the president should clearly be the senior partner in this arrangement. During a famous press conference on January 31, 1964, Charles de Gaulle set forth his views on the nature of the connection and the sharing of responsibilities between the president of the Republic and the prime minister:

> One could argue that a kind of dyarchy [two coequal units] exists at the top of French government. But this is precisely not the case. It is the president who chooses the prime minister, appoints as well the other members of the government, and has the power to change the prime minister either because the task the prime minister has set out to accomplish has been completed . . . or because the president no longer approves of the prime minister. The president can block decisions taken in Government councils, promulgate laws, negotiate treaties, decree or not the measures that are proposed to him. He is the chief of the armed forces. He appoints public officials. Obviously, he alone has the authority to extend or deny the imprimatur of the State. Of course, the very magnitude of his responsibilities requires that he not be consumed, without respite or limit, by political, parliamentary, economic, and administrative matters. The latter are the responsibilities of the prime minister of France.

It is important to note that this is de Gaulle talking. The Fifth Republic Constitution does create a dyarchy —that is a situation where two units of the executive each has major, separate, independent authority. But for a long time, de Gaulle's interpretation prevailed. President Charles de Gaulle, with prime ministers Michel Debre, Georges Pompidou, and Maurice Couve de

Murville; President Georges Pompidou, with prime ministers Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Pierre Messmer; President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, with Raymond Barre; and François Mitterrand, with Pierre Mauroy and Laurent Fabius—all entered into the type of association de Gaulle had described, even though, naturally, specific characteristics of each set of personalities influenced the way they interacted. Missing from this list is, of course, Jacques Chirac, who in 1976 resigned his position as prime minister to Giscard d'Estaing. Chirac had come to believe that he lacked sufficient authority as prime minister. De Gaulle's broad interpretation of presidential authority defined the governing arrangements for most of Fifth Republic France. Chirac saw the relationship between the president and prime minister differently, leading to his own decision to resign.

In 1986, a different challenge faced French politicians. Faced with the possibility of divided government, the contenders took care to spell out their positions on cohabitation during the 1986 campaign. While Mitterrand proclaimed himself ready to respect the French people's electoral decision, and ready to apply the letter of the law of the French Constitution, come what may, he also stressed that he would not play a passive role. Throughout the campaign, Jacques Chirac, the opposition's leading figure, presented himself as the candidate best able to operate as prime minister under cohabitation. Raymond Barre, who had been prime minister under Giscard d'Estaing, felt that cohabitation was "a wholly unnatural system," contrary to the basic political logic of the Fifth Republic, which, as Barre understood it, required an essential compatibility between the president and the prime minister.

How the French Have Reacted

Before the legislative election of March 16, 1986, the French were anxious. The election raised the possibility of a complete break with twenty-eight years of practical experience with the institutions of the Fifth Republic. Public discomfort expressed itself especially in people's insistence that the president should have a majority on his side in the National Assembly if France were to be well-governed. In May 1985, 59 percent thought that the president needed a legislative majority to support him. Only 29 percent felt it was possible for a president of the left to function with a legislative majority of the right. At the same time, a majority wanted to tell the Socialists they were unhappy with the way things were going. Institutional considerations pushed the electorate one way, politics the other.

Just after the election results confirmed that the president would not have a majority on his side in the National Assembly, the French public expressed doubts that this condition could survive until 1988, the date of the next presidential election (see table 1).

In succeeding months, though, the French displayed a profound sense of relief. Mitterrand's commitment to uphold "the Constitution, every aspect of the Constitution, and only the Constitution," and his decision to name Jacques Chirac—the head of the most important party in the new majority—prime minister, eased doubts. A new governing team was put into place without problems. The French approved the performance of the two principal protagonists, Mitterrand and Chirac, in their new roles. By increasing majorities, they began believing that cohabitation was functioning reasonably well (see table 2).

Table 1

Question: Will cohabitation last until 1988?

	Yes	No
June 1986	39%	40%
July	50	25
August	51	26
September	52	27
October	59	22
November	63	21
February 1987	65	21

Source: Surveys by B.V.A. for *Paris-Match*, latest that of February 1987.

Table 2

Question: (Is Mitterrand/Is Chirac) doing what is needed to make cohabitation work?

	Mitterrand	Chirac
April 1986	60%	54%
May	65	60
June	62	55
July	63	53
August	59	50
September	55	45
October	55	54
November	63	61
December	56	53
January 1987	51	43
February	45	42

Source: Surveys by B.V.A. for *Paris-Match*, latest that of February 1987.

Question: As of now, do you think that the cohabitation between François Mitterrand and the new RPR-UDF legislative majority is functioning very well, fairly well, fairly badly, or very badly?

	Very/fairly well	Very/fairly badly
April 1986	50%	22%
June	65	25
July	66	24
October	71	23
December	66	26

Source: Surveys by SOFRES for *Le Point*, latest that of December 1986.

Cohabitation's Mixed Reviews

We must be careful, however, not to confuse the French people's satisfaction with the way the Mitterrand/Chirac adjustment was proceeding, with their underlying judgments about cohabitation itself. This distinction has not always been made in the media. The outpouring of commentary that suggested that the French were actually happy about the fracturing of power was misguided. So too was the notion that the French—inclined to reject solutions posed by either left and right and therefore receptive to an arrangement that provided both—were enthusiastic about the new arrangement.

A careful examination of French public opinion shows the French have not readily accustomed themselves to the simultaneous presence of a president from the left and a parliamentary majority from the right. In effect, though the French felt relieved that a major political crisis had been avoided and that Mitterrand should remain in office (see table 3), this did not resolve their underlying reservations about cohabitation. We see this in the responses to the question: Is cohabitation a good thing for France? (See table 4.)

Table 3

Question: Should Mitterrand remain in office until 1988?

	Yes	No
April 1986	67%	22%
May	70	28
June	68	25
July	70	19
August	70	20
September	69	20
October	72	17
February 1987	69	16

Source: Surveys by B.V.A. for *Paris-Match*, latest that of February 1987.

Table 4

Question: Is cohabitation a good thing for France?

	A good thing	A bad thing
April 1986	37%	45%
May	48	36
June	40	44
July	45	32
August	43	37
September	40	42
October	43	39
November	51	34
December	44	37
January 1987	36	48
February	29	53

Source: Surveys by B.V.A. for *Paris-Match*, latest that of February 1987.

The French people think of cohabitation as an unnatural condition. This is evident from their answers to two contrasting questions. Who bears the principal responsibility for the conduct of our national affairs? Over half the French, 53 percent, obstinately reply—the president of the Republic. Only a third, 37 percent, think the prime minister bears the principal responsibility. All right, then, since March 1986, who has been in charge of French government? The same voters who had replied that the president bears the principal responsibility for the conduct of French government declared that the prime minister had, in fact, been in charge since the March election. Fifty-two percent named the prime minister and 25 percent the president (see table 5).

Table 5

Question: Who bears the principal responsibility for the conduct of national affairs?

53%	The president bears principal responsibility for conduct of national affairs.
37	The prime minister

Question: Right now, who is in effective charge of the French government?

52%	The prime minister is in charge of the government now
25	The president

Source: Surveys by B.V.A. for *Paris-Match*, October 1986 and February 1987.

Looking Ahead to 1988

When one looks carefully at public opinion, one sees clearly that it favors a return to a situation where the president and the prime minister are pulling in the same political direction.

Over the past year, French opinion has shifted as political differences have mounted between the Elysee Palace, where the French president has his offices, and the Matignon, where the prime minister's offices are located. The public was divided on the idea of private prisons and the proper response to terrorism (see table 6). Later, though, in two major crises—one occurring when secondary school and college students took to the streets protesting university reforms, the other on the plan that prompted a long, hard strike in rail and other public services—the public strongly backed the president's support of the student movement and the stance he assumed by meeting with the strikers. This is so, even though Mitterrand, by acting as he did in these hot situations, signaled clearly that the era of peaceful coexistence was over in the divided French executive.

Table 6

Question: From time to time, François Mitterrand expresses his disagreements with the government. Do you personally share his criticism of:

	Share the criticism	Don't share it
The expulsion of 101 Malians	33%	47%
The restrictions on gaining French citizenship	34	47
The idea of private prisons	38	36
Refusing to make deals with states implicated in terrorism	39	33

Source: Survey by SOFRES for *Le Point*, December 1986.

Polls quickly picked up a shift in public sentiment resulting from the heightened political tensions between the president and prime minister. The public became more inclined to question the good intentions of the two principal actors—interestingly enough, especially the good intentions of the prime minister. And once again a majority expressed the view that having a president of one political persuasion and a prime minister of another was not workable (see table 7).

Table 7

Question: What's the best result of future elections?

A president and a prime minister . . .	
Belonging to the same party	71%
Belonging to different parties	17

Source: Survey by B.V.A. for *Paris-Match*, February 1987

One immediate political consequence of the above benefited Raymond Barre. He had been forced to be silent on the institutional problems for much of the year, believing that he had made his concerns sufficiently clear before the March election and not wanting to expose himself to the charge that he was dividing the new majority. When opinion swung toward greater doubts about cohabitation—aided by Barre's successful appearance on a popular television program honoring political leaders—Barre reaped the benefits and took the lead in the latest presidential trial heats for 1988. The next presidential election is still more than a year away, however, and the ongoing saga of "The French People and Cohabitation" may yet take some new turns.

For the past year the French president has enjoyed a spectacular rise in his popularity (see figure 1). It does need to be borne in mind, however, that the figures have an entirely different meaning in the post-March 1986 context when the president's powers have been greatly limited, than in the preelection context, when the president was judged as responsible for the basic direction of policy and government.

Prime Minister Chirac finds himself in a difficult situation these days. He must show results from his economic policies before the spring of 1988 if he is to have a chance to move into the Elysee Palace. For his part, Raymond Barre must walk a fine line. He cannot be seen to take too much satisfaction from his foresight concerning institutional problems, which would in effect put him in a position of taking satisfaction from the setbacks of his own political family.

The verdict that the French people hand down at the end of this two-year institutional digression will depend largely on how they assign praise and blame for handling a situation—cohabitation—with which they have never been comfortable and whose continuation they consider undesirable. ☑

Michel Brulé is associate director of Brulé Ville Associés. Pierre Giacometti is director of the public opinion division at B.V.A.

Figure 1

MITTERRAND RATINGS: COMPARING THE MAJOR SURVEYS

Question: Do you have complete confidence, some confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in François Mitterrand to resolve the problems facing France today? (SOFRES)

What is your opinion of Mr. François Mitterrand as President of the Republic/Jacques Chirac as prime minister? (BVA)

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Mr. François Mitterrand as President of the Republic? (IFOP)



Source: Surveys by *Figaro* magazine-SOFRES, Brulé Ville Associés for *Paris-Match*, and IFOP for *Journal du Dimanche*, all latest that of January 1987.

Why The British Don't Like Us Anymore

by Ivor Crewe

By the close of 1986, even casual observers of British politics would have noticed a deep-seated anti-Americanism. The year began with the "Westland affair"—the government's decision to sell Britain's one remaining (but unprofitable) helicopter company to an American company, Sikorsky. This incident revealed a deep anxiety among M.P.s ranging from the patriotic Right to the anti-capitalist Left. Anxiety turned to resentment at the government's proposal (later withdrawn) to sell British Leyland, the massively subsidized car manufacturer, to General Motors. (Insult was added to injury when profit-making Land Rover, a traditional symbol of Britishness, became part of the deal.) This inevitably meant, local M.P.s insisted, that car workers would be laid off as ruthlessly as steel workers and miners had recently been made redundant by Ian MacGregor, the imported *American* chairman of British Steel and the National Coal Board.

In April, the American bombing raid on Libya, launched with Mrs. Thatcher's permission from bases in Britain, was instantly and loudly condemned by the opposition parties and, behind the scenes, by many Conservatives, too. Public opinion opposed the raid by 65 to 29 percent (Gallup). The summer was filled with news of Americans cancelling flights and holidays to a supposedly terror-torn London. This rankled. In October, the annual Labour party conference confirmed that, if elected to office, Labour would break the post-war defense consensus and seek the removal of all U.S. (that is, NATO) nuclear installations from British soil. Much of the leader's speech attacked U.S. policy in Nicaragua. The breakdown of the Reykjavik talks was widely blamed on Reagan's "stubbornness" about his "madcap" SDI scheme, which the public expects will escalate the arms race while protecting the United States rather than Europe from the consequences. A constant accompaniment to these incidents was the grumbling about the Americanization of daily life—in particular the import of "war-nographic" American

Table 1

BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements ... ?

	Percent strongly agree/agree minus percent strongly disagree/disagree		
	All	**Age 18-34**	**Age 65+**
The military and organizations like the CIA have too much influence on United States policies	+52	+56	+48
The United States forces its policies too much on Britain and other European countries	+47	+57	+34
There is much crime in the United States, it is an unsafe country to live in	+45	+45	+44
The United States is as great a threat to world peace as is the U.S.S.R.	+37	+56	+14
The United States does much damage to European countries by its economic policies	+25	+34	+21
Much is done in the United States to combat poverty among the people and to correct social abuse	−14	−19	—
The United States seems to me to be a pleasant country to live in	−13	−21	+5
For Britain and other European countries, it is a good thing to join in as much as possible with the policies of the United States	+12	−28	+6
Americans are, on the whole, pleasant and friendly people	+62	+47	+65
The United States does much good for poor countries in the world by food and other aid	+22	+6	+39

Source: Survey by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., November 1986.

films and the fast-food invasion of British high streets.

This mixture of commercial resentment, cultural disdain, military moderation, and diplomatic dismay toward the United States showed up in public opinion. A November 1986 Gallup poll found that many more agreed than disagreed with a series of anti-American statements (see table 1).

Generational Differences

Anti-Americanism is hardly new to Britain. The reaction to the hundreds of thousands of GIs stationed in Britain during World War II was one of rueful envy: they were "over-paid, over-sexed, and over here." But long-term comparisons suggest that hostility has grown (see table 2). In July 1942, seven months after the United States entered the war, the public defended and admired the United States. By May 1986, the balance of opinion was reversed: generous respect had turned into sullen rejection.

Not surprisingly, belief in the existence of a "special relationship" between Britain and the United States has declined in tandem. Anglo-American relations have been regarded as a "one-way street" for a long time. In late 1962, following the Macmillan-Kennedy Nassau agreement, cynics outnumbered believers by 75 to 25 percent on whether Britain was "treated as an equal partner by the U.S. in affairs that concern them both." By April 1984, the division was even more skewed, at 85-15 percent. Belief in the *desirability* of a special relationship has also cooled. In the mid-1960s, more people supported a closer alliance on foreign policy (36 percent) than a looser one (22 percent), with substantial numbers happy to leave things as they were. Two decades later, clear—although not overwhelming—pluralities called for a more distant working relationship between the two countries (see table 3).

Not only is anti-Americanism growing, but also the prospect that it will continue. The generation whose formative years were the era of Roosevelt, Lend-Lease, and Marshall aid are now in their sixties; their children, now in their forties, include those alienated by American involvement in the Vietnam War; and their grandchildren, now in their twenties, have come to maturity in the Carter/Reagan presidencies. On every indicator, the younger generation is more hostile to the United States than the older one (see table 1). Moreover, anti-Americanism is at least as strong among the young professionals and intelligentsia—the opinion-formers and decision makers of the twenty-first century—as among the rest of the young.

Table 2

CHANGING BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES 1942 AND 1986

Question: Here are some statements which have been made about the Americans. Do you agree or disagree with them?

		Agree	**Disagree**
They are a more democratic people than we are	July 1942	52%	33%
	May 1986	31	56
They take a superior attitude toward the British and they have no grounds for this attitude	July 1942	37	44
	May 1986	59	31
The Americans are too willing to let other people do the fighting for them	July 1942	28	55
	May 1986	58	32
We would be better off if we were like the Americans in many respects	July 1942	41	39
	May 1986	20	72

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., latest that of May 1986.

Table 3

BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Question: Do you think that Britain should work more closely or less closely with the United States than it is at present on questions of foreign policy/economic policy?

	May 1966	March 1967	Nov. 1974	March 1984	May 1986
Foreign Policy					
More closely	32%	39%	38%	35%	25%
As at present	28	25	25	21	20
Less closely	23	24	17	32	43
Percent "more closely" minus percent "less closely"	+9	+15	+21	+3	−18
Economic Policy					
More closely	37%	37%	39%	36%	28%
As at present	25	27	23	21	21
Less closely	21	20	17	28	36
Percent "more closely" minus percent "less closely"	+16	+17	+22	+8	−8

Note: "Don't know" not shown.
Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd.

Generalized Goodwill?

What, then, does British anti-Americanism amount to, and why is it growing? So far, anti-Americanism has loosely referred to an unfavorable attitude of any kind toward the United States. There are some special categories of it. One is *pathological* anti-Americanism—a deep-seated, all-embracing hatred equivalent in its psychological properties (rigidity, irrationality, paranoia) to anti-Semitism or racism. A good example of such ineradicable prejudice is embodied in Enoch Powell, the former Conservative minister, anti-immigration campaigner, and now Ulster Unionist M.P., who attributes the assassination of M.P. Airey Neave and Lord Mountbatten (both "claimed" by Irish Republicans) to the machinations of the CIA, and denounces the Anglo-Irish "Hillsborough" Agreement on the future of Northern Ireland as the culmination of a thirty-year State Department plot. The flavor of his anti-Americanism was recently captured in an interview for a Conservative student magazine:

> **Q.** Would you describe yourself as anti-American?
> **A.** Yes.
> **Q.** Why are you anti-American?
> **A.** I don't like Americans.
> **Q.** Why not?
> **A.** I just don't. One doesn't have to have reasons.

This kind of prejudice undoubtedly exists, especially on the Labour Left, and all points leftwards, but it is confined to a small—although probably growing—minority.

Indeed, the majority of the British are innately prejudiced *in favor* of Americans. Questions designed to measure trust and liking for other peoples reveal widespread positive feelings toward Americans. The June 1986 Eurobarometer, for example, asked people from twelve EEC countries how much they "trusted people" from each of sixteen different countries (see table 4). Only the Swiss, the Dutch, and the Danes were "trusted" more than the Americans—in each case people from small, peaceable, and friendly democracies, visited by large numbers of British tourists, and without any perceived economic, cultural, or military influence over Britain. But none of the people from the other medium- or super- powers—not the Germans, French, Italians, Japanese, or Chinese, let alone the Russians—is trusted as much as Americans.

Table 4

BRITISH TRUST TOWARD OTHER PEOPLES

Question: Now, I would like to ask about how much you would trust people from different countries. For each country please say whether in your opinion, they are in general very trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, not particularly trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy.

Trust in . . .	Percent very/fairly trustworthy minus percent not very/not at all trustworthy (Balance of trust)	Very/fairly trustworthy
the Swiss	+57	62%
the Dutch	+57	61
the Danes	+49	54
the Americans	**+37**	**59**
the Belgians	+36	46
the Luxemburgers	+35	40
the Germans	+33	54
the Chinese	+27	44
the Portuguese	+26	39
the Irish	+20	50
the Japanese	+19	41
the Italians	+13	41
the Greeks	+12	36
the Spaniards	− 3	33
the French	− 4	36
the Russians	− 4	29
the Turks	− 8	21

Source: Survey by the Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer, No. 25, June 1986.

We should not make too much of this generalized goodwill. Respondents are usually well-disposed toward the people (as distinct from the governments) of foreign powers, especially people with whom they share a common language and related culture and with whom, therefore, they think they are familiar. Attitudes toward the United States *government*—to its international role and its presidency—reveal a different picture. Shortly after the Eurobarometer revealed widespread British trust in Americans, a June 1986 Gallup poll discovered that only 20 percent had "very great" or "considerable" confidence "in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems." Of the remainder, 26 percent had "little" confidence, and fully 49 percent had "very little" or "none at all."

This question has, in fact, been intermittently asked by Gallup since 1970. As table 5 shows, confidence in the United States as a superpower was evenly balanced throughout the Nixon years (including 1970, when Cambodia was bombed), surged in Carter's first year to +26 percent, but since then has declined, going into reverse in 1979, the year of the Tehran hostages, and turning into a resounding vote of no confidence throughout the Reagan era (−19 percent in 1986).

Table 5

BRITISH PUBLIC'S CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER

Question: How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems—very great, considerable, little, or very little?

	Very great/considerable	Little	Very little/none at all	Percent very great/considerable minus percent very little/none (Balance of confidence)
1970 (2)	29%	28%	27%	+2
1971 (−)	—	—	—	—
1972 (2)	30	25	32	−2
1973 (4)	29	26	33	−4
1974 (5)	33	25	32	+1
Nixon, 1970–1974 (13)	30	26	31	−1
1975 (4)	32	26	30	+2
1976 (1)	33	27	26	+7
Ford, 1975–1976 (5)	32	26	29	+3
1977 (2)	49	22	21	+28
1978 (2)	36	23	28	+8
1979 (3)	28	25	35	−7
1980 (4)	29	25	35	−6
Carter, 1977–1980 (11)	34	24	31	+3
1981 (3)	30	25	35	−5
1982 (4)	27	27	40	−13
1983 (4)	24	26	44	−20
1984 (4)	22	25	48	−26
1985 (4)	24	29	41	−17
1986 (4)	25	26	44	−19
Reagan, 1981–1986	25	26	42	−17

Note: The number of monthly polls asking the question each year is given in parentheses. The entry for each year is the mean. "Don't know" not shown. Respondents volunteering the answer "none at all" were categorized separately, but have been added to those saying "very little" in this table. Sample sizes–900 to 1,100.

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., latest that of 1986.

This trend has been paralleled by an even sharper fall in presidential approval (see table 6). Every few months, Gallup asks British respondents "Do you think (name U.S. president) is or is not proving a good president of the United States?" Carter began with an overwhelming British vote of confidence (61 to 11 percent), which rapidly deteriorated in 1978 and 1979, but recovered slightly in 1980 (+15 percent). Reagan, however, was denied a honeymoon. His rating was slightly negative in his first year (−4 percent) and plummeted thereafter. It has recovered slightly in the second term of his presidency, but remains firmly negative. Thus, hostility to the United States's role in the world is almost confined, and clearly connected, to the Reagan administration. Perhaps anti-Americanism is no more than anti-Reaganism.

Table 6

BRITISH PUBLIC'S RATING OF REAGAN AND CARTER

Question: Do you think Mr. Reagan (Carter) is or is not proving a good president of the United States?

	Is	Is not	Rating
Carter			
1977 (2)	61%	11%	+50
1978 (2)	45	33	+12
1979 (4)	38	44	−6
1980 (3)	50	35	+15
1977–1980 (11)	47	33	+14
Reagan			
1981 (2)	30	34	−4
1982 (4)	27	58	−31
1983 (4)	27	60	−33
1984 (4)	32	55	−23
1985 (4)	40	48	−8
1986 (4)	39	50	−11
1981–1986(22)	33	51	−18

Note: The number of monthly polls asking the question each year is given in parentheses. The entry for each year is the mean. Sample sizes are 900 to 1,100. The question was first asked in May 1977.

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., latest that of 1986.

Sources of Strain

Why does the most genuinely popular president in the United States since Roosevelt inspire such distrust (unlike Roosevelt) across the Atlantic? Why is the United States under the Reagan presidency less well regarded than it was under the disgraced Nixon, the stand-in Ford, or the disappointing Carter? The right answer is almost certainly the obvious one. The British public judges the United States on its foreign policy, for which the president is the mouthpiece. And to British eyes and ears Reagan's words and actions are far from reassuring.

The wide range of available polling data allows us to be quite specific about the source of British skepticism. It is not founded upon doubts about the United States's *political dependability* as an ally. A March 1982 Gallup question put the perceived reliability of the United States to an exacting test: "If Britain's security was threatened by a Russian attack, how much confidence do you have in the United States to do *whatever is necessary* to defend Britain, *even if this risked a direct attack against the United States?*" (italics added). A clear majority (56 percent) had "a great deal" or "a fair amount" of confidence in the readiness of the United States to risk its own security for the sake of Britain; only 12 percent were *convinced* it would not.

The doubt concerns neither the capacity nor the will of the United States, but concerns its good judgment. We worry not about the warmth of its commitment to Britain, but about the coolness of its relations with the U.S.S.R. Reagan is perceived as obstructive on arms negotiations and belligerent and reckless in his foreign policy. Substantial majorities are skeptical about Reagan's commitment to arms control. Thus, a 68 to 24 percent majority agreed in March 1984 that the United States was not "doing all it should to prevent a new world war"; in May 1984 a 66 to 21 percent majority disagreed that Reagan had "seriously tried to halt the nuclear arms race," and in October 1984 a 66 to 20 percent majority agreed that Reagan's meeting with Gromyko was an election gimmick rather than a serious attempt at arms negotiations. The main reason for opposing the Libya raid was the overwhelming conviction that it would increase (84 percent) rather than decrease (4 percent) the "likelihood of terrorist-backed attacks by Libya in Britain" (MORI, April 1986).

By 1986, the British had, therefore, adopted an attitude of *equilateralism* toward the United States and the Soviet Union (in wall grafitti terms, US = SU). As table 7 shows, the gap in approval for the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in world affairs rapidly narrowed between 1983 and 1986, and dissatisfaction with United States efforts to reach an agreement on nuclear arms controls was as widespread as that with the Soviet Union. Equilateralism partly reflects a gradual improvement in the Soviet Union's peace-seeking image in Britain, especially under Gorbachev's skillful public relations efforts, but it also reflects the widespread conviction that the Reagan administration is unenthusiastic and unconstructive about arms control. Most recently (December 1986), the British have come to regard the United States as the "greater threat to world peace" than the U.S.S.R. (by 37 percent to 33 percent) and as equally likely to break any agreement on a freeze or decommissioning of nuclear weapons. This skepticism reflects hostility not to Reagan's nuclear defense strategy *per se*, but to his current arms policies. This is neatly demonstrated by answers to a pair of questions about whether "nuclear missiles make Britain a safer or less safe place to live." Asked about an independent British missile, 52 percent answered "safer," 29 percent "less safe." Asked about an American missile, only 37 percent said "safer," and 44 percent said "less safe."

Table 7

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the role the United States/Soviet Union is playing in world affairs?

	1973	1983	1984	1985	1986
U.S.A.					
Approve	30%	32%	30%	33%	34%
Disapprove	38	54	54	50	52
Balance of approval	-8	-22	-24	-17	-18
U.S.S.R.					
Approve	NA	7	8	15	26
Disapprove	NA	75	72	61	51
Balance of approval	NA	-68	-64	-46	-25

Question: Do you think the United States (Soviet Union) has done everything reasonable to try to reach agreements with the Soviet Union (United States) about controlling nuclear weapons, or should the United States (Soviet Union) do more?

	1985	1986
U.S.A.		
Has done everything reasonable	19%	19%
Should do more	73	75
Balance of praise	-54	-56
U.S.S.R.		
Has done everything reasonable	9%	16%
Should do more	80	76
Balance of praise	-71	-60

Note: The entry for each year is the mean of several askings each year. Sample sizes 900-1,100. "Don't know" not shown.

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup poll) Ltd., latest that of 1986.

To many observers, the strain in Anglo-American relations comes not from an absence of will or reliability on the part of the United States to defend Britain and the rest of Europe, but from a certain recklessness. Substantial segments of the public believe that the first move in a nuclear war is as likely to be American as Russian, that the United States holds equal responsibility with the U.S.S.R. for the nuclear arms race, and that the siting of U.S.-controlled missiles on British soil increases rather than decreases the likelihood of an attack on Britain. There is, therefore, a thin line between the dependability of the United States and overdependence upon the United States. Hence, the growing majorities who agree that "the foreign policy of Britain depends too much on the United States" (45 to 30 percent in March 1974; 74 to 20 percent in June 1984). The catch in the "special relationship" with the United States is that the same arrangements that ensure its reliability in a crisis have come to be seen, during the Reagan era, as making a crisis more likely. The United States is regarded as a dependable defender of Britain, but increasingly as the main reason that Britain might need defending.

Thus, the source of growing "anti-Americanism" in Britain does not appear to be an unalterable generational shift of culture, but a more or less accurate perception of the current defense strategies and international posture of the Reagan administration. There remains a large reserve of diffuse goodwill toward the United States on which the current administration is drawing, but which a change of foreign policy or president can easily replenish. ☑

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WATTENBERG

(Continued from page 11)

the misperceptions really are misperceptions. If they are not, think about changing them. Do Soviet diplomats really believe, as they say, that their (genocidal) activities in Afghanistan are merely aid to "a fraternal ally"?

But if the honest answer is "no," then openness alone won't help the Soviets. If openness only confirms horror, they're better off without it.

* * *

This is the puzzle of glasnost. The Soviets can't change perceptions about the openness of their police state, unless they are really open. If they decide to be open, they have to worry about what people will see. It won't help the Soviets much to be open about the subjugation of Eastern Europe, for example, unless they are at the same time at least relaxing their rule.

The external aspect of glasnost, it seems to me, will ultimately founder if it only opens up the press, literature, and the intelligentsia in the Soviet Union. It will founder if it deals only with a few high-profile individuals. Sooner or later the substance that the openness reveals, will count—as a plus, or as a minus.

Only if glasnost yields a truly more liberal Soviet society (mobility, electoral reform, real unions, freedom of religion) and serious foreign policy changes will this least liked and most feared nation in the world succeed in changing perceptions of it held by the outside world.

Glasnost is a high-risk strategy for Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. It could reinvigorate a decaying society, or, if it is seen to hurt rather than help, it could send Russia back into deep repression.

We shall see what happens.

Will glasnost seriously change the substance of the Soviet Union? I do not know. I doubt it, but I hope so.

* * *

What should the United States do about glasnost? It may be serious; it may be cosmetic. It may continue; it may be reversed. It could lead to salutary changes in foreign policy; it probably won't. It could work and help us, by diminishing the harsh goals of our superpower adversary; it could work and, by charging up our adversary, hurt us. Do we really want a more dynamic, efficient adversary, if only somewhat more liberal? We saw in the détente era that a democracy like ours can turn mushy in the face of apparent good news, believing only what it hopes is true, responding to wishes, not reality. We apparently believed Soviet promises about human rights and international rules of the road; we allowed our military situation to deteriorate. Meanwhile, the Soviets ignored their human rights commitment, continued a relentless military buildup, and made major advances in the third world.

This time we need a détente that is a two-way street. We need hard-headed, hardball détente; we need hard-nosed linkage. We shouldn't make major changes in trade policy simply because a few thousand emigrants are allowed out of the Soviet Union. After all, glasnost is a confession of weakness. Something wasn't working in the workers' paradise. We're in a good bargaining position.

To take advantage of it, we need a coherent, government-wide consensus on foreign policy. That's not exactly what we have had recently.

In a most peculiar way, glasnost offers Ronald Reagan an unusual opportunity. For substantive international reasons, and for domestic political reasons, the president ought to convene an ongoing, high-level working group to reassess, and perhaps redirect, American foreign policy in the light of glasnost. After all, it may prove to be a tectonic shifting of plates upon which our geopolitics rests.

Such a group should include not only key Reagan cabinet-level foreign policy officials, but also the congressional foreign policy players of both parties. That would include ranking Republican members, and such Democrats as Speaker Jim Wright, Majority Leader Tom Foley, Majority Leader Robert Byrd, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairmen Dante Fascell, Les Aspin, Claiborne Pell, and Sam Nunn, Intelligence Committee Chairmen David Boren and Lee Hamilton. That Democratic group is, for the most part, a moderate, responsible, and experienced bunch.

The exercise would not attempt to solve any day-to-day or issue-by-issue items. The executive branch and the Congress already have peculiar and constitutional ways of doing that.

Rather, the attempt of such an ongoing working group would be to establish a set of agreed-upon first principles regarding American responses to what the Soviets have already done in glasnost and what they might do. This could enable the administration to take a major step toward what has been sought, but what has eluded the executive branch for almost twenty years now: that near-mythical "bipartisan foreign policy," the lack of which has taken its toll on America's ability to act effectively around the world.

There could be, of course, an ancillary political benefit for the president. Mired in the daily water-torture of the Iran/Contra affair, the administration could hope that such an initiative would help focus attention on the future rather than the past. Not even a soft-line Democrat would dare oppose a Reagan-sponsored initiative to deal constructively with the Soviets in pursuit of a better, safer world—even if Reagan also had a domestic political motive behind it. (At least not for a while.) ☑

Ben J. Wattenberg, an AEI senior fellow, is co-editor of Public Opinion *and vice-chairman of the board of RFE/RL.*

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MY FELLOW AMERICANS...
(page 6)

MAKING MR. RIGHT... PRESIDENT

The Perfect Candidate, The Perfect Speech

✓

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OPINION ROUNDUP

CLASS DIFFERENCES: AN ISSUE FOR 1988?

Class differences in political outlook within the United States strike many observers as curiously indecisive; they are sufficiently large and persisting so that they can hardly be ignored; yet they are sufficiently modest in degree and limited in reach so that they hardly sustain the left's historic expectation that they must be decisive.

In these pages, we review recent survey findings using family income as a rough measure of class position. Most of the distributions here show three broad income strata: low (annual household income of $15,000 or less); middle ($15,000-$39,999) and upper ($40,000 and higher).

Class differences are consistently greatest in two areas: (1) personal satisfaction and efficacy, and (2) support for government services. Low-income respondents are less likely than those with high incomes to say they are very happy, that they have a chance of achieving the good life, or that they are satisfied with their personal lives and community experiences. These responses to objective conditions carry over into demands on government. Low-income people are more likely to support government programs to help the needy. Those with high incomes are less inclined to back remedial interventions by government (p. 23).

Even in this area, though, income differences are less than overwhelming. Should government do everything possible to improve the living standards of poor Americans, or is that not government's responsibility? The proportion opting for the former position is 18 percentage points higher among the low-income group than the high one. But perhaps more striking is the fact that only 39 percent of people with family incomes of $15,000 or less back unequivocally this call for a strong governmental push on behalf of the needy. The figure on page 23 displaying these data shows *class differences*, but hardly a *class divide*.

In other areas class differences are smaller and often inconsequential. Most spending issues, including defense, show no substantial differences in class outlook (pp. 24 and 28). Government performance is assessed similarly. And, the tax system and tax reform have not developed as class issues (p. 26).

Apparently, class differences are not very large because class resentment is limited. Surveys provide a number of indications of this. The gulf between high- and low-income people is narrow when it comes to assessments of central institutions, even those like business and labor traditionally associated with contending class interests. Virtually identical proportions (90 and 92 percent) of low- and upper-income groups say it is hard work, not connections, that gets successful professional people ahead (p. 27).

Partisan differences by class are limited and persisting. Thus, low-income voters have continued in recent years to be moderately more supportive of Democrats than high-income voters. According to a composite of eight Gallup polls taken in 1985, people with family incomes under $10,000 were about 14 percentage points more Democratic than those with incomes of $100,000 or higher. The NORC surveys (p. 29) put the margin a bit higher, but it is only when one reaches incomes of $50,000 or above that Democratic support drops off appreciably. Ronald Reagan has received more support among high- than low-income people throughout his presidency, but the differences are not far from the average for recent presidents, nor are they massive (pp. 30-31).

We don't know who the 1988 presidential nominees will be; hence we don't know whether appeals to the electorate will sharpen or diminish class divisions. The likelihood is that the experience of the recent past will be replicated; class differences will remain one of the many sources of moderate divisions in the American electorate.

E.C.L.

LIFE SATISFACTION: BIG DIFFERENCES BY CLASS

Question: Thinking of your concept of the good life, how good do you think your chances are of achieving it—very good, fairly good, not very good, or not good at all?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 85-1), December 1-8, 1984.

Question: Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1986.

Question: In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in . . .



Note: Sample size = 978

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 3-17, 1986.

Question: Next I'm going to read a series of statements. For each one please tell me whether you agree or disagree.



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, July 27-30, 1984.

Question: Here is a list of things having to do with community life. (Hand respondent card) Would you go down that list and for each one tell me how you would rate it here in your area—excellent, good, fair, or poor? First . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 86-2), January 11-25, 1986.

DEMANDS ON GOVERNMENT: CLASS DIFFERENCES, BUT NO CLASS DIVIDE

Question: Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 meaning that the government ought to reduce the income difference between the rich and the poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing the income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1986.

Question: Look at card TT. In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctor and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1986.

Question: I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at card RR. Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1986.

Question: Now look at card SS. Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1986.

Question: Which of these two statements best describes your feelings about the small farmer in America? The small farmer is important to this country in many ways and special programs and efforts should be devised if necessary to insure the survival of the small farmer. *OR* If the small farmer can compete, fine. But if he can't hold his own against the big farming companies without special help and treatment from the government, then big farmers will have to replace him.

▨ *Special programs should be devised to insure the survival of the small farmer* ☐ *No special treatment or help from government*



National 84/17

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 85-4), March 23-30, 1985.

Question: . . . There is a controversy over special admissions procedures and quotas for blacks and other minority students in colleges and graduate school programs. Some say quotas and programs are necessary to increase the number of minorities in these schools and make up for past discriminations. Others say this practice discriminates against whites who cannot be considered for the places in the quota. What is your feeling—that the quotas should be kept to insure a certain number of minority students or that they should be illegal?

▨ *College quotas should be kept to insure certain numbers of minority students* ☐ *Quotas should be illegal* ☐ *Mixed feelings (vol.)*



National 31/50/19

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 85-7), July 13-20, 1985.

Question: In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of black and white school children from one district to another?

▨ *Favor busing* ☐ *Oppose*



National 30/70

Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1986.

Question: At present, the federal budget deficit is running at the rate of about 200 billion dollars per year. Basically, there are only a few ways this deficit can be reduced. Please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of each of the following ways to reduce the deficit.

▨ *Approve...to reduce deficit* ☐ *Disapprove*

Cut defense spending



National 64/32

Cut government spending for social programs



National 46/54

Cut "entitlement" programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and the like



National 9/91

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 10-13, 1986.

IN MANY AREAS, CLASS DIFFERENCES ARE SMALL

Question: What is your opinion of *most* federal government departments and agencies? There may be exceptions, of course, but would you say your opinion of *most* federal government departments and agencies is highly favorable, moderately favorable, not too favorable, or rather *un*favorable?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 86-3), April 26-May 3, 1986.

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your view about government power today?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), May 17-20, 1985.

Question: Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to blacks. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law would you vote for?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1986.

Question: Here is a list of some different services that the government provides, using tax dollars it collects from the public. (Hand respondent card) Thinking of what you get for what you pay in taxes, would you read down that list and for each one tell me whether you feel you get excellent value for the dollar, or good value, or only fair value for the dollar, or poor value for the dollar? First . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 86-4), March 15-22, 1986.

Question: Even if the government were willing to spend whatever is necessary to eliminate poverty in the United States, do you think the government knows enough about how to do that, or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, April 20-26, 1985.

Question: Do you think that the problem of poverty in the United States can be handled mainly by volunteer efforts, or do you think that there must be substantial government involvement, as well?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, April 20-26, 1985.

Question: In your opinion, which *one* of the following will be the biggest threat to the country in the future—big business, big labor, or big government?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 7-10, 1985.

Question: Thinking about your paycheck since the beginning of the year when the new tax law went into effect, do you consider the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay to be too high, about right, or too low?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 15-19, 1987.

Question: A number of efforts have been made to help certain groups in this country improve their opportunities. For example, women have been given more consideration than in the past in getting jobs and in being promoted on the job. Thinking about women and job opportunities, do you think that we in this country have gone too far, not far enough, or have done about the right amount in making job opportunities for women?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 85-3), February 9-23, 1985.

LIMITED CLASS RESENTMENT

Question: I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the *people running* these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?

▨ *Have a great deal of confidence in people running...* ☐ *Some confidence* ☐ *Hardly any confidence*

Executive branch of the federal government

By income:



National 21:55:24

Organized labor

By income:



National 8:50:42

Major companies

By income:



National 25:64:10

Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, February-April, 1986.

Question: I'm going to read a list of some of the top positions in our society. (Hand respondent card) For each one, would you tell me the reason you think most people reach them—is it because of chance, say the type of family you are born into, who you know, etc., or is it more due to talent, hard work, and a strong will on the part of the individuals to reach those positions in spite of chance? First, do you think most people get to be . . . because of who they are and who they know, or more get there because of hard work, talent, and strong will?

Most people get to be (president, etc.)...

▨ *Because of who they are and who they know* ☐ *Because of hard work, talent, and strong will*

Important political leaders such as president, state governor, or U.S. senator

By income:



National 64:37

Successful professional people such as doctors, lawyers, architects, etc.

By income:



National 10:90

Heads of the country's largest corporations

By income:



National 48:52

Millionaires

By income:



National 55:45

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 86-2), January 11-25, 1986.

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one, I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount?



Welfare

Assistance to the poor/Caring for the poor

Dealing with drug addiction, drug rehabilitation

Improving and protecting the nation's health

Improving the nation's education system

Protecting social security

Improving and protecting the environment

Space exploration program

Solving the problems of the big cities

Halting the rising crime rate/Law enforcement

Note: "Low income" = less than $15,000 for 1984-1986; "Middle income" = $15,000-34,999 for 1984-1985, and $15,000-39,999 for 1986; "High income" = $35,000 and over for 1984-1985, and $40,000 and over for 1986.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1984-1986 combined.

PARTY ID: CLASS DIFFERENCES MODERATE

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?

Generally think of self as...



Note: "Independent" not shown.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1983-1986 combined.

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

My political values are...



Note: Point 4 "Midpoint," not shown.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1983-1986 combined.

A Touch of Class: Com

Question: How do you feel about president . . .? At the present time would you describe yourself as a strong supporter, a moderate supporter, a moderate critic, or a strong critic of the president?



	1974			1975			1976		1977			1978					
	Sep	Sep	Nov	Feb	Jun	Oct	Jun	Dec	Mar	Apr	Sep	Mar	Jun	Aug	Sep	Oct
Low income	65%	57%	50%	36%	47%	38%	32%	71%	80%	78%	64%	68%	56%	57%	65%	60%
High income	83	67	64	52	57	52	46	53	76	63	56	44	41	32	53	47
Difference	−18	−10	−14	−16	−10	−14	−14	18	4	15	8	24	15	25	12	13

	1979							1980					1981					1982		
	Jan	Mar	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Dec	Jan	Feb	Apr	Jul	Dec	Mar	Apr	Jul	Sep	Dec	Mar	Jun	Sep
Low income	55%	58%	41%	48%	45%	46%	62%	59%	59%	58%	43%	44%	47%	53%	46%	36%	33%	32%	33%	30%
High income	45	40	32	37	29	32	48	46	51	42	28	67	75	75	70	64	62	57	57	54
Difference	10	18	9	11	16	14	14	13	8	16	15	−23	−28	−22	−24	−28	−29	−25	−24	−24

	1983						1984					1985				1986		
	Jan	Mar	Jun	Jul	Sep	Dec	Feb	Apr	Jul	Aug	Dec	Mar	Jun	Sep	Dec	Mar	Sep	Dec
Low income	27%	24%	32%	31%	30%	40%	36%	34%	31%	33%	45%	44%	43%	45%	48%	50%	50%	40%
High income	45	51	54	55	57	62	59	58	62	62	65	66	65	63	70	65	63	59
Difference	−18	−27	−22	−24	−27	−22	−23	−24	−31	−29	−20	−22	−22	−18	−22	−15	−13	−19

Note: From September 1974-December 1976, "Low income" = $6,000 and under; "High income" = $18,000 and over. For March 1977-December 1980, "Low income" = $7,000 and under; "High income" = $25,000 and over. From March 1981-December 1984, "Low income" = $10,000 and under; "High income" = $30,000 and over. From March 1985-December 1986 "Low income" = $15,000 and under; "High income" = $35,000 and over.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-1), latest that of December 6-13, 1986.

paring the Presidents



VOTE BY INCOME

Vote for President

By income:

	1976			1980			1984	
Less than $10,000	58D	40R	Less than $10,000	50D	41R	Less than $12,500	54D	46R
$10,000-$14,999	55D	43R	$10,000-$14,999	47D	42R	$12,500-$24,999	42D	58R
$15,000-$24,999	48D	50R	$15,000-$24,999	38D	53R	$25,000-$34,999	40D	60R
$25,000-$50,000	36D	62R	$25,000-$50,000	32D	58R	$35,000-$50,000	32D	68R
Over $50,000	NA	NA	Over $50,000	25D	65R	Over $50,000	31D	69R
National	50D	48R	National	41D	51R	National	41D	59R

Vote for Congress

By income:

	1978			1982			1986	
Less than $10,000	62D	35R	Less than $10,000	70D	28R	Less than $12,500	57D	40R
$10,000-$15,000	58D	40R	$10,000-$19,999	59D	39R	$12,500-$24,999	54D	44R
$15,001-$25,000	56D	42R	$20,000-$29,999	59D	40R	$25,000-$34,999	53D	45R
Over $25,000	45D	53R	$30,000-$50,000	46D	49R	$35,000-$49,999	54D	44R
			Over $50,000	36D	64R	$50,000 and over	47D	51R
National	55D	43R	National	55D	43R	National	53D	45R

Note: [illegible]

Source: Surveys by CBS News, CBS News/New York Times, latest that of November [illegible]

TEEN ANGELS

I'M OK AND SO'S EVERYTHING ELSE

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? . . . On the whole, I'm satisfied with myself.



Source: Survey by *Monitoring the Future*, Lloyd D. Johnston, Jerald G. Bachman, and Patrick M. O'Malley, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1985.

Question: Here is a list of things. (Hand respondent card) Some of the things on that list are things which make people feel good; others are things which don't really have that effect. As I read each item, please tell me whether it is the kind of thing which *does* or *does not* make you personally feel good.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for The American Chicle Group, *The American Chicle Youth Poll*, November 16-26, 1986.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCIES

Question: Here is a list of things that we hear go on in certain schools. (Hand respondent card) Thinking about the students in your school—not just the ones you know—for each thing on the card would you tell me if there is a lot of it among the students in your school, some of it, or very little of it? First . . .



Note: Sample size = 531.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for The American Chicle Group, *The American Chicle Youth Poll*, November 16-26, 1986.

Question: Now I'd like to ask you some questions about school. Generally speaking, do you like school, or don't you like it?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for The American Chicle Group, *The American Chicle Youth Poll*, November 16-26, 1986.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Family Feelings

HAPPY TOGETHER

Question: Now I'd like to talk with you about your family and home life. Generally, would you say your home life is happy or not too happy?

8-17 Year Olds



Question: Thinking about the amount of time your family spends together as a whole, do you feel you spend *too much* time together, *too little* time, or *just the right amount* of time together?

8-17 Year Olds



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for The American Chicle Group, *The American Chicle Youth Poll*, November 16-26, 1986.

THE FAMILY FEUDS

Question: During the LAST 12 MONTHS, how often have you . . . Argued or had a fight with either of your parents?



Note: In 1975, question asked "During the last year how often have you. . . ."

Question: How closely do your ideas agree with your PARENTS' ideas about . . .



Note: "Don't know" calculated out. For "What things are O.K. to do when you are on a date" equaled 13%.

Source: Surveys by *Monitoring the Future*, Lloyd D. Johnston, Jerald G. Bachman, and Patrick M. O'Malley, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, latest that of 1985.

KIDS SAY THE DARNEDEST THINGS

Question: Here is a list of some different things. (Hand respondent card) For each one, please tell me whether you feel that this is something about which you feel you can talk about comfortably with your parents or not?



Note: Sample size = 469 young people ages 8-12, and 531 ages 13-17.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for The American Chicle Group, *The American Chicle Youth Poll*, November 16-26, 1986.

Peers And Pressure

REBELS AND THEIR CAUSES

Question: Now, here is a list (hand respondent card) and, for each one I'd like you to tell me how old you feel people should be before they make their own decisions on those things. First . . . how old do you think people should be to make their own decisions?

To make their own decisions on...



Note: * = less than 1%. Sample size = 531

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for The American Chicle Group, *The American Chicle Youth Poll,* November 16-26, 1986.

RISKY BUSINESS

Question: How do you think your CLOSE FRIENDS feel (or would feel) about YOU doing each of the following things?

Close friends would...



Question: The next questions are about your experiences in school. . . . How do you think most of the students in your classes would feel if you cheated on a test?



Source: Survey by *Monitoring the Future,* Lloyd D. Johnston, Jerald G. Bachman, and Patrick M. O'Malley, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1985.

ANOTHER SATURDAY NIGHT AND I AIN'T GOT NOBODY

Question: Do you agree or disagree with each of the following? . . . A lot of times I feel lonely.



Question: On the average, how often do you go out with a date (or your spouse, if you are married)?



Source: Survey by *Monitoring the Future,* Lloyd D. Johnston, Jerald G. Bachman, and Patrick M. O'Malley, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1985.

Future Perfect

JOB DESCRIPTIONS: ME vs THEE

Question: Different people may look for different things in their work. Below is a list of some of these things. Please read each one, then indicate how important this thing is for you.



Question: In the following list you will find some statements about leisure time and work. Please show whether you agree or disagree with each statement.



FUTURE TRADITIONS

Question: How do you think your own life will go in the next five years—do you think it will get better or worse?



Question: If you did get married (or are married) . . . How likely do you think it is that you would stay married to the same person for life?



Question: If you did get married (or are married) . . . How likely is it that you would want to have children?



Source: Surveys by *Monitoring the Future*, Lloyd D. Johnston, Jerald G. Bachman, and Patrick M. O'Malley, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, latest that of 1985.

PARENTAL LEAVE:

In February 1987, Representatives Patricia Schroeder and William Clay introduced the Family and Medical Leave Act, H.R. 925. The bill entitles employees who have worked for three consecutive months, or 500 hours, to parental leave in certain situations. The bill provides unpaid family (maternal/paternal) leave of up to eighteen weeks over a twenty-four month period for the birth or adoption of a child; unpaid family leave for care of a seriously ill parent; unpaid employee leave for illness; and the creation of a commission to study paid leave. The bill has been dubbed "Yuppie welfare" by its critics, and hailed as essential and long overdue by supporters. What do most Americans think about it?

A solid majority of Americans think that unpaid parental leave is a good idea. When asked about *paid* leave, however, overall support shifts to opposition, although there are striking differences by age, sex, and ideology. There is more sympathy for requiring companies to provide leave for care of a sick child than for the birth or adoption of a child. The final question in this series shows that a plurality of Americans think that parental leave is a nice thing for companies to offer, but slightly less than a third think it should be required. The data show that Americans like parental leave, but balk at the notion of requiring companies to provide it.

KHK

Question: I am going to read some statements to you about current issues. Please indicate if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, or strongly disagree. . . . There should be a federal law guaranteeing maternity leave.



Note: Sample = 800 women.
Source: Survey by Mark Clements Research Inc. for *Glamour*, August 1986.

Question: Congress is now considering a bill, often called the "parental leave" bill, that would require employers with five or more workers to offer both mothers and fathers an unpaid leave of up to eighteen weeks after a birth or adoption. The legislation would require employers to give parents their former jobs or comparable ones when they returned to work. The bill would also allow parents time off to care for a seriously ill child. Do you think requiring employers to provide unpaid parental leave for employees is a good idea or a bad idea?



Note: Sample size = 1,430. Not all age categories shown.

Question: What about paid parental leave: Do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea to enact a law that would require employers to give both mothers and fathers three months of leave at 75 percent pay following a birth or an adoption?



Source: Survey by Cambridge Reports, Inc., July 7-August 8, 1986.

PERK OR PRIORITY?

Question: Do you think companies should be required by law to let men and women take up to eighteen weeks of unpaid leave from their work (after the birth or adoption of their child/to take care of their seriously ill child), or don't you think so?

Companies should be required to provide up to 18 weeks unpaid parental leave...



Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, July 14-15, 1986.

Question: Congress is considering a bill that would require companies employing more than fifteen people to grant up to eighteen weeks of *unpaid* leave to employees under certain circumstances and be required to hold the employee's job for him or her. Here are those circumstances. (Card shown respondent) Let's talk about the up-to-eighteen weeks leave first. Do you think granting such leaves is something companies should be required to do, or something that would be nice for them to do but not required, or something that they should not be expected to do?

Granting unpaid parental leave is something companies...

	☐ *Should be required to do*	▨ *Nice, but not required*	☐ *Should not be expected to do*
National	31%	43%	20%
By selected groups			
By age:			
18-29 years	40%	40%	15%
30-44 years	33	47	16
45-59 years	27	43	21
60 years and over	20	43	29
By household income:			
Under $15,000	35	38	18
$15,000-24,999	30	44	20
$25,000-34,999	30	50	15
$35,000 and over	30	48	23
By occupation:			
Executive/professional	26	51	20
White collar	35	45	18
Blue collar	36	39	17
Homemaker	29	43	17
Employed women	38	42	15

Note: "Don't know" = 6% (national).

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-1), December 6-13, 1986.

Question: (Asked of those who said parental leave should be required = 31%) Do you think the eighteen week leave should apply to all those on the list or only some of them? (If "only some") Which ones?

Responses of those who said parental leave should be required



Note: Ten percent of those who said parental leave should be required said it should be provided in all of these cases.

THE BRITISH LOOK

Question: Are you satisfied with the way . . . Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as prime minister? . . . Mr. Kinnock is doing his job as leader of the Opposition? . . . Mr. Steel is doing his job as leader of the Liberal party? . . . Dr. Owen is doing his job as leader of the SDP?



Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI) London, latest that of March 26-April 2, 1987.

Question: How would you vote if there were a general election tomorrow? (To those "undecided" or "refused") Which party are you most inclined to support?



Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI) London, latest that of March 26-April 2, 1987.

TOWARD AN ELECTION


on attempt,

Thatcher grants overflight request to U.S. for Libyan strike, April 1986

	Thatcher sat/dis	Steel sat/dis	Kinnock sat/dis	Owen sat/dis
1986				
Jan.	34/58	49/24	40/40	45/26
Feb.	29/64	47/29	37/46	46/29
March	32/61	48/29	35/46	45/29
April	32/61	42/33	38/45	41/31
May	29/64	47/28	39/42	43/30
June	30/62	45/30	38/43	39/33
July	30/63	42/29	33/44	39/30
Aug.	27/65	43/31	32/48	41/32
Sept.	32/59	40/33	32/46	41/31
Oct.	35/55	37/33	40/40	35/33
Nov.	37/54	40/35	37/45	39/34
Dec.	39/55	46/32	36/50	46/31
1987				
Jan.	37/56	45/27	37/47	42/30
Feb.	38/54	42/33	30/53	41/31
March	44/50	49/29	28/58	47/29

	Conservative	Labour	Liberal/SDP
June 1983	43%	27%	29%
July	44	30	25
Aug.	46	30	22
Sept.	45	27	26
Oct.	42	37	19
Dec.	44	37	18
Jan. 1984	42	37	19
Feb.	41	38	19
March	41	40	17
April	40	39	20
June	39	39	21
July	37	40	20
Aug.	39	39	21
Sept.	42	36	20
Oct.	44	35	20
Nov.	43	35	19
Dec.	40	36	22
Jan. 1985	42	34	21
Feb.	39	35	24
March	36	40	23
April	38	37	24
May	33	35	30
June	35	36	27
July	33	34	31
Aug.	31	35	31
Sept.	30	33	35
Oct.	37	36	25
Nov.	36	36	25
Dec.	35	35	28
Jan. 1986	33	38	28
Feb.	34	35	30
March	34	36	28
April	34	39	25
May	32	40	26
June	34	40	23
July	36	37	25
Aug.	37	37	24
Sept.	35	37	26
Oct.	39	41	17
Nov.	41	39	18
Dec.	39	38	21
Jan. 1987	39	38	21
Feb.	41	35	20
March	41	29	29

ALL IN A DAY

Question: Which have you personally done in the last 24 hours?



	1986	Male response	Female response
Eaten beef	44%	50%	38%
Skipped breakfast	38%	38%	38%
Stayed up past midnight	33%	35%	31%
Taken any kind of non-prescription pill or medicine (aspirin, vitamins, etc.)	32%	25%	37%
Had a snack between dinner and bedtime	29%	30%	27%
Eaten chicken	29%	27%	30%
Eaten potato chips, pretzels or other salty snacks	28%	33%	23%
Taken any kind of prescription pill or medicine	28%	20%	35%
Had a mid-afternoon snack	25%	23%	26%
Had a mid-morning snack	25%	27%	24%
Done exercise or calisthenics	24%	23%	24%
Read Ann Landers or Dear Abby or someone like them	22%	15%	29%
Gotten up before 6 A.M.	21%	22%	21%
Skipped lunch	21%	20%	22%
Eaten pork	21%	23%	19%
Used a sugar substitute	19%	15%	23%
Eaten fish	19%	18%	19%
Drunk beer	17%	28%	7%
Checked your horoscope	14%	11%	17%
Used a credit card or charge card	14%	15%	13%
Drunk other alcoholic beverages	9%	11%	7%
Used a salt substitute	8%	7%	9%
Drunk wine	6%	5%	7%
Played some active sport (golf, tennis, basketball, etc.)	6%	9%	3%
Skipped dinner	5%	6%	5%
Gone jogging	4%	6%	3%

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 86-3), February 8-22, 1986.

ARE COLLEGE COSTS A PROBLEM?

by Terry W. Hartle

College degrees have become more expensive just at the time that their quality is being questioned. Since 1980 the price charged by colleges has climbed 75 percent, while the consumer price index has advanced by just 33 percent. Over the same period, median family income has grown by roughly 34 percent.

People have noticed the change. In a December 1986 survey by the Opinion Research Corporation (ORC), 82 percent agreed that costs were rising at a rate that will put college out of reach for most people.

A college education can cost a phenomenal amount of money. The average annual cost to attend a private university (including tuition, fees, room, and board) has more than tripled in fifteen years—from $3,163 in 1970-1971 to $11,765 in 1986-1987. Public universities went from $1,478 a year to $4,410 over the same period. In the 1980s, college tuition has risen faster than the cost of food, energy, new cars, new houses, and even medical care (see table 1).

Table 1

PRICE INCREASES IN THE 1980s:
COLLEGE TUITION LEADS THE WAY

College tuition	75%
Medical care	63
New houses	42
All consumer prices	33
Food	26
New cars	25
Energy	3

Source: Basic data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Department of Education. Calculations by the author and Arthur Hauptman.

Rising college costs create problems for everyone. For many families, higher education will be more expensive than anything except a new house. Students often borrow huge amounts of money to finance their education, and there are mounting concerns that some college graduates are excessively indebted when they leave school. Colleges and universities have struggled to explain why tuition is rising so rapidly, but so far they've been unconvincing. Policy makers face growing demands to expand student aid programs (or to create new ones) to guarantee that qualified students can afford a college degree.

Despite these concerns about rising college prices, many adults continue to believe that higher education is affordable. In the December ORC poll, 52 percent—an all-time high—said that they would be better able to afford college today than five years ago. Among college graduates in the ORC poll—the type of adults most likely to send their children to college—60 percent said they could better afford it now.

A similar pattern emerges among college students. For more than a decade, the American Council on Education and the University of California at Los Angeles have surveyed college freshmen to determine their attitudes and characteristics. Among other things, the surveyors ask students if they are concerned about financing their education. Over the last ten years, their answers have changed little.

In 1976, 35 percent of all college freshmen expressed "no concern" about paying for their education, compared with 36 percent last year. The percentage of students who called the financing of higher education a "major concern" actually declined over the same period (see table 2).

A few minor shifts in perception have taken place, but the general trend has not changed: college freshmen have about the same level of concern about financing their education that they did a decade ago. Indeed, the only significant changes that have taken place are at the predominantly black colleges, where the percentage of students expressing no concern has *increased* and major concern has *declined*. Since these schools enroll large numbers of economically disadvantaged and minority students, the results are surprising.

Table 2

CONCERN ABOUT FINANCING COLLEGE
(Responses of college freshmen)

Students in:	1976	1980	1986
All institutions			
No concern	35%	34%	36%
Some concern	49	52	50
Major concern	16	15	14
All two-year colleges			
No concern	37	35	34
Some concern	47	52	51
Major concern	15	14	15
All four-year colleges			
No concern	33	33	37
Some concern	50	52	49
Major concern	17	15	14
All universities			
No concern	34	34	38
Some concern	50	51	49
Major concern	16	15	13
Predominantly black colleges			
No concern	22	28	28
Some concern	48	51	50
Major concern	30	21	21

Source: *American Freshmen: National Norms for Fall . . .*, Cooperative Institutional Research Program, American Council on Education and the University of California, Los Angeles

Affording the Opportunity

This evidence is not definitive, but it does suggest that the cost of higher education *may* not be the overwhelming burden that popular stories suggest. Why would this be?

There are several possible explanations. The first is lack of awareness. Some adults and many college freshmen may simply fail to anticipate the substantial expense involved in financing a higher education. In these cases, the first tuition bill might come as a tremendous shock. The flip side of this offers another possible explanation. Parents may have anticipated higher college costs and prepared themselves better by putting money aside.

A second explanation is that many parents and students recognize that financial aid can greatly reduce the actual cost of college attendance. There can be a substantial difference between the *posted* price of a college education (what colleges say they charge) and the *net* price to students/parents after financial aid has been figured into the equation. Most people seem to recognize this. Seventy percent of the respondents in the December 1986 ORC poll said that they would not be able to afford higher education without the help of low-interest loans or grants. Today, roughly half of all college students receive some financial help from the federal government to meet college bills. At some schools, especially private institutions, the percentage is much higher.

The belief that federal student aid programs should be protected from budget cuts is well established. A February 1985 Harris poll found a 79 percent majority convinced that it would be "a serious mistake to cut a federal student loan program." More recently, a January 1987 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll found that 46 percent wanted to increase loans and grants to college students, and 39 percent wanted them left at



Reprinted by permission: United Feature Syndicate about the same level. Only 14 percent wanted to see less student aid available.

A third possibility is that most college students (80 percent) attend public institutions, where the price is subsidized and relatively affordable. Roughly 35 percent of America's college students go to community colleges, where the average annual tuition in 1986-1987 was about $660. Another 25 percent of college students are in four-year public colleges (as opposed to universities), where tuition is roughly $1,300 per year. In both types of schools, students often commute and save on room and board.

For those contemplating tuition at a private college or university, attitudes can be quite different. A 1984 Roper survey found that 37 percent of parents wanted their children to attend a private college, but less than 40 percent of those thought that was where their children would go. (Only about 20 percent of college students attend private institutions.) In most cases, those who preferred a private college but expected their children to go elsewhere said it was because they would not be able to afford the higher priced schools.

Finally, perceptions about the affordability of higher education may be shaped by general economic growth. For the last four years the nation has enjoyed slow but steady economic growth with incomes rising slightly faster than consumer prices. Thus, some may believe they are in a better position to afford a college education than they would have been in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Then, incomes were rising slower than consumer prices and public confidence in future economic growth was low. The reality, of course, is that with college price increases far outstripping income growth, many families are falling behind.

One concern is whether consumers will continue to regard higher education as a good investment. Public estimates of the value of a higher education have been increasing. Yet, growing worry about college quality—fueled by Education Secretary William Bennett's tough questions and several critical reports—suggests that public views may begin to change, as they did toward elementary and secondary education in the mid-1970s. If this happens, and college costs continue to soar upward, America's colleges and universities might find themselves priced out of the market. ☑

Terry W. Hartle is the chief education adviser for the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. He wrote this article while he was a resident fellow at AEI.

Brownstein

(Continued from page 42)

zations affiliated with the official party committees. Though these groups had nowhere near the impact their critics suggested, they symbolized a larger truth: with both parties trying to demonstrate their fitness for running the economy, neither wanted to be viewed as the enemy of business.

That's still true, but less so. Times are changing again. The spreading scandal on Wall Street—reinforced by the Iran scandal in Washington—is already reactivating the voices of liberal populism.

The fall of Ivan F. Boesky and a raft of his high-living compatriots, allows liberal populists to suggest (as they have been longing to do for six years now) that immorality is the inexorable result of a culture based solely on the acquisition of material reward. Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., keen as always to changes in the political curve, was among the first to sound the new cry. He wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* last December: "The Reaganite ethos is at bottom the ethos of greed, and Ivan Boesky is the predictable result."

The Democratic presidential contenders are close on Schlesinger's heels. They found during the tax reform debate last year that business was still a good target for popular discontent. Now, emboldened by the headlines from Wall Street, they are attacking the underlying tenet of the business culture: that self-interest, aggressively pursued, inevitably yields public benefits.

Joseph Biden, one of the Democratic hopefuls, expressed the new old counter-argument in a February speech to the AFL-CIO: "For too long, we have pushed individualism over community. It's been 'I got mine, you get yours' and 'What's in it for me?' Ronald Reagan's standard has been wealth and economic gain for the individual. That measure of the bottom line can tell us everything except that which has been most important to this country."

That standard—of maximizing individual wealth—has been the pinstriped populists' standard too. As it faces challenges, so will they. At one level, the insider trading scandals are undoing the incredible public relations job Pickens has done burnishing the image of corporate takeovers. Once again, threatened executives are picturing the raiders as rapists, and pressure is growing in Congress for action to restrict takeovers.

The more lasting damage will be to business's image. The Wall Street scandals virtually guarantee that the pinstriped populists will be outflanked by other voices less sympathetic to the basic values of corporate managers. Business executives didn't like getting nailed to the wall by Pickens and Perot. They're probably going to like what's coming even less. ☑

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PREJUDICE

BLACKS AND JEWS: HOW MUCH BIAS?

by Seymour Martin Lipset

Is the glass half full or half empty? Are racism and religious bigotry generally at a low or high level in the United States as we approach the end of the twentieth century? Should we congratulate ourselves for the prejudices we've conquered or chastise ourselves for those that remain?

There is no clear answer to these questions, but polls offer some evidence. In general, since the end of World War II, bigotry has declined steadily. The rate of improvement has sometimes fallen to close to zero, but it has rarely reversed. While this conclusion holds for minority groups such as blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, it has been documented most exhaustively for Jews.

Changes Over Time

One of the most perceptive and cautious observers of the position of Jews internationally, Yehuda Bauer, the head of the International Center for the Study of Anti-Semitism at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has noted that "in the past few decades the level of popular anti-Semitism in Western countries has been waning." Even so, a decline in prejudice clearly does not equal the elimination of prejudice, as the American data in Opinion Roundup (pp. 21 to 39) indicate. Recent surveys of attitudes toward Jews in countries as diverse as Greece and Austria report that half the population gives voice to anti-Semitic sentiments. The American Jewish Committee (AJC) examined several opinion surveys and reported that about one-third of all Americans express some negative feelings toward Jews. A detailed survey taken by Yankelovich for the AJC in 1981, repeating an Anti-Defamation League study of 1964, found that the average level of anti-Semitism had fallen from 32 to 25 percent (using the same scale) between 1964 and 1981. Even so, sizable numbers of respondents gave the negative answers in 1981 to five important items shown below with a plus (+) sign.

The level of agreement with these negative images of Jews is countered by the overwhelming willingness of the majority, usually a considerable one, to endorse positive statements: Jews are hard-working (81 percent), family oriented (79 percent), religious (71 percent), warm and friendly (64 percent), and have contributed much to our cultural life (54 percent).

A similar pattern occurs in attitudes about blacks. This has been well-documented by Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo in an extensive and admirable analysis of racial attitudes in America. They report that all the studies that have dealt exclusively or primarily with broad principles about race relations from the forties to the eighties show increas-

Table 1

TRENDS IN NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS

Base: Non-Jews	1964	1981	Difference
Probably True			
Jews today are trying to push in where they are not wanted	18%	16%	−2
Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews +	49	37	−12
*Jews stick together too much +	52	40	−12
*Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind	26	16	−10
*Jews always like to be the head of things +	54	38	−16
*International banking is pretty much controlled by Jews	30	21	−9
*Jews are (not) just as honest as other businessmen	28	17	−11
*The trouble with Jewish businessmen is that they are so shrewd and tricky that other people don't have a fair chance in competition	35	20	−15
*Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want	42	23	−19
*Jews have a lot of irritating faults	40	19	−21
The movie and television industries are pretty much controlled by Jews	47	25	−22
*Jews have too much power in the U.S.	11	20	+9
*Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America +	30	30	—
*Jews have too much power in the business world +	29	32	+3
Jews are alway stirring up trouble with their ideas	10	10	—

Note: * = part of the 11-item Anti-Semitism index. + = the five important items noted in the text. "Don't know" not shown.

"strong positive attitudes over time." Growing proportions of Americans have been willing to tell pollsters that they favor racially integrated schools (90 percent); support giving blacks as good a chance as whites "to get any job" (90 percent); that they would vote for a black for president "if he were qualified for the job" (85 percent in 1985); and that blacks "have a right to live wherever they can" (88 percent). Yet in 1982, only 39 percent of those interviewed by NORC disagreed strongly that "white people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhood," and a year later only 40 percent said that they approved of marriage between whites and blacks. Even more strikingly, Gallup reported in 1983 that as many as one-quarter felt that there "should be laws against intermarriage between blacks and whites."

These results point to an America that has become less anti-Semitic and less racist in the years since the war against Nazism, but that still includes a sizable minority who retain negative feelings about their black or Jewish fellow citizens.

The Context

Interpreting these results can be complex. One influence on responses is the context in which questions are posed. A striking example is the often-repeated question: "Do you think Jews have too much power [influence] in the United States or not?" A number of surveys taken during the 1980s by Yankelovich, Skelly and White; CBS News/*New York Times*; and ABC News/*Washington Post* have found that between a fifth and a quarter of the respondents say that Jews have too much power. But four surveys conducted by the Roper Organization for the AJC between January 1984 and February 1987 reported that only 7 or 8 percent gave the same response. Why this striking variation? The first group of pollsters inquired only about Jews. Roper, however, asked whether respondents believed each of nine groups listed on a card has too much power (see table 2). Jews finished eighth, next to last. It seems that most Americans who say that Jews have too much power do not think that Jews are peculiar in this regard; in other words, theirs is not necessarily or even probably an anti-Semitic response.

Table 2

ESTIMATES OF EXCESSIVE POWER

Question: Which, if any, of the groups listed on this card do you believe have too much power in the United States?

	1984	1985	1986	1987
a) Business corporations	51%	49%	44%	42%
i) Labor unions	50	45	44	33
d) News media, TV, and newspapers	50	42	40	38
b) Arab interests	30	30	28	20
g) Asians/Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Vietnamese	*	11	12	12
c) Blacks	13	13	11	11
f) The Catholic Church	10	11	10	9
e) Jews	8	8	8	7
h) Hispanics	4	*	6	5

Note: All figures represent percent of total sample. Multiple responses were accepted. The letters before the groups refer to the order in which a given one was listed. * = not asked.

This pattern recurs on questions concerning Jewish influence over the media. A 1985 Gallup poll, conducted for the Times Mirror Corporation, inquired about each of twelve different groups separately, "whether you feel this group *often influences* organizations in the way they report the news, or not?" One-third replied that Jews have such influence, which is presumably unwelcome from the respondents' point of view. That as many as one-third are bothered by excessive Jewish influence over the news media should concern anyone interested in the potential for anti-Semitism in this country. But, as it happens, Jews ranked at the bottom of the list of twelve. The question order is listed here before the category, the response after it: [7] federal government (78%), [3] business corporations (70%), [1] advertisers (65%), [9] labor unions (62%), [12] Republicans (60%), [6] Democrats (58%), [11] the military (50%), [10] liberals (48%), [5] conservatives (45%), [2] blacks (44%), [4] Catholics (35%), and [8] Jews (33%).

In 1986 NORC asked a national cross-section to rate different groups on a "feeling thermometer" between zero and 100 degrees, telling respondents that between zero and 50 degrees meant that "you don't feel favorable toward the group." Jews came out well ahead of liberals and conservatives, but somewhat behind Protestants and Catholics. Only 7 percent rated Jews at 40 degrees or lower, compared to 5 percent for Catholics and 3 percent for Protestants. Over four-fifths, 82 percent, gave Jews a "favorable and warm" rating, and 45 percent scored them at 70 degrees or better. The overall positive rating for Catholics was slightly higher, 85 percent, with 54 percent placing them in the top categories. The equivalent figures for Protestants were 91 percent and 58 percent.

Of course, many negative stereotypes about Jews persist, as the data in table 1 demonstrate. Others that relate to historic Christian beliefs also remain prevalent, especially among evangelicals and fundamentalists. A survey of this group (defined as white Baptists, United Methodists, Lutherans, and Mormons) taken for the ADL by Tarrance, Hill, Newport, and Ryan in 1986 showed that three-fifths, 59 percent, agreed with the statement: "Jews can never be forgiven for what they did to Jesus until they accept him as the true savior." Yet only 5 percent of those interviewed expressed an unfavorable opinion of Jews, while 49 percent reported "very favorable" or "favorable" attitudes.

Essentially, the opinion data tell us that as of the late 1980s, Jews now suffer about as much prejudice as other white groups. By comparing evaluations of Jews with other groups (rarely done in studies of anti-Semitism *per se*), we see that Jews are perceived to be just as

(Continued on page 57)

PREJUDICE

PRIME-TIME PREJUDICE: TV's IMAGES OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS

by S. Robert Lichter, Linda S. Lichter,
Stanley Rothman, and Daniel Amundson

When Kingfish uttered his last "Holy Mackerel, Andy!" in 1953, it marked the end of television's most controversial depiction of blacks. Ironically, the departure of "Amos 'n' Andy" also signaled the end of a brief period of ethnic diversity that would not reappear in prime time for two decades. This observation emerges from our content analysis of prime-time television series—620 episodes randomly selected from 20,000 Library of Congress holdings from 1955–1986.[1]

Several of the earliest family sitcoms were transplanted radio shows set in America's white immigrant subcultures. Among them were Jews ("The Goldbergs"), Italians ("Life with Luigi"), and Scandinavians ("Mama"). These ethnic shows were soon joined by "Amos 'n' Andy" and "Beulah," which starred the black maid of a white middle-class family.

The radio shows had relied on stereotypical dialogue and behavior for much of their humor, a style that was carried over to the new medium. But changing social standards and the heightened reality of a visual medium made this a problem. On radio Amos, Andy, and even Beulah were all portrayed by white males. But when "Amos 'n' Andy" shifted to TV in 1952, the sight of its all-black cast reinforcing racial stereotypes provoked outrage in the black community. Complaints ranged from Kingfish's fractured syntax ("I'se regusted") to the slow shuffle and falsetto "yazzah" of Lightnin', the dim-witted janitor. The NAACP blasted the show's portrayal of blacks as "inferior, lazy, dumb, and dishonest" and urged a boycott of the sponsor, Blatz beer. In the program's defense, actor Alvin Childress (Amos) argued that "Many episodes showed the Negro with professions and businesses like attorneys, store owners, and so on, which they never had in TV or movies before."

This kind of controversy doesn't attract advertisers. "Amos 'n' Andy" lost its network slot after two seasons, despite landing regularly in the Nielsen top twenty. Its demise was part of a general shift away from urban ethnic sitcoms toward homogeneous suburban family settings like "Father Knows Best" and "Leave It to Beaver."

The departure of "Amos 'n' Andy" and "Beulah" in 1953 all but eliminated blacks from the airwaves. Until the mid-1960s, only about one character in 200 was black. Jack Benny's valet Rochester was one of the few major roles still held by a black in the late 1950s. Urban settings sometimes featured an occasional black deliveryman, porter, or waiter, but black professionals and businessmen were virtually nonexistent.

Hispanics did little better in this monochromatic world, accounting for fewer than 2 percent of all roles between 1955 and 1965. For most Hispanic characters, life consisted of lounging in the dusty square of a sleepy Latin town, waiting for the stars to come on stage. Occasionally they would show up as outlaws in the Old West, but mostly as extras in the bad guy's gang.

A notable exception was Cuban band leader Ricky Ricardo in "I Love Lucy." When exasperated by Lucy's schemes and misadventures, Ricky added a comic touch with his displays of "Latin" temper and lapses into agitated Spanish. Although "I Love Lucy" made its mark on television comedy, it did little to promote Latin characters other than the male lead.

The same could be said of another early show with a Hispanic setting—"Zorro." Anglos were cast in the major roles: Guy Williams played Don Diego, alias Zorro, the masked champion of the poor and oppressed in old Los Angeles. Annette Funicello, fresh from the Mickey Mouse Club, showed up as the singing senorita Anita Cabrillo. The bad guys were evil, greedy Spanish governors and landowners. Despite its "Hispanic" characters, the series was not a generous portrayal of either the people or the culture.

The 1960s

In the mid-1960s, the depiction of blacks changed dramatically. The proportion of black characters jumped to 7 percent, and the range of roles expanded as well. In adventure series like " I Spy" and "Mission: Impossible," blacks moved into their first starring roles in over a decade. The parts they played were prominent, and they offered new styles of characters—neither caricatures nor stereotypes, but solid portrayals of more realistic (if somewhat idealized) individuals.

Alexander Scott of "I Spy" and Barney Collier of "Mission: Impossible" were competent, educated black professionals. These men were highly successful agents whose racial backgrounds were clearly secondary to their bravery and skill. They opened the way for blacks to appear in roles that did not require the actor to be black. There was no more use of poor English, servile shuffling, or pop-eyed double takes for comic effect. Instead, the Collier character was an electronics expert, and Scott was a multilingual Rhodes scholar.

Although the racial background of characters became less significant in the 1960s, racial tensions posed more of a challenge for scriptwriters. When television raised race as an issue during this period, it was usually to illustrate blacks' bitterness and frustration with the system. Scripts began to crackle with anger at continuing racial injustice, although militancy and violence were invariably condemned. In a 1966 "I Spy" episode, for instance, a black militant planned to create an electrical blackout to allow his co-conspirators to go on a crime spree. Scott went undercover to infiltrate the gang and foil their plot. He didn't share the man's bitterness at white society. Nor did he see himself as markedly different from his white colleagues. This reflected the series' underlying premise that mutual goodwill can make race irrelevant to social relations.

This message of tolerance and equality was inherent in the pairing of Scott and his white partner, Kelly Robinson. Within a few years, such interracial law enforcement teams became a prime-time cliché. Indeed, TV's most common message on the subject was that race shouldn't matter, people are all pretty much alike, and they need only emphasize their basic similarities over their superficial differences in order to get along.

The 1970s

In the early 1970s, this began to change. A major stimulus was the influx of all-black sitcoms like "Sanford and Son," "The Jeffersons," "Good Times," and "What's Happening." Suddenly TV rediscovered blacks interacting with other blacks, often in ghetto settings. Although a long way from "Amos 'n' Andy," these shows carried their own stereotypes. They sometimes celebrated hip con men and smooth operators whose principal pursuits were pleasure and luxury. The shows substituted jivin' and struttin' for grinnin' and shufflin'. This was seen by many as no great improvement.

Esther Rolle (Florida Evans), for example, left "Good Times" in disgust over the slothful and womanizing image of the J.J. Evans character played by Jimmie Walker. As the authors of *Watching TV* commented, "Here was a young black comic who became a national celebrity, especially among black children, by portraying a shiftless, addle-brained jive-ass—exactly the sort of media character blacks had complained about for years."[2]

Even if the new minority roles were sometimes clichéd or problematic, they brought a new racial consciousness to television. The 1970s generation of characters prided themselves not on their similarity to the mainstream, but on their differences from it. Assimilated characters like Alexander Scott and Barney Collier gave way to the racial pride of George Jefferson of "The Jeffersons," Fred Sanford of "Sanford and Son," and Rooster on "Starsky and Hutch." Race became a central aspect of the roles of such characters. Where would Fred Sanford or George Jefferson be without hip talk and street slang? Language was just one way of stressing the difference between groups.

The new black characters also picked up flaws as they took on more complete roles. Unlike the saintly black heroes of the late 1960s, Fred Sanford was domineering and could appear foolish at times. George Jefferson could be as bigoted as his one-time neighbor Archie Bunker. By badgering the interracial couple living upstairs and labeling their daughter a "zebra," George left no doubt about his views.

In other series, however, minority characters were shown as social or moral superiors charged with the task of straightening out the thinking or behavior of white society. It was Chico Rodriguez who taught Ed Brown to relax and be more tolerant on "Chico and the Man." Benson, the sharp-tongued black butler on "Soap," tried to bring some order into the chaotic lives of the Tate family, even saving young Billy from a cult.

TV's ethnic revival of the mid-1970s presented new opportunities for minorities, but it had drawbacks, too. Along with more prominent and desirable roles came more undesirable ones. Bumblers and buffoons took their places alongside heroes and sages. Among Hispanics, Juan Epstein was one of the uneducated underachievers or "sweathogs" on "Welcome Back Kotter." He played Buchanan High School's only Puerto Rican Jew as a tough but dense would-be con man. Carlos Valdes, Jessica Tate's Latin lover on "Soap," was nicknamed "el puerco" (the pig).

In addition to its clay-footed hero, J.J. Evans, "Good Times" offered up some unquestionably negative black characters—insensitive building supervisors and abusive politicians, for example. In "What's Happening" the Thomas family made do without their con man father after he walked out on them. His occasional visits home were usually searches for money to finance scams. Minority characters began to show up as criminals in shows like "Kojak," "Baretta," and "Barney Miller."

Throughout the late 1970s, a mixture of ethnic heroes and heavies held forth in some of the most popular shows. But ethnic characters were beginning to lose their novelty. Integrated casts and ethnic diversity remained common in the 1980s, but heritage began to fade as an issue. As the prime-time world became less polarized, integration became an accepted part of the scenery. The age of pluralism had arrived. The riots were over, the fight was won, and characters could get back to other plot functions.

Among those functions were crime and other wrongdoing. Shows like "Taxi," "White Shadow," and

"WKRP in Cincinnati" continued to present integrated casts, but new minority roles were often played on the dark side of the law. Crime shows like "Miami Vice," "Hill Street Blues," and "Hunter" consistently offered up Hispanic drug lords as major nemeses. Trafficking in human misery made these characters rich enough to own cities and sometimes even small countries. They were among the nastiest criminals on TV in the 1980s. Hispanic petty criminals also peopled the slums of "Hill Street Blues" and "Cagney and Lacey."

Blacks fared better than Hispanics in the 1980s, largely escaping criminal portrayals, while enjoying several new starring roles. Rico Tubbs of "Miami Vice," Heathcliff Huxtable of "The Cosby Show," Mary Jenkins of "227," and Bobby Hill of "Hill Street Blues" are typical of the positive black roles TV has turned out recently. Series like "227" and the short-lived "Amen" and "Charlie and Co." continued the sharp-tongued tradition of 1970s black sitcoms, without the abrasive or objectionable images that had brought criticism. By contrast, "Cosby" harks back to the "I Spy" mode of quietly providing role models without drawing attention to racial issues or images.

Table 1

TRAITS OF TV CHARACTERS 1955-1986

	White	Black	Hispanic
All Characters	89%	6%	2%
Social background*			
Attended college	72	44	**
Lacked high school diploma	25	49	**
Low economic status	22	47	40
Professional or executive	22	17	10
Unskilled laborer	13	16	22
Plot functions			
Starring role	17	15	8
Character succeeded	65	72	54
Character failed	23	16	34
Positive portrayal	40	44	32
Negative portrayal	31	24	41
Committed crime	11	7	22

*Characters were coded only if their backgrounds were clearly indicated by the script. **Too few characters were coded for meaningful comparisons.

The 1980s

If this overview has dealt mainly with blacks at the expense of Hispanics, that reflects television's own

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emphasis. Table 1 summarizes the gap. Both groups have been underrepresented, but three times as many blacks have appeared on the small screen. Perhaps more important, blacks have gradually progressed from invisibility to integration into TV's fantasy world. Since 1975, nearly one in ten characters have been black (from a low of under 1 percent in the 1950s), while Hispanics have hovered around the 2 percent mark for three decades.

The two groups have been portrayed as about equally socially disadvantaged. TV's blacks are only about half as likely as whites to have high school diplomas and middle-class incomes. Hispanics hold upper-status occupations less than half as often as whites, and they are half again as likely to portray unskilled laborers. These occupational figures provide ammunition for those who see TV as reinforcing a white power structure. During the past three decades, whites have portrayed 94 percent of the educated professionals and business executives, blacks have played 5 percent, and Hispanics only 1 percent.

Ironically, though, these discrepancies stem partly from television's recent efforts toward sympathetic social realism. The tube turned to the ghetto and the barrio in the 1970s to affirm minority cultures, not to disparage their social status. Several new black sitcoms were produced by liberal activist Norman Lear. Even today, "The Cosby Show" is attacked for presenting an upper-class world of little relevance to the black experience.

On television, at least, demography is not destiny. What blacks on TV lack in social status, they make up in starring roles and positive portrayals. Meanwhile, Hispanic characters span a narrow spectrum from villains to second bananas. Before 1965 we didn't code a single black character in a major role. Since then the proportion of blacks in starring roles has nearly equaled that of whites, at a rate about double that of Hispanics. More broadly, black characters attain whatever they strive for more often than either whites or Hispanics. In fact, the failure rate among Hispanics is more than double that of blacks.

Few people on television appear in a negative light. Out of every ten characters, about four are good guys, three are partly or wholly negative, and another three play neutral background roles. But blacks wear the most white hats and Hispanics the fewest. To highlight the differences, we subtracted the percentage of negative from positive characters for each group. That yields figures of +20 for blacks, +9 for whites, and -9 for Hispanics. That makes Hispanics the only group with a mainly negative TV image. These relative rankings have remained constant across three decades, except that Hispanics moved up to the level of whites (+4) after 1975, still well behind blacks (+14).

Finally, the more villainous the character, the sharper the group differences. Hispanic characters are twice as likely as whites and three times as likely as blacks to commit a crime. Over one out of every five Hispanic characters has been a criminal, compared to one out of nine whites and only one out of fourteen blacks. And despite being outnumbered by three to one, Hispanic characters have committed more murders and other violent crimes than blacks. Once TV's roster of Hispanic stereotypes included the grinning bandito criss-crossed with ammunition belts. These days, "any time a Cuban or Colombian crosses the tube, he leaves a good thick trail of cocaine behind," as Ben Stein observed about "Miami Vice."[3]

Perusing these figures, it is hard to resist the conclusion that Hollywood has cracked open the door to black concerns while letting Hispanics serve as window dressing. No wonder a recent *TV Guide* article was titled, "There's Lt. Castillo, Sifuentes. . .and Little Else."[4] The "Miami Vice" cop and "L. A. Law" attorney are not only exceptional as continuing series characters, but also noteworthy simply for being on the right side of the law. And "Miami Vice" remains one of television's most reliable suppliers of Hispanic criminals. In Stein's pithy phrase, "To viewers of 'Miami Vice,' 'Cuban = Gangster' is the iron law of immigration."[5]

In a widely noted 1982 episode of "Hill Street Blues," Lt. Calletano was chosen by the department as its "Hispanic Officer of the Year." At the award banquet, however, the Colombian Calletano was identified as a Puerto Rican and Mexican food was served. Angered, he launched into a denunciation of continuing prejudice among his self-satisfied coworkers: "I look around this room. . .and the only other Hispanics I see are waiters and busboys." He might have been speaking on behalf of all Hispanic characters in the television industry. On the tube today, Steppin' Fetchit is a distant memory, but "Jose Jimenez" is still alive and well.

---

[1] Our overall portrait is supported by findings from several studies of much briefer periods during the 1970s. Unfortunately, statistical breakdowns of Hispanic characters are still rare. For an overview, see Bradley Greenberg, *Life on Television* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1980), ch. 1-2; Paula Poindexter and Carolyn Stroman, "Blacks on Television: A Review of the Research Literature," *Journal of Broadcasting*, vol. 25, Spring 1981, pp. 103-121; James Hinton et al., "Tokenism and Improving Imagery of Blacks in TV Drama and Comedy," *Journal of Broadcasting*, vol. 18, Fall 1974, pp. 423-437; George Gerbner and Nancy Signorelli, "Women and Minorities in Television Drama 1965-1978," Annenberg School of Communications Research Report, Philadelphia, October 29, 1979.

[2] Harry Castleman and Walter Porazik, *Watching TV* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 256.

[3] Ben Stein, "Miami Vice: It's So Hip You'll Want to Kill Yourself," *Public Opinion*, Oct/Nov 1985, p. 42.

[4] Geraldo Rivera, "There's Lt. Castillo, Sifuentes. . .and Little Else," *TV Guide*, April 18, 1987, pp. 40-43.

[5] Ben Stein, *Public Opinion*, op. cit.

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This is part of a larger study of social leadership, of which Stanley Rothman is director and Robert Lichter is associate director. It is sponsored by the Center for the Study of Social and Political Change at Smith College and the Center for Media and Public Affairs in Washington, D.C.

I. THE STATE OF INTOLERANCE IN AMERICA

Question: (Hand respondent card) These are some of the different kinds of people making up our population: Italians, Catholics, Negroes, Protestants, Chinese, Jews, Mexicans, Filipinos. Would you prefer not to work with any of these kinds of people if they had an equal position to yours and worked side by side with you, or would it make no difference to you? (1948)

Question: We can choose our friends, but we can't always choose the people we work closely with. Here is a list of some different types of people (Card shown respondent). For each one, would you tell me whether you would strongly object to working around them, or prefer not to work around them, or wouldn't mind working around them? First . . . (1987)



Source: Surveys by Elmo Roper for *Fortune*, 1948, and the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-2), January 10-24, 1987.

How much can we learn from public opinion polls about tolerance in America? Have Americans learned to hide their true feelings about race or religion, for example, so that they appear more tolerant than they actually are? There is probably some of that going on when the public answers pollsters' questions. But overall, polls are a useful tool that help us understand attitudes, particularly when we are able to compare today's responses with those given ten, twenty, thirty, or forty years ago. In this section we are looking at political *and* ethnic tolerance. In the area of political tolerance, Americans insist on the need to extend

1948

Question: Which kinds of people would you prefer not to have marry a near relative of yours? Any other?

Would prefer not to have marry a relative of yours...



Note: Asked of those who said they "would prefer not to have any of these kinds of people marry a near relative of theirs." Adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses.

1948

Question: Which kinds of people would you prefer not to have move into your neighborhood? Any other?

Would prefer not to have move into your neighborhood...



Note: Asked of those who said they "would prefer not to have any of these kinds of people move into their neighborhood to live." Adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses. * = less than .5%

Source: Survey by Elmo Roper for *Fortune*, 1948.

legal protections and guarantees, but not nonprejudicial or nonjudgmental treatment. In the area of ethnic tolerance, the operative norm is legal tolerance *and* nonprejudicial treatment.

Throughout these pages, we have chosen to look at intolerant responses—how many Americans would not want to invite a member of another race to dinner, for example—in order to gauge the distance we have yet to go in conquering prejudice. As Seymour Martin Lipset says, and as the charts on the following pages show, "The glass of intolerance is emptying at different rates for different groups."

1981

Question: (Show card) On this list are various groups of people. Could you call off the number of any that you would not like to have as neighbors.

Would not want as neighbors...



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA), January-December 1981.

1981

Question: (Respondents were handed a card listing various groups of people) On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors.

Would not like to have as neighbors



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, December 11-14, 1981.

1987

Question: This card lists various groups of people. Would you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?

Would not like to have as neighbors



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 16-19, 1987.

Blacks

Question: Which statement on this card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel? White people have a right to keep (Negroes/blacks) out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and (Negroes/blacks) should respect that right.



By education: (Non-black response)	1963	1985
	Agree strongly/slightly	
Less than high school graduate	64%	45%
High school graduate	49	25
Some college	46	18
College graduate	37	12

Question: How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a (Negro/black) friend home to dinner? Would you object strongly, mildly, or not at all?



By education: (Non-black response)	1963	1985
	Object strongly	
Less than high school graduate	40%	19%
High school graduate	25	12
Some college	22	8
College graduate	13	2

Question: Do you think there should be laws against marriage between (Negroes/blacks) and whites?



By education: (Non-black response)	1963	1985
	Should be laws	
Less than high school graduate	76%	52%
High school graduate	57	29
Some college	41	16
College graduate	27	9

Question: Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel? . . . (Negroes/blacks) shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted.



By education: (Non-black response)	1963	1985
	Agree strongly/slightly	
Less than high school graduate	78%	78%
High school graduate	71	66
Some college	61	59
College graduate	57	36

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1963-1970, and National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-1985.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Jews

Question: Which of the things on this card do you think people who employ large numbers of workers should do?

Question: If you were about to send a child of yours to college, which of these kinds of colleges would you prefer to see him or her go to?

Question: If you were going to spend a week at a vacation hotel, which of these different kinds would you rather stay at, assuming that they all cost the same and provided the same quality of accommodations?

1948







Source: Survey by Elmo Roper for *Fortune*, 1948.

Question: Would you prefer not io have any of these kinds of people move into your neighborhood to live, or would it make no difference to you? (1948)

Question: How do you feel about having Jews in your neighborhood? Would you like to have some Jewish neighbors, wouldn't it make any difference to you, or would you prefer not to have any Jewish neighbors? (1964, 1981)

Question: Would you prefer not to have any of these kinds of peope marry a near relative of yours, or would it make no difference to you? (1948)

Question: Suppose a child of yours wanted to marry a Jew who had a good education and came from a good family. How would you feel about this? Would you object strongly, somewhat, a little, or not at all? (1964, 1981)



Note: 1964 and 1981 surveys are of non-Jews only.

Source: Survey by Elmo Roper for *Fortune*, 1948; the National Opinion Research Center for the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, 1964; Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Jewish Committee, 1981.

Question: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Most American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States.



Note: 1984 was asked of and based on one-half of the sample.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for the American Jewish Committee, latest that of May 31-June 7, 1986.

Question: Do you think most American Jews place the interests of israel ahead of the interests of the United States, or don't you think so?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 5-8, 1987.

Question: Now I am going to read a number of statements about Jews. In each case please tell me whether you think the statement is probably true or probably false.



Note: Asked of non-Jews only. "Don't know" and "No opinion" calculated out.

Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center for the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, 1964; Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Jewish Committee, 1981.

Coming in the Next Issue:

Constitutional Questions

Homosexuals

Question: I'm going to read you a few statements and after each please tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement. Homosexuality is morally wrong. Do you agree or disagree?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 20-24, 1986

Question: Do you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be legal?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, 1977 and 1982-1987. Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 18-20, 1981

Question: I'd like to ask you about the hiring of homosexuals in specific occupations. Do you think homosexuals should or should not be hired for the following occupations . . .?

Homosexuals should not be hired for the following occupations...



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 14-18, 1987.

Question: Between now and the time of the convention in 1980/1984 there will be discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates—their education, age, religion, race and the like. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president would you vote for him if he happened to be a homosexual? (Gallup) Do you think you would vote for a generally well-qualified person for president if that person happened to be a homosexual? (Roper)

Would not vote for homosexual for president



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 29-May 2, 1983, and the Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report*, September 19-29, 1985.

Question: If your party nominated a well-qualified person for Congress, and you heard that he or she was gay or lesbian, would that make you more likely to vote for that candidate, or less likely, or wouldn't it make any difference one way or the other?

If your party nominated homosexual or lesbian for president...



Note: * = less than .5%

Source: Surveys by the *Los Angeles Times*, latest that of December 5-12, 1985.

The Handicapped

Question: Suppose someone in your family wanted to marry a severely physically handicapped person? Would you oppose the relationship, or not?



Note: "Don't know/No answer" = 14%.

Source: Survey by Media General for the Associated Press, January 16-24, 1987.

Question: How would you feel if a severely handicapped person sat next to you in a restaurant or shared another close common space? Would it make you uncomfortable, or not?



Question: How would you describe the way people generally react toward you after they learn that you have a disability, handicap, or health problem—do they treat you as an equal, or act as if they feel sorry for you, or do they shy away from further contact with you, or don't any of these describe your experience with people in general?

Attitudes of disabled people

The way people react to you



Note: 21% said that none of these categories described their experiences. Sample size = 1,000 disabled Americans.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for the International Center for the Disabled in cooperation with the National Council on the Handicapped, November-December 1985.

Political Minorities

Question: There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people . . .



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization and the National Opinion Research Center for the Fund for the Republic, May 1954. Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of 1985.

Smokers

Question: Here is a list of laws that have been proposed. Would you read down that list and for each one tell me whether you would be for or against such a law? . . . A law banning smoking in all public places.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 77-1), December 4-11, 1976.

Question: Would you favor or oppose a complete ban on smoking in all public places?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 14-18, 1987.


SMOKERS USE OUTER OFFICE, PLEASE
12-8
STAHLER
©THE CINCINNATI POST 1986

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Question: Does smoking in place where you work bother you, or not?



Question: Are you now more likely to think about your rights as a non-smoker than you were five years ago, or not?



Question: Compared with five years ago, do you get more complaints about smoking from your fellow workers, or not?



Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, April 12-14, 1987.


IT'S BEEN AWFUL... NO ONE WILL TOUCH ME.. OR KISS ME.
MY FRIENDS ARE AFRAID TO BE AROUND ME.
PEOPLE WON'T HAVE ME IN THEIR HOMES.. IT'S LIKE I HAVE LEPROSY...
I CAN'T EAT IN PUBLIC RESTAURANTS...
I'M A SOCIAL OUT CAST!!!
ARE YOU AN AIDS VICTIM?
NO... A SMOKER.
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MIKE PETERS

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II. GROUP DIFFERENCES: AGE,

In these pages, we examine the relationship of three different variables—age, education, and ideology—to levels of professed tolerance. Age and education have the strongest impact of all variables these surveys have identified. The more formal education people have, the more likely they are to give a "tolerant" response. And, the younger they are, the more



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center

EDUCATION, AND IDEOLOGY

likely they are to give this response. Much of this comes from the significantly different formative experiences of the young and the old. Different ideological orientations have some relationship to professed tolerance, but their influence is much more ambiguous.



General Social Surveys, 1982-1986 combined.

Question: There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance consider a person who believes that blacks are genetically inferior. Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?



Note: Non-black response.

Question: Here are some opinions other people have expressed in connection with black-white relations. Which statement on the card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel? White people have the right to keep blacks out of their neighborhood if they want to and blacks should respect that right.



Note: Non-black response

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1982-1986 combined.

Question: How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a black friend home to dinner? Would you object strongly, mildly, or not at all?



Note: Non-black response

Question: Do you think there should be laws against marriages between blacks and whites?



Note: Non-black response

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1982-1986 combined.

Question: If your party nominated a (Negro/black) for president, would you vote for him if he was qualified for the job?



Note: "Young" = 18-29 years old, "Older" = 55 years and over.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1977-1986 combined.

Question: We can choose our friends, but we can't always choose the people we work closely with. Here is a list of some different types of people. (Card shown respondent) For each one, would you tell me whether you would strongly object to working around them, or prefer not to work around them, or wouldn't mind working around them? First . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-2), January 10-24, 1987.

In the next three pages, we show some of the results of a survey taken in 1978 that was designed by George Marcus, James Piereson, and John Sullivan and conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. The survey began by asking respondents to identify from a diverse list, the group they liked least. This approach was different from other studies that mention a narrow range of groups, groups that might not be seen as any particular problem or threat by

Continued

Question: I'm going to read some more statements to you now, and I'd like you to tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, are uncertain, disagree, or strongly disagree with these statements.



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center for John L. Sullivan, George Marcus, and James Piereson, March 15 through April 19, 1978.

many respondents. The groups in this study were socialists, fascists, Communists, Ku Klux Klan, John Birch Society, Black Panthers, the Symbionese Liberation Army, atheists, pro-abortionists and anti-abortionists. The data shown below are responses about the group the respondent liked least. From this perspective, the public appears (pages 38-39) to have more doubts about extending acceptance to the group they liked least than it does when asked


Would be displeased if my son or daughter dated member of group mentioned.

Member of group mentioned should be banned from being president.

Would be unwilling to invite into my home for dinner member of group mentioned.

Member of group mentioned should not be allowed to teach in public schools.

about atheists, a group that may not be the object of special current concern. The data on page 37 show that education groups differ little in their professed adherence to various key norms of political tolerance in the abstract (see the first three charts on page 37), but they differ greatly when it comes to applying these norms. Marcus et al. point out, however, that education may not so much increase political tolerance generally as increase support for one particular idea or model of it. Everett Ladd discusses this on page 2.

Group mentioned should not be allowed to hold public rallies in our city.



Group mentioned should be outlawed.



Would be upset if member of group mentioned moved in next door to me.



Member of group mentioned should not be allowed to make a speech in this city.



Group mentioned should have their phones tapped by the government.



OPINION ROUNDUP

WHAT WE DON'T KNOW ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Question: Some products we buy and use in this country are manufactured and assembled in the U.S., others are manufactured and assembled abroad, and still others are manufactured and assembled partly here and partly abroad. Here is a list of some different products. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and for each one tell me whether you think the product sold under that name is made entirely in the U.S., or made entirely abroad, or made partly here and partly abroad? First . . .



Note: According to the Roper Organization, the Ford Taurus and the Apple Computer are made entirely in the United States (except for a few extraneous parts); Zenith TV sets, RCA videocassette recorders, Dodge Colts, GE microwave ovens, and Panasonic stereo sets are mainly produced abroad; AT&T telephones are produced internationally; the Ford Escort and the Dodge Aries are made mainly in the U.S.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 87-1), December 6-13, 1986.

New Arguments about America's New Jobs

by Marvin H. Kosters

A new conventional wisdom about the U.S. work force is developing in Washington and becoming increasingly popular across the country. This new view promises to play an important role in the 1988 campaign and beyond. It provides a powerful fulcrum for policy debate because it goes to the heart of people's concerns about the health of the economy and the livelihood of America's workers.

The quality of jobs is at the core of the argument: workers are said to be getting mainly low-paid jobs with little opportunity for advancement—there are fewer "good jobs." The argument is powerful, but it is wrong. It paints a grossly distorted picture of what is happening to work and jobs in America.

The main elements in the new conventional wisdom are:

- Real wages are stagnating or declining for the average worker.
- The major source of poorer job quality is the shift from manufacturing to service employment.
- This shift has in recent years produced a disproportionate number of low-wage jobs.
- Replacement of "good" manufacturing jobs by jobs in services has led to a serious erosion of the middle class.

Some of these notions contain an element of truth. Anecdotes, and even some data make them seem plausible. But to get a more realistic picture, it is necessary to examine the data in more detail.

Real Average Hourly Pay

Part of the confusion comes from the ways we calculate average real wages—wages after they are adjusted for inflation. Different measures give different results, as the table below shows.

Table 1

Earnings, Incomes, and Hourly Pay
(Average annual percent change)

	1952–1972	1972–1985
Earnings per week		
Adjusted by CPI	1.81	–1.19
Income per capita		
Adjusted by PCE	2.47	1.66
Wage per hour		
Adjusted by CPI	2.20	–0.80
Adjusted by PCE	1.98	0.03
Compensation per hour		
Adjusted by CPI	2.70	0.21
Adjusted by PCE	2.47	0.77

One important distinction that needs to be made is between hourly pay and other measures of economic well-being. The big decline in average weekly earnings in recent years, for example, is partly a result of shorter average working hours—not declining wages per hour of work. The significant increase in income per capita, on the other hand, reflects in part the rise in the fraction of the population that is employed. If we exclude these measures because they reflect changes in how much people choose to work, we are left with two different concepts of pay per hour—wages and compensation (which includes "fringe" benefits).

Compensation per hour is a more comprehensive measure of pay per hour of work than wages or average hourly earnings, and it is a more appropriate measure of what an employer pays for an hour of work and what the average worker receives. It covers all workers in the private nonfarm sector, and it includes private benefits (such as health insurance) and employers' tax payments for public benefits (such as social security). Hourly pay, as measured by compensation per hour, has increased slightly since 1972.

How each of these measures is adjusted for inflation is also important. The consumer price index (CPI) overstates the effects of inflation on the typical worker during the late 1970s because of the way mortgage interest rates were treated (a flaw that was corrected in 1983). This distortion can be avoided by using the personal consumption expenditures deflator (PCE). Using this adjustment, real average hourly wages have been essentially unchanged since 1972 and real compensation per hour shows a small rise. Workers are still becoming better off, but they aren't advancing nearly as rapidly as they were before.

The Shift to Services

The shift in employment shares from goods- to service-producing industries has often been portrayed as the culprit behind the slowdown in real wage growth. The lower average wages in services and the size of the shift in the industry employment mix toward services lend plausibility to this explanation.

Wages *are* considerably lower in the service sector. Wages for service workers (as measured by average hourly earnings, the only measure of hourly pay available by detailed industries) are about 83 percent of manufacturing wages. There is, of course, considerable diversity within these broad sectors. Average wages in the textile and apparel manufacturing industries, for example, are lower than average wages in the service sector.

The shift toward employment in services has been remarkable. Service employment now accounts for about 70 percent of private sector employment, an increase from about 50 percent in 1950. If government employment is included, services now account for about 75 percent of nonfarm employment.

The significance of the shift in employment toward services is dramatically apparent compared to manufacturing. During the past two decades, manufacturing has usually employed about 18 to 20 million workers. During that same twenty-year period, however, total civilian employment went up from 73 to 110 million workers—an increase of about 50 percent. This remarkable decline in the manufacturing employment share took place even though real output in manufacturing has remained roughly constant as a share of the overall output of the economy.

The argument is that rapid growth in service jobs without corresponding increases in manufacturing employment means that "good" high-wage manufacturing jobs are being replaced by low-wage service jobs, and that this change has contributed importantly to lower average wages. But can it explain the slowdown in real wage growth?

The pronounced slowdown in real wage growth cannot be attributed to the shift to service employment, or even to employment shifts among more detailed industry categories. A careful analysis of average real wages, using an index built up from industry hours and employment weights, shows that real wages increased by 90 cents from 1964 to 1985 (in 1977 dollars). Eighty-eight cents of the increase occurred from 1964 to 1972; only two cents of the increase occurred from 1972 to 1985. This dramatic slowdown in real hourly wage growth follows the same pattern shown for real compensation per hour in table 1.

Shifting industry employment shares—not just between goods- and services-producing industries, but among fifty-two detailed industries—had a negative effect on the real wage index. Why? Because in industries where labor costs were relatively high, changes in technology and capital were apparently introduced relatively more aggressively to economize on labor costs.

Efforts to economize on labor costs did not begin in the 1980s, however, or even since the early 1970s. Shifts in industry employment have been occurring for a long time, and the effects of employment shifts on wages have not changed much over the years. For the period from 1964 to 1972, for example, the shift in industry employment shares had an effect of slightly less than a penny per year compared to slightly more than a penny per year since 1972. Clearly, changes in industry employment patterns made very little contribution to the decline in real wage growth that actually occurred—from about 11 cents a year before 1972 to only a small fraction of a penny per year since.

Service Jobs and Middle-Income Wages

Even though the sharp rise in service employment is not the source of the slowdown in growth of average real wages, it could have affected the distribution of wages. Service jobs have often been portrayed as sharply divided into those paying very low wages and highly paid professions. The implication is that as service employment accounts for a larger fraction of jobs, the middle class is disappearing, or at least suffering serious erosion. McKinley Blackburn and David Bloom, two Harvard analysts, conclude their study by saying: ". . .the country has moved in the direction of 'haves' and 'have nots' with less in between."

The point that the middle class is disappearing has often been accompanied by the claim that most workers and families displaced from middle-class status end up among the poor instead of the rich. Data have been assembled in support of the proposition that new jobs have been preponderantly very low paid, even poverty level, jobs. In a study published by the Joint Economic Committee, for example, Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison report that for the 8 million net additional employees since 1979, nearly three-fifths were low-wage jobs (paying less than $7,000 in 1984) compared to one-fifth in the earlier period. (For white males, 96.7 percent of new jobs were "low-wage" jobs.) They conclude: "It would be difficult to imagine a clearer indication of the tendency toward proliferation of low-wage work."

Some of these analyses that purport to show dramatic changes in the shape of the distribution of earnings are based on superficial analytic methods and produce results that are profoundly misleading. Perhaps the most serious flaw in some of these studies is that they fail to distinguish carefully between shifts over time in the distribution as a whole and changes in its shape. As a consequence, changes in the rate of growth of real wages—changes that *have* occurred, and that have shifted the distribution as a whole—have been misinterpreted as changes in the shape of the distribution of wages. Bouts of inflation, for example, have sometimes reduced real wages for all workers, but such changes should not be confused with changes in the share of workers with low earnings.

Some data do seem to show increased diversity in incomes and increased inequality. It is important, however, to consider the source of such increases in diversity. It has not been the result of a shrinkage of jobs in occupations paying middle-income salaries; that share has remained steady according to BLS studies. It has not been a result of increased variation in average wages across industries; percentage variation in industry average wages has been roughly stable when industry employment shares are taken into account. In other words, hourly wage rates have not become less equal, although incomes have been affected by changes in hours of work.

The distribution of average hourly earnings for individual workers is a much better measure of whether workers' hourly pay is becoming more equal or more widely dispersed, because industry averages could obscure inequality within industries. Percentage variation in average hourly earnings of individual full-time workers has actually declined significantly during the decade before 1984. This has occurred both within manufacturing and for private sector workers as a whole, and for union and nonunion workers as well. For full-time private sector workers, for example, percentage variation has declined from almost 65 percent in 1974 to about 52 percent in 1984. The data for hourly wage rates of individual workers show increased concentration around the middle instead of increased inequality, despite the growing service employment share. This is contrary to the claims of those who argue that middle-income jobs are disappearing.

Why the Income Distribution Changes

There are other sources of variation in incomes that explain the differences between what has happened to incomes compared to what has happened to hourly wages of individual workers. The distribution of incomes for families, for example, shows a small decline in the income share received by the middle fifth, a decline from 17.7 to 17.0 percent from 1964 to 1984. This trend has sometimes been interpreted as an erosion of the middle class. Instead of a flattening of the middle of the distribution, however, the decline for the middle fifth was apparently part of a broader shift in income shares toward the upper part of the distribution. The share of the lowest and second fifths also declined, mainly because of growing incomes in the upper part of the distribution. That is, families in the lower part of the income distribution are receiving a smaller slice of a growing family income pie.

Trends for individual workers are quite different from those for families. These data show a rising share of income for all three fifths in the lower part of the distribution, and their numbers have been growing relative to the number of families. Despite this trend toward more people living outside families, however, the number of workers per family has been increasing. The share of married-couple families with two or more earners rose from 55 to 61 percent from 1967 to 1984. This rise in the share of families with more than one earner has raised money income for such families and thereby increased the family income pie as well as the share of income that accrues to families in the upper part of the distribution.

In analyzing what has happened to workers' jobs, it is extremely important to distinguish between what has happened to the typical worker's take-home pay and what has happened to incomes of family households. Differences in living arrangements—influenced by divorce, deferral or avoidance of marriage, and establishment by singles of separate households—are one source of change in income distributions. Differences in family choices about work—such as the increase in multiple earners in families—are another source. Differences in work choices of individuals are still another source. Average hours of work have declined, for example, and multiple job holding, job-sharing, part-time work, and other adaptations are increasingly important factors influencing annual earnings and incomes. Increased diversity from sources like these should lead us to expect increased diversity in incomes unless offsetting tendencies are at work.

Job Quality and Policy

The distribution of wage rates should be viewed as a description of a menu of options available to workers. Incomes, on the other hand, reflect individual choices —about hours and weeks of work and often living arrangements—within the framework of a range of opportunities available to them. The evidence shows that increased dispersion in income, for groups where this has occurred, is primarily attributable to increased diversity in choices made and not to a more dispersed or less attractive range of job opportunities. Indeed, the distribution of hourly wage rates has become more equal.

The distinction between the role of personal choices and the quality of job opportunities is critical for considering the role of policy. Public attitudes might reasonably be expected to show more concern about trends attributable to deteriorating opportunities than to trends attributable to the choices people make about their working and living arrangements as these affect their incomes. Moreover, the underlying sources of distributional changes are important for analyzing policies intended to influence trends that may be the object of public concern. Policies intended to influence industry patterns through trade policies or preferential domestic policies can be expected to be ineffectual as well as inefficient for affecting trends that are mainly influenced by choices of workers rather than by the set of opportunities among which choices are made.

Summary

The enviable record of the U.S. economy for creating new jobs in recent years is increasingly haunted by fears that the quality of jobs is deteriorating. These fears have been generated and nurtured by works with provocative titles like these: "The Shrinking Middle Class," "The Deindustrialization of America," "The Polarization of America," "The New Class War," "The Grim Truth about the Job Miracle," and "American Job Machine Has Begun to Sputter." These titles might suggest that the evidence is firm and conclusive.

That this view can be seriously challenged has gone largely unrecognized, even though much of the evidence supporting it is subject to serious criticism. Support for fears that a widespread deterioration in the quality of jobs is occurring rests on analytical foundations that are extremely weak. Evidence that points in the opposite direction suggests that concerns about declining job quality are not just exaggerated, they are instead essentially unfounded. ☑

Marvin H. Kosters is director of Economic Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. This is adapted from an essay written by the author and Murray Ross for AEI's Contemporary Economic Problems series.

Immigration and American Attitudes

by Rita J. Simon

For as long as polls have been around to measure their sentiments, Americans have been unenthusiastic about the influx of large groups of immigrants. Before that, most of the leading weekly and monthly magazines were also opposed to or at best wary of the "new immigrants" who began coming from Eastern and Southern Europe in the 1880s. Up to 1980, the magazines continued to object to each succeeding wave of immigration: Catholics and Jews, Chinese and Japanese, Mexicans and Caribbeans, and most recently Vietnamese and Cubans.[1]

Certain conditions do temper the overall objection to immigrant groups:

- The more abstractly or generally worded a question about immigrants or immigration policy is, the more negative the responses are likely to be. When the American public was asked in 1978, for example: "Thinking now about Indochinese refugees, the so-called 'boat people,' would you favor or oppose the United States relaxing its immigration policies so that many of these people could come to live in the United States?" 32 percent were in favor, 57 percent were opposed, and 11 percent had no opinion. But when asked, "Would you, yourself, like to see some of these people come to live in this community or not?" 48 percent said yes, 40 percent said no, and 13 percent had no opinion.

  This pattern is antithetical to that which occurs when the topic is civil liberties. On that issue, a general question such as "Do you favor free speech?" yields over 90 percent affirmative answers. But to a question about allowing a known atheist or communist to speak in the community center, the affirmative answers drop to slightly above 50 percent. The principles of the Bill of Rights evoke some of our most sacred, symbolic loyalties. Yet that symbolism tends to lose its power in more specific circumstances. The symbolism associated with immigration policy is not nearly as strong and so brings forth far less loyalty.
- United States foreign policy has some effect on public attitudes toward immigration policy. During the 1950s cold war period, a larger proportion of the public favored admitting refugees from communist regimes in Eastern European countries than they did refugees during the 1930s or later during the 1970s and 1980s.
- Respondents who enjoy higher socioeconomic status (persons with more education, higher incomes, more prestigious jobs) are more likely to favor admitting greater numbers of immigrants than are respondents of lower socioeconomic status, no matter where the immigrants come from or when the question is asked.
- Ethnic communities that have been here longer tend to be evaluated more positively than recent arrivals, even if the earlier communities were feared, opposed, and disliked when they arrived.

What the Polls Report

When national polls first came into use, the United States was experiencing the worst economic depression in its history, and the conflict that became World War II had already started in Asia and Europe. The 1930s was also a period of strong isolationist beliefs and policies.

As the prospects for war increased, warnings came from Congress, from other public officials, and from leading journalists that the United States should not be misled by allowing itself to become involved in another European or Asian conflict. National polls conducted in 1937, 1939, and 1941 showed that the public disliked the prospect of involvement, and many believed our entry into the previous war had been a mistake.

Inevitably, concerns about U.S. involvement in another major European war reinforced concerns about immigration policy. The first items about immigration to appear in national polls in the 1930s asked whether people who were forced to leave Nazi Germany should be allowed to enter the United States. In May 1938, Elmo Roper, for *Fortune*, asked:

Question: What is your attitude toward allowing German, Austrian, and other political refugees to come to the United States?

Encourage, even if we have to raise immigration quotas	5%
Allow them to come, but do not raise quotas	18
With conditions as they are, we should keep them out	68
Don't know	9

Fewer than 25 percent favored admitting the refugees [under any circumstances], and 68 percent wanted to keep them out.

Shortly after the war ended, in January 1946, the first general question about whether the United States should allow "more," "fewer," "none," or "about the same number" of immigrants to enter the country appeared in a national poll. Table 1 describes the American public's response to that and subsequent questions over the next forty years. The data described in table 1 concern *legal* immigration only.

Table 1

NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS THAT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ENTER

Question: Should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?

	1946[1]	1953	1965	1977	1981	1982	1986
More/increase	5%	13%	8%	7%	5%	4%	7%
Same/present level	32	37	39	37	22	23	35
Fewer/decrease	37	39	33	42	65	66	49
	14[2]						
No opinion/don't know	12	11	20	14	8	7	9

[1] In 1946, the question was: Should we permit more persons from Europe to come to this country each year than we did before the war, should we keep the number about the same, or should we reduce the number?

[2] 1946 was the only time "None" was offered as a choice on the response card, and 14 percent selected it.

Only once in four decades, in 1953, did the desire to increase the number of immigrants exceed 10 percent; only once in four decades, in 1965, was "decrease" the number of immigrants not the largest response.

Refugees

Refugees have been treated as a special category of immigrants since the 1930s, when the people involved were mainly Germans, Austrians, and Jews. Table 2 traces the public's reaction to refugees by examining polls conducted between 1939 and 1980. During those years, groups seeking refugee status included Central and East Europeans (fleeing Nazism and then Communism), Cubans, and Vietnamese.

The data show that shortly following the end of World War II and for about a decade from the mid-1950s to the 1960s, public opinion was more in

Table 2

NUMBER OF REFUGEES THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ADMIT

	1938	1939	1946	1947	1953	1956	1957	1965	1975	1975	1978	1979	1980
Allow to enter	5%		10%		47%	11%	60%	64%	36%	37%	32%	34%	26%
	18		43			48							
Keep out	68	83	23	72	48	34	31	23	52	49	57	57	66
			17										
Don't know	9		7		5	7	9	13	12	14	11	9	8

1. (1938) What is your attitude toward allowing German, Austrian, and other political refugees to come to the United States? a. Encourage (5%), b. Allow them to come, but do not raise quotas (18%), c. With conditions as they are, we should keep them out (68%), d. Don't know (9%). 2. (1939) If you were a member of the incoming Congress, would you vote yes or no on a bill to open the doors of the United States to a larger number of European refugees than are now admitted under our immigration quota? 3. (1946) There are still a lot of refugees or displaced persons in European camps who cannot go back to the homes they had before the war. Which of these four statements comes closest to what you think this country should do about these refugees? a. We should admit all of those refugees who are well and strong to the United States, no matter what other countries do (10%), b. We should take only our share of these refugees and insist that other countries do the same (43%), c. There are still too many here now and we should not admit any more at all, but we should help to get them settled elsewhere (23%), d. They are a problem for the European countries to worry about and we should let those countries handle the problem (17%). 4. (1947) Would you vote yes or no on a bill in Congress to let 100,000 selected European refugees come to this country in each of the next four years in addition to the 150,000 immigrants now permitted to enter every year under our present quota? 5. (1953) Do you favor a law that President Eisenhower asked the Congress to pass that would admit 240,000 refugees to enter the United States over a two-year period? 6. (1956) Do you feel the United States is letting in too many refugees from Hungary, about the right amount, or not enough? (11%/48%/34%) 7. (1957) There are an estimated 15 million refugees in different parts of the world. These people have been forced to leave their home countries or have fled for various reasons. Are you in favor of or against allowing any of these refugees to come to the United States to make their home? 8. (1965) Do you think the United States' immigration policy should or should not have provisions for admitting people who escape from Communism? 9. (1975) If these South Vietnamese are evacuated, should they be permitted to live in the United States or not? 10. (1975) Do you favor or oppose 130,000 Vietnamese refugees coming to live in the United States? 11. (1978) Thinking now about the Indochinese refugees, the so-called "boat people," would you favor or oppose the United States relaxing its immigration policies so that many of these people could come to live in the United States? 12. (1979) Should the U.S. government permit these Cubans to come and live in the United States? 13. (1980) Some people say that the U.S. government should permit persons who leave other countries because of political oppression to come and live in the United States. Others say that the federal government should halt all immigration until the national unemployment rate falls below 5 percent. Which point of view comes closer to the way you feel—that political refugees should be permitted to immigrate to the United States or that immigration should be halted until the unemployment rate in the United States drops?

favor than against admitting European refugees who were trying to escape from Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In 1975, when the people seeking refugee status were Vietnamese, more objected to than favored their admittance. In 1979, when a new wave of Cubans sought refugee status, public opinion opposed their admission as well. In 1980, as a matter of policy, 66 percent favored halting the entry of political refugees to this country. And from 1975 through 1980, public attitudes toward letting refugees in were more negative than they were toward immigrants generally.

Illegal Immigrants

The biggest immigration issue confronting American society in the 1980s is the illegal aliens who enter this country, mostly from Mexico. Part of the problem is that no one knows how many there are, and the estimates range from two to ten million. Government officials, labor leaders, and anti-immigrant organizations target illegals as a great danger to native workers, especially to those in low-skilled jobs. When Leonard Chapman was commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1975, he claimed that removal of illegals would create at least one million jobs for Americans. Raymond Marshall, who was the secretary of labor, told the *Los Angeles Times* in December 1979 that unemployment could be decreased from 6 percent to 4 percent if half the jobs held by illegals were taken by natives.

Specific issues about illegal aliens have focused on their employment status, amnesty for those who've been in the country for a certain period, and I.D. cards. Table 3 describes public response to those issues from 1977 through 1985.

Table 3

EMPLOYMENT AND AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL ALIENS

	1977	1980	1983	1984	1985
Ban employment[1]	72%	76%	79%	75%	
Grant amnesty[2]	39	37		35	35
Favor I.D. cards[3]	65	62	63	62	

[1] Do you think it should or should not be against the law to employ a person who has come into the United States without proper papers?

[2] It has been proposed that illegal aliens who have been in the United States for several years should be allowed to remain in the United States. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?

[3] Do you believe everyone in the United States should be required to carry an identification card, such as a social security card, or not?

People distinguish between illegals and other immigrants, and they hold more negative attitudes toward the undocumented immigrants than they do toward refugees and immigrants generally. Table 3 shows that most do not favor amnesty, an important part of the immigration bill recently passed by Congress.

Socioeconomic Status

The data in table 4 describe the relationship between pro-immigrant responses and various indices of socioeconomic status such as education, income, and occupation.

Responses to questions over a forty-year span are perfectly consistent: whatever the measure, and whatever the specific issue, the higher the respondents' status, the more pro-immigrant they are likely to be. Immigrants represent a greater threat to the livelihoods and living standards of lower-status respondents than

Table 4

PERCENT WHO FAVOR IMMIGRANTS OR MORE OPEN IMMIGRATION POLICIES
BY VARIOUS INDICES OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

	1938[1]	1946[2]	1946[1]	1947[1]	1953[1]	1956[1]	1975[1]	1978[1]	1980[1]	1984[3]	1986[2]
By Economic Class:							**By Income:**				
Rich	30%		57%	31%	67%	70%	1. Highest		48%		51
Upper middle class	29			23	58		2.		40		47
Lower middle class	22			17	49		3. Mid-point		28		42
Poor	15		29	12	40	20	4.		22		39
							5. Lowest		22		33
By Occupation:											
Professional	43%								52%	41%	
Clerical sales									32	33	
Laborers	15								27	32	
By Education:											
College		49%	59%	34%	70%	66%	48%	51%	56%	39%	54%
High School		40		16	51		32		29	32	42
Grade School		34	27	10	44	28	26	40	19	33	36

[1] See question wording for table 2.
[2] See question wording for table 1.
[3] See question wording for table 3.

they do to persons with higher education and more skills. So, the poorer the person, the greater the fear that more immigrants will mean fewer jobs, lower rates of pay, fewer opportunities for mobility, and more competition for housing, schools, and social services. Illegal immigrants are feared most because they are viewed as the strongest contenders for lower-status jobs and benefits.

Earlier vs. Newer Arrivals

The fourth generalization concerns the more positive evaluations given to ethnic groups that have been here longer, irrespective of the sentiments aroused by their arrival.

Question: Since the beginning of our country, people of many different religions, races, and nationalities have come here and settled. Here is a list of some different groups. Would you read down that list and, thinking both of what they have contributed to this country and have gotten from this country, for each one tell me whether you think, on balance, they have been a good thing or a bad thing for this country?

	Good	Bad	Difference
English	66%	6%	60%
Irish	62	7	55
Jews	59	9	50
Germans	57	11	46
Italians	56	10	46
Poles	53	12	41
Japanese	47	18	29
Blacks	46	16	30
Chinese	44	19	25
Mexicans	25	34	−9
Koreans	24	30	−6
Vietnamese	20	38	−18
Puerto Ricans	17	43	−26
Haitians	10	39	−29
Cubans	9	59	−50

*Two categories not shown are "Mixed Feelings" and "Don't Know."

The Chinese and Japanese, whom we once excluded with special legislation, today receive more positive than negative evaluations, as do Jews, Irish, Italians, and Poles, against whom the quota acts of the 1920s were largely directed. All of the *recent* immigrants, however, are viewed as bad for this country. Fifty years from now, they will probably be well-established and well-regarded, and objections will be aimed at a new batch of immigrants.

Conclusion

Briefly, all of the data described in this article indicate that most Americans say they would like to decrease the number of immigrants and refugees permitted to enter the United States. If public opinion alone dictated U.S. immigration policy, much of the restrictionist legislation of the 1920s would have remained in place, and refugee programs would probably never have been enacted. ☑

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[1] Rita J. Simon, *Public Opinion and the Immigrant*, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1985.

Rita J. Simon, Dean of the School of Justice, The American University, is the author and editor of New Lives: The Adjustment of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in the United States and Israel, *and the editor of a special issue of the* Annals *entitled* Immigration and American Public Policy, *Fall 1986.*

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WHAT'S LEFT FOR LABOR:

AN ANALYSIS OF THATCHER'S VICTORY

by Ivor Crewe

In renewing Mrs. Thatcher's landslide majority, the British electorate gave the inevitable impression of massive continuity. The small changes in the parties' parliamentary strength reflected modest shifts in their share of the vote. The Conservatives went down 17 seats but held onto all but 0.3 percent of their 1983 vote; Labour added a mere 20 seats and 3.2 percent of the vote to its postwar nadir of 1983; and the Alliance slipped by 2.9 percent from 23 to 22 MPs (see table 1).

Table 1 THE 1987 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS
(Change from 1983 in parentheses)

	Seats		U.K. vote		G.B. vote	
Conservative	376	(−17)	42.2%	(−0.2)	43.2%	(−0.3)
Labour	229	(+20)	30.8	(+3.2)	31.5	(+3.2)
Liberal/SDP	22	(−1)	22.6	(−2.8)	23.1	(−2.9)
Welsh/Scottish	6	(+2)	1.7	(+0.2)	1.7	(+0.2)
Others	—		0.5	(−0.1)	0.5	(−0.2)
N. Ireland	17	—	2.2	(−0.3)	—	

Britain's most expensive, media-saturated campaign appears to have had the smallest impact on party support for decades. The polls recorded next to no movement in party support after the party programs were announced. The BBC TV/Gallup election survey revealed that fully 81 percent of respondents claimed to have decided their vote before the campaign began, a higher proportion than for any election since 1966. Asked to explain their vote, only a third of Conservatives said it was "because of something in particular" about the party; twice as many said it was "because there was no need for a change."

Beneath the surface stillness of the parties' national vote, however, flowed complex currents and counter-eddies (see table 2). The 1983 Conservative vote was marginally more solid than the Labour or Alliance vote but was far from a granite block. Almost a quarter defected this year, half to the Alliance and the rest in almost equal numbers to Labour and abstention. But the Conservatives recouped most of these losses by enticing almost (but not quite) as many defectors from Labour and the Alliance.

Similarly, the Alliance's retreat in the face of Labour's advance was not the simple product of a direct transfer from Alliance to Labour. On the contrary, the traffic between the parties went both ways and was almost identical. (These figures, however, being based on respondents' recall, must be treated with some caution: in particular the figure for Alliance defectors to Labour probably underestimates the true proportion.)

Table 2 THE FLOW OF THE VOTE, 1983-1987

Of those who voted. . .in 1983	Conservative	Labour	Liberal/SDP
Voted. . .in 1987			
Conservative	77%	4%	10%
Labour	5	75	12
Liberal/SDP	12	11	70
Other	—	1	1

Note: Columns do not always add up to 100% because of rounding.

Gender and Age

Let us place some sociological flesh on these bones of electoral change by asking: who switched? Differences between men and women were minuscule. As usual, the Alliance did marginally better, Labour marginally worse, among women than men. For the third election running, the traditionally higher Conservative vote among women than men failed to materialize. It has now ceased to be a tradition (see table 3).

Table 3 VOTE BY SEX AND AGE

	Men		Women		First time	
	1987	1983-87	1987	1983-87	1987	1983-87
Conservative	44%	−2	44%	+1	45%	+4
Labour	33	+4	31	+2	34	+5
Liberal/SDP	22	−2	25	−3	21	−9

Note: For purposes of comparison between elections the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal/SDP vote is their share of the three-way party vote.

Voting this time did not produce the usual gentle age gradient of increasing Conservative support. In fact, the Conservative vote was lowest among 23-44 year olds, among whom it dropped sharply (–7 percent) compared with 1983, to the equal benefit of Labour and the Alliance. The cause might be found in the twin social issues of hospitals and schools, which were cited more than in other age groups as the main issues behind their vote.

The youngest voters were more Conservative than their immediate elders, once again defying stereotypes and postwar psephological conventions. Labour's self-consciously "pop" youth campaign did produce a 5-percent increase in its vote among the young but still yielded a mere 0.5 percent swing, because the Conservative vote rose by almost as much (4 percent). The real loser among 18-22 year olds was the Alliance, whose vote fell from 30 to 21 percent, probably reflecting the panache of Labour's campaign this time round.

Was Class the Issue?

Class, rather than age or sex, remains the primary shaper of the vote, and the stark North-South variation in the constituency swings immediately suggests a sharpening of class polarization. But table 4 refutes any such simple notion, at least one that relies on conventional definitions of social class. In both the "core" middle class of the professions, administration, and management and the "lower" middle class of office and clerical workers, the Conservative vote *fell* by 3 percent. Its share of the total non-manual vote shrank for the third consecutive election, falling to little more than half (55 percent)—its lowest level since the two 1974 elections. The unique appeal of Thatcherism is clearly not to the middle classes, who have edged further away from the Conservatives in each election since 1979.

Table 4 VOTE BY SOCIAL CLASS

	Professional/ Managerial		**Office/ Clerical**		**Skilled manual**	
	1987	**1983-87**	**1987**	**1983-87**	**1987**	**1983-87**
Conservative	59%	−3	52%	−3	43%	+4
Labour	14	+2	22	+1	34	−1
Liberal/SDP	27	—	26	+2	24	−3
	Semi-skilled/ Unskilled manual		**Unemployed**			
	1987	**1983-87**	**1987**	**1983-87**		
Conservative	31%	+2	32%	+2		
Labour	50	+6	51	+6		
Liberal/SDP	19	−8	17	−9		

The erosion of the Conservative middle class, however, is confined to specific segments, especially the intelligentsia and public-sector workers (see table 5). The Conservative vote fell by 9 percent among the university educated, to the special benefit of the Alliance, which has become the leading party among what it might wish to call the "thinking electorate." Special polls for the *Times* educational supplement reported large swings from Conservative to the Alliance among school teachers and a mere 17 percent Conservative vote among academics.



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Table 5 THE NEW DIVISIONS IN THE MIDDLE CLASS

	Univ. Educated		**Public Sector**		**Private Sector**	
	1987	**1983-87**	**1987**	**1983-87**	**1987**	**1983-87**
Conservative	34%	−9	44%	−4	65%	+1
Labour	29	+3	24	–	13	—
Liberal/SDP	36	+4	32	+4	22	−1

Note: Vote is share of three-party vote.

A similar division within the middle classes is portrayed by the contrast between the private and public sector. In the private sector, the Conservative vote remained high (65 percent) and stayed solid (up 1 percent); among public-sector workers, it was much lower (44 percent) and fell by 4 percent (see table 5). Mrs. Thatcher's personal preference for businessmen over bureaucrats and profit makers over professors appears to be fully reciprocated.

Workers' Paradise Lost

Nonetheless, the Conservatives' vote held steady only because they made further inroads into the working class. At 36 percent its share of the manual workers' vote was the largest for any postwar election, including the 1950s when the national Conservative vote was much higher. Its success among the newly affluent working class of the South this year was crucial (see table 6). Among working-class homeowners, Conservatives led Labour by 44 percent to 32 percent; among those who had bought their council houses, by 42 percent to 31 percent. In the South—not just the Home Counties, but London, East Anglia, and the South West—the Conservatives won a larger majority among manual workers alone (46 percent Conservative to 28 percent Labour) than in the electorate as a whole (see table 6). Among first-time buyers of shares in the newly privatized industries, of whom half were manual workers, the Conservative vote was 54 percent.

It is in the contrasting shifts of a divided working class that Conservative success and Labour failure is most apparent. Labour's 1987 campaign was geared to recovering those working-class supporters whose large-scale desertion had produced the debacle of 1983.

Table 6 THE NEW WORKING CLASS

	Lives in South	Owner-occupier	Non-union	Private sector
Conservative	46%	44%	40%	38%
Labour	28	32	38	39
Liberal/SDP	26	24	22	23
1987 Majority	+18C	+12C	+2C	+1L
1983 Majority	+16C	+22C	+6C	+1L
% of all manual workers	40%	57%	66%	68%
Change from 1983	+4	+3	+7	+2

The strategy only half worked. Labour partly remobilized the rank-and-file working class of semi-and unskilled manual workers (and the unemployed) among whom its vote rose by a full six percentage points, twice the national average. But it failed spectacularly in the other half of the working class—the foremen, supervisors, craft, and high-tech workers who make up the skilled, secure, and affluent "new working class" (see table 4 and 6). Here there was a *further* swing to the Conservatives of 2.5 percent since 1983.

Comparisons with the 1970s starkly underline Labour's diminishing appeal to skilled workers. In October 1974, the last election it won (just barely), Labour took half the skilled worker vote (49 percent), and the Conservatives less than a third (31 percent). In 1979—an election it *lost*—it took 45 percent of their vote, level pegging with the Conservatives. Last week, Labour secured barely over a third (34 percent) of their vote, trailing the Conservatives by 9 percent. There could be no clearer electoral testament to Thatcherism.

My postmortem survey of the 1983 election (see *Public Opinion*, June/July 1983) concluded that Labour's claim to be the party of the working class was sociologically, if not ideologically, threadbare. The Labour vote remained largely working class; but the working class was no longer largely Labour. The party had come to represent a declining segment of the working class—the traditional working class of the council estates, the public sector, industrial Scotland and the North, and the old industrial unions—while failing to attract the affluent and expanding working class of the new estates and new service economy of the South (see table 7). It was a party neither of one class nor of one nation; it had become a regional class party. The 1987 survey reinforces each of these conclusions.

In one important sense, the picture is even gloomier for Labour this time. Government policies are producing a steady expansion of the new working class, and diminution of the old. Council house sales, privatization, the decline of the manufacturing industry (on which the old unions are based) and the steady population drift to the South have restructured the working class. The new working class is the dominant segment—and increasingly so. Demography and time are not on Labour's side. Its need to break out of its old class fortresses is more urgent than ever but on present evidence no nearer in sight.

Table 7 THE TRADITIONAL WORKING CLASS

	Lives in North	Council tenant	Union member	Public sector
Conservative	29%	25%	30%	32%
Labour	57	57	48	49
Liberal/SDP	15	18	22	19
1987 Majority	+28L	+32L	+18L	+17L
1983 Majority	+10L	+38L	+21L	+17L
% of all manual workers	37%	31%	34%	32%
Change from 1983	−1	−4	−7	−2

Labour seems to have few excuses for the 1987 loss. By common consent, it fought a professional, disciplined election under a personable and effective leader, pushing the government onto the defensive and forcing its own best issues to the top of the agenda. What went wrong?

Did Labour Run an Excellent Campaign?

Perhaps the received wisdom about the excellence of Labour's media campaign should be reexamined. Those who switched to Labour, for example, or only plumped for Labour during the campaign, mentioned a Labour party election broadcast (PEB) less often than their Alliance counterparts mentioned an Alliance broadcast. The net impact was a 1-percent addition to its vote. By comparison, Conservative broadcasts added a mere 0.4 percent, while the Alliance's were worth a 2.7 percent bonus. Reinforcing evidence comes from the chronology of the campaign polls, which show that Labour reached its 33-percent plateau before the broadcast of its first and perhaps over-celebrated commercial devoted to Kinnock.

Kinnock's electoral advantage to Labour has also been overestimated. It largely consisted of not being Michael Foot. Thirty-one percent chose him as a potential prime minister, well above Foot's tiny 13 percent in 1983, but still behind the 41 percent for Thatcher (see table 8). Among Labour voters, he was far more acceptable (79 percent) than Foot had been (44 percent) but less popular than Thatcher was among Conservatives (86 percent). His standing did improve in the first week of the campaign—the real benefit of the opening broadcast—but only from the extraordinarily low base of 25 percent to which it had ebbed after his trip to Washington; and it failed to rise any further.

Moreover, he led the field as the *worst* choice for prime minister (44 percent). His combined "best" + "worst" score of -13, while puny in comparison with Foot's -50 in 1983, suggests that on balance he was more of an electoral liability than an asset, especially when compared with Thatcher (+8) and Owen (+7). (See table 8). All these net scores are small, of course, indicating that in this campaign, its presidential style notwithstanding, leaders made little difference to their party vote. Evidence to this effect is that the number preferring one party's policies but a different party's leader (18 percent) was well down from 1983 (25 percent) and their vote split 80 to 20 percent in favor of the former. Nonetheless, Kinnock subtracted more than he added to Labour's vote.

Table 8 THE BEST (AND WORST) PERSON FOR PRIME MINISTER

	Thatcher	(Foot) Kinnock	Steel	(Jenkins) Owen
Would Make the Best Prime Minister:				
1983	46%	13%	35%	6%
1987	42	31	10	17
Would Make the Worst Prime Minister:				
1983	25	63	2	10
1987	34	44	12	10

It would be a mistake, too, to assume that Labour's campaign successfully expunged its extremist image. The proportion mentioning Labour disunity as a factor behind their vote remained as modest in 1987 (11 percent) as in 1983 (10 percent), but references to Labour extremism rose sharply from 19 percent to 27 percent among the general public and from 25 percent to 42 percent among Labour defectors. The party's campaign organizers managed to keep its "loony" left out of sight but not, apparently, out of mind.

The Paradox of Labour's Failure

Labour's poor performance remains a puzzle, however, because its campaign did succeed in placing its favorable issues much further up the agenda than in 1983 (see table 9). The single most important issue remained unemployment (mentioned by 49 percent) although far less overwhelmingly than in 1983 (72 percent), followed again by defense (35 percent); running close came the National Health Service (NHS) (33 percent); with education (19 percent), and pensions (10 percent) further behind. No other issue reached double digits (respondents could choose two).

Table 9 THE ISSUES THAT MATTERED

	Percent mentioning an issue as one of the two influencing vote*		Party preference on issue	
	All	1983-87	1987	1983
Unemployment	49%	−23	+34L	+16L
NHS/Hospitals	33	+22	+49L	+46L
Education	19	+13	+15L	NA
Defense	35	−3	+63C	+54C
Pensions	10	+2	NA	NA

* This was an open-ended question. The issues above were those most frequently mentioned. NA = not available.

Had the electorate voted solely on these main issues, Labour would have won. It was considered the more capable party on three of the four leading issues —jobs, health, and education—among those for whom the issue was important. Its lead over the Conservatives as the party for jobs doubled from 16 percent in 1983 to 34 percent in 1987; only part of this electoral advantage was eroded by the declining saliency of the issue. Its precedence over the Conservatives on the NHS edged forward from 46 to 49 percent among a group of concerned voters that had trebled in size since 1983. On all three social issues, there was widespread agreement, even among Conservatives, that matters had deteriorated. By wide margins, the public believed there had been an increase over the "last few years" in unemployment (+70 percent), and in NHS waiting lists (+69 percent), and that the quality of education had deteriorated (+58 percent). Thus only on defense was Labour manifestly vulnerable: it lagged behind the Conservatives by a massive 63 percent (an even wider gap than the 54 percent in 1983) among the 35 percent of the public for whom the defense issue mattered.

The final balance sheet favored Labour. An election confined to these four issues, where voters faithfully supported the party they preferred on the issues they said mattered, would have left Labour 2 percent ahead of the Conservatives.

The puzzle of the Opposition's failure is only solved if we give due prominence to three other verdicts on the recent past, all of them more favorable. By clear if modest margins, the public agrees that the economy has improved (45% said "got better," 30% "got worse") their living standards have risen (38-28 percent), and "opportunities to get ahead" have expanded (46-27 percent). In this conjunction of public poverty and private prosperity lies the key to the policy paradox of the Opposition's failure. When answering survey questions on the important issues, respondents think of public problems; when entering the polling booth they think of family fortunes. "Prosperity" is not an issue or a problem but a blessing; and by a decisive 55 percent to 27 percent majority, the public regarded the Conservatives as more likely to bestow it. Here, quite simply and obviously, lies the key to Conservative victory. Few said "We have never had it so good." Many thought it.

Whither the Alliance?

It is tempting to attribute the Alliance's dismal performance (all the more for being unexpected) to a mishandled campaign. After all, it began the campaign with the 27 percent support it secured at the local elections; it was granted equal media coverage for the first time; and it had not lost support during previous campaigns, at least since regular opinion polls began. It had reason to expect to move at least a little toward the 35 percent support it reached in the polls in 1985 and 1986.

The current scapegoat, the double leadership, was not the main culprit. Among the 23 percent of respondents who claimed to have voted or seriously considered voting Alliance, before deciding against, the overwhelming reason given was some variation of the classic "wasted vote" argument. Altogether, 68 percent said that the Alliance could not win or that voting Alliance would let in one of the major parties—an even larger proportion than in 1983 (58 percent). Much smaller proportions referred to the double leadership (22 percent), unclear policies (17 percent), or inexperience (16 percent). Among actual defectors from the Alliance, fear of letting the Conservatives in was twice as potent as fear of letting Labour in (the ratio was the reverse in 1983), as the collapse of the Alliance vote to Labour in many two-party marginals revealed. Once again, the Alliance was doubly penalized by the electoral system: unable to convert votes into seats, it was unable to convert support into votes.

None of the Opposition parties, therefore, can lay too much blame (or future hope) on the campaign. They were beaten by that old maxim for winning elections "Prosperity at home and peace abroad." They were also beaten by a changing social structure and an unbending electoral system. Therein lies both immediate solace but long-term despond for the Opposition parties; and the enticing prospect of yet further Conservative triumphs in what increasingly looks like a dominant one-party system. ☑

Ivor Crewe is a professor of government at the University of Essex. This is a shortened version of an article that first appeared in The Guardian *on June 15 and 16, 1987. I am grateful to* The Guardian *for permission to reproduce parts of the article here.*

About the BBC/Gallup Survey

This article is based on a survey commissioned by BBC Television, conducted by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., and designed by the author. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 4,886 people on June 10 and June 11, 4,035 in England and Wales and 851 in Scotland (weighted down for overall Great Britain figures). Northern Ireland was excluded from the survey. The sample was a quota sample composed of age, sex, and housing. The survey also incorporated weighted oversamples of 945 respondents in Conservative-held marginals where Labour was the main challenger, 917 respondents in Conservative-held marginals where the Liberal/SDP Alliance was the main challenger, and 696 respondents in "three-way marginals," where all three parties polled within 15 percentage points of each other in 1983.

In 1979 and 1983, almost identically designed BBC/Gallup election surveys recorded the actual vote in Great Britain to within one percentage point for each party. The 1987 survey, however, was less accurate (actual election figures in parentheses): Conservative 40.4 (43.2), Labour 35.4 (31.5), Liberal/SDP 22.5 (23.1), Others 1.8 (2.2). The voting figures given in tables 2-5 have therefore been reweighted to bring them into line with the actual election result.

Ladd

(Continued from page 3)

Is a More Educated Public More Tolerant?

One of the strongest relationships surveys show is: the more formal education someone has, the more likely he is to give the "tolerant" response. Many analysts think this is because, with increased education, people are better able to see the link between an abstract principle of political tolerance—like honoring the right of free speech for all, no matter what their views are—and the application of the principle when push comes to shove. Surveys indeed show that education makes little difference in professed adherence to abstract principles, but a great deal of difference when it comes to applying these norms (p. 37).

Some students of political tolerance point out, however, that contemporary American education may not increase general political tolerance as much as it increases support for one particular idea or model of it. Consider the question of whether someone should be allowed to give a speech in the community labeling blacks as "genetically inferior." The college educated are much more likely than the grade school and high school educated to say that he should be allowed to speak. Viewed strictly in terms of the application of a First Amendment right, only one response to the question is tenable. But many people—especially those who have less education and whose social and occupational positions bind them to the day-to-day life of their communities, rather than to national institutions and standards—may well see the issue quite differently: Isn't the goal of a politically tolerant and harmonious community discouraged when racists give speeches in which they attack blacks as biologically inferior? It is simply not the case that the "First Amendment model" is the only valid definition of a tolerant society, or that a failure to adhere to this model fully makes one intolerant.

Along with universal principles like the right to free speech, what George Marcus calls "rules of propriety and decorum" form the foundation of a politically tolerant society. Different though they are, both of these supports are, in fact, badly needed if that society is to stand secure. ☑

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[1] Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind* (Gloucester, MA. Peter Smith, 1963; first published 1955).

[2] Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, *Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe about Civil Liberties* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983).

[3] John L. Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[4] Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, *Racial Attitudes in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

[5] Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 13. The study Rokeach was criticizing in the passage noted above is by T. W. Adorno, et al, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1950).

[6] Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, p. 52.

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Lipset

(Continued from page 5)

honest, just as unobjectionable as neighbors or coworkers, and just as supportable for high public office as white Catholics or mainline Protestants. Negative stereotypes exist, but these are held more strongly against evangelical or fundamentalist Protestants.

Indicators of anti-Semitism have diminished steadily since the forties and are at an all-time low today. This is not because old anti-Semites have changed, but because they are dying and being replaced by younger, better-educated, and more cosmopolitan groups. The newer generation, even as they age or even if they adhere firmly to an orthodox form of Christianity, harbor fewer animosities toward Jews.

Objective Indicators

Some will argue that opinion data are not enough, that in the post-Holocaust environment, bigots have learned not to express prejudice when talking to a stranger such as an interviewer. But a number of corroborating behavioral changes also attest to the sharp decline in anti-Semitism. These have been documented by Earl Raab, a leader in the Jewish community:

- First, according to the hard evidence assembled by the ADL, overt episodes of vandalism and violence are declining.
- Second, law enforcement agencies and Jewish groups report an extremely low membership for organized anti-Semitic hate groups, in the thousands rather than the tens of thousands. These groups, which have been active among the economically distressed rural population, have received considerable media attention. But a Harris poll of the midwest farm areas, commissioned by the ADL in 1986, found almost no admitted members of those groups. Even more striking, the overwhelming majority, 80 percent or better, had never heard of them.
- Third, the evidence indicates that economic and social discrimination against Jews has continued to fall as a matter of objective reality, that is, almost all doors are open to Jews.
- And finally, Raab notes what he considers the most important criterion, the evidence from the electoral arena. How many non-Jews will vote for identifiable and avowed Jews to represent them in high public office? The evidence is clear. More and more such Jews are being elected to the House (twenty-eight), the Senate (seven), and to high state and municipal offices by electorates that are overwhelmingly non-Jewish.

The Blacks

The situation of blacks is obviously more complicated than the Jews'. Blacks remain, on the average, close to the most underprivileged racial-ethnic group in the United States. Most of the large waves of immigration from Asia and large sections of Latin America are more successful economically than native-born blacks. There is a sizable black underclass composed heavily of the female heads of households and their offspring. Fear of blacks is widespread, a reaction linked to the belief that crimes such as robbery and mugging are committed disproportionately by blacks. Anti-black violence, both in neighborhoods and on college campuses, may be increasing. What is even worse than these episodes is the apparent lack of reaction among the white majority.

Yet, although blacks have a long way to go to achieve parity with the white ethnic groups, the evidence assembled by Schuman, Stub, and Bobo points to the same kinds of generalizations that have been made for Jews. As they note, "Whereas discrimination against and enforced segregation of blacks was taken for granted by most white Americans as recently as the 1940s, today the dominant belief is that blacks deserve the same treatment and respect as whites and that some degree of racial integration is a good thing." And a recent (January 1987) Gallup poll that inquired which among seven groups "you would not like to have as neighbors" reported that 44 percent said "members of religious sects and cults," while only 13 percent answered "blacks," the same as for religious fundamentalists and unmarried couples living together (see p. 23). As with Jews, the negative implications of some responses may be reduced or eliminated if the same question is asked about a number of groups.

Schuman, et al., like Raab, point up the positive implications of behavioral evidence. They emphasize "an abundance of non-survey evidence of genuine changes in white actions toward blacks," noting especially the "wide range of high elected and appointed political positions, and not by any means only in areas with black majorities." And while stressing that blacks remain greatly underrepresented in every privileged area of American life, they, like others, emphasize the substantial improvements in the proportions of blacks in middle-class positions or educational achievement.

The major problem in public attitudes facing blacks, according to Schuman, et al., is that most white Americans do not support government remedial action to improve the situation of blacks or to open opportunities for them. Although an overwhelming majority of Americans, for example, endorse the *principle* of integrated schools and neighborhoods (as long as blacks are not half or more), they are divided on public laws to enforce residential integration. In 1986 NORC found 47 percent who said they would vote for a law that "says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to blacks"; only 51 percent said they would support a law that "says a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color."

Some opposition to remedial action may reflect anti-statist views or antagonism to government intervention for any purpose. But NORC also found three-fifths who said that if they belonged to "a social club that would not let blacks join, they would not try to change the rules so that. . .blacks could join." Only a third would try to integrate a segregated club. This result jibes with findings from other NORC polls: 61 percent in 1985 agreed that "Blacks should not push themselves where they're not wanted," down from 83 percent in 1970, but still a solid majority.

Unfortunately, underlying the lack of willingness to endorse programs to improve the black situation is a majority view that the reason blacks "have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people" is that most of them just "don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves out of poverty" (59 percent agree, 37 disagree). Conversely, only 44 percent agreed that "these differences. . .are mainly due to discrimination," while 54 percent rejected this explanation, the same distribution as in 1985. Similarly, in a 1985 NORC survey, only 53 percent replied "yes" to: "Do you think these differences [in job, income, and housing levels between whites and blacks], are. . .because most blacks don't have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty?" while 45 percent answered negatively.

Conclusion

Is the glass of bigotry half full or half empty? The evidence suggests that it is more than half empty and continuing to drain for Jews, while it remains more than half full for blacks, and emptying very slowly.

The Jews have been able to pass into the culture as a group whose behavior and values are prototypical American, as sociologist Robert Park once put it. They now appear in honored and productive positions in all segments of the society. Their energy and achievements are viewed with admiration. If they have a survival problem, it is that they are too easily accepted by their non-Jewish neighbors; recent studies of major Jewish communities outside of New York indicate that well over half of all marriages involving a Jew are with a non-Jew, and that the rate of intermarriage continues to increase.

Blacks, however, face a much more difficult situation. Race and color clearly are far greater barriers to intimate contact and equal social access than religion or ethnicity. Americans have extended their concept of equality to mean true equality of educational and economic opportunity. But many Americans still refuse to accept blacks as social equals into their networks, which in turn affects educational and economic opportunities. And the continued existence of a black underclass, which is necessarily characterized by a host of social morbidities, reinforces negative images of black behavior and aptitudes. These reduce the chances for social acceptance of the black middle class.

Jews have arrived. Blacks still have a long way to go.

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Beer

(Continued from page 19)

survey, a nationwide study carried out in November 1983, provides answers to three questions about women's experience with sex discrimination. The first was: "In the place where you work now, do you think you've ever been discriminated against because you're a woman in terms of salary, responsibility, or promotion?" and 77 percent of the women replied in the negative. In response to the question, "In other places where you have worked, have you ever been discriminated against because you're a woman?" 73 percent responded negatively. Finally, "Has it ever happened to you, that in seeking work, you applied for a job which interested you, only to learn they wanted to hire a man and not a woman?" elicited 83 percent "no" responses. We can conclude that, on the basis of their reported experience, at least three-quarters of American working women have never been victims of sex discrimination in their jobs.

This evidence is corroborated by a survey of American women conducted for the American Medical Association by Decision/Making/Information, Inc. of McLean, Virginia. Of all their respondents, 74 percent said they had never been subject to sex discrimination. Black women show the same pattern; only 24 percent say they have suffered sex discrimination.

Conclusion

An honest comparison of incomes and occupational distributions does not conclusively demonstrate systematic sex or race discrimination. Moreover, the astonishing success of black West Indians calls into question whether racial discrimination is a serious obstacle to upward mobility in the United States today. Finally, majorities—in some cases large majorities—of blacks and women themselves say they have never suffered from discrimination.

There are certainly cases of racial and sexual discrimination in the United States today, and these are not to be tolerated. Specific legal mechanisms exist whereby instances of individual discrimination can be rectified. It is false, however, to consider blacks and women as whole *classes* of people suffering from such pervasive discrimination that they need preferential treatment *as groups*. Any policy that aims at treating Americans as group victims of discrimination, rather than as individuals, is based on sociologically untenable ground. ☑

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[1] U.S. Dept of Labor, Women's Bureau, *Time of Change: 1983 Handbook on Women Workers* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983).

[2] National Research Council on Occupational Classification and Analysis, *Women, Work, and Wages* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1981).

[3] *Comparable Worth: Issue for the 80s* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1984).

[4] Thomas Sowell, "Ethnicity in a Changing America," *Daedalus*, Winter 1978.

[5] Peter Blauner, "Islands in the City," *New York*, April 21, 1986.

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WHERE THE PUBLIC STANDS ON NICARAGUA

by Everett Carll Ladd

It's interesting that the national polling data over the course of the last three years have shown that— in the latest Harris poll in June—[by] 74 to 22 [percent] people in this country oppose aid to the Contras. . . . And I can tell you myself, Colonel North, from campaigning in New Hampshire, a fairly conservative state. . .[that] the people in this country just don't think [Contra aid is] a very good idea. And that is why this Congress has been fickle and vacillating. Now, you may suggest that some of us voted [for Contra aid] anyway, even though it's against what our constituents believe. But, I want to point out to you, Colonel North, that the Constitution starts with the words, 'We the people.' There is no way you can carry out a consistent policy if 'We the people' disagree with it, because the Congress represents the people."[1]

—Senator Warren Rudman

Legislators sometimes feel compelled to take stands opposed to what majorities of their constituents favor, following the rule Edmund Burke so elegantly stated in his November 3, 1774 speech to the electors of Bristol: "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays you, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." Nonetheless, in a democracy the public's wishes should weigh heavily with their elected representatives. Senator Rudman is doubtless right that in the United States today "there is no way you can carry out a consistent policy if 'We the people' disagree with it. . . ."

But what do Americans really want out of U.S. policy in Central America generally and Nicaragua in particular? Have they in fact decisively opposed a policy of aid to the Contras? Since Oliver North's dramatic testimony before the Iran-Contra committee, all polls have shown increases in the proportion of the public endorsing Contra aid in questions that ask about it directly. I will discuss these data below. My objective, though, is to sift through the mountain of survey data on the subject that has accumulated over the last several years, in order to clarify the underlying structure of public thinking. For whatever shifts of opinion have occurred, the structure is fundamentally unchanged.

Americans Have Not Been Opposed to Contra Aid

Had Senator Rudman the opportunity to review the entire body of survey information, he probably would not have reached the conclusion that he did—that North's acceptance "into people's homes as almost a folk hero" was surprising since "the very things [aid to the Contras] he is espousing" were opposed by nearly three-fourths of Americans.[2] Contrary to what seems to be an increasingly popular myth, Americans do not warm to figures with whom they have deep policy disagreements. It would indeed be astounding, then, for them to have responded so positively to North had they been solidly opposed to the cause of Contra assistance that he pleaded so passionately. In fact, there is no irony or contradiction: the public's views cannot accurately be summarized as "opposed to Contra aid."

It is not accurate either, of course, to describe the American public as enthusiastically committed to Contra aid. While it is always comforting politically to have the people unreservedly on one's side, and sometimes tempting to claim such support when one knows better, neither opponents nor proponents of Contra aid can plausibly claim that mandate. If members of the public found themselves required periodically to debate a particular Contra aid proposal and then vote on it, more of them would be pushed into choosing sides—but they aren't and they haven't.

Resist Communism

The poll data brought together on pages 21-23 make evident just how inaccurate it is to claim that Americans oppose assisting the Contras and want their elected representatives to so vote. Many aspects of public opinion push in the opposite direction. For one, developments in Nicaragua—as in any country where Communist expansion or consolidation is at issue—bring into play public attitudes toward Communism and the Soviet Union—which remain very negative. Communism is seen as a bad form of government—for nearly half of those with an opinion, the very worst kind—and the Soviet Union as a system that grossly denies human freedom. The United States must be ready to do what is necessary, including using troops, to prevent Communism's advance. In September 1986 a highly popular Ronald Reagan was seen by a third of Americans as "not tough enough" in dealing with the Soviet Union (see p. 21).

Judgments framed with regard to Communism internationally are hardly muted when applied to Central America. Americans see the region as vital to U.S. interests. They think that success by movements or governments aligned with the Soviet Union would lead to still further Communist expansion in the region and should be resisted. They believe that the United States should take strong action to prevent the consolidation of a pro-Soviet government in Nicaragua. Indeed, in Spring 1986, by a margin of two-to-one, they endorsed "aid to the rebels in Nicaragua in order to prevent Communist influence from spreading to other countries in Central America" (see table 1).

Reluctance on Foreign Aid

These data surely do not support the view that congressmen who back the Contras are defying *vox populi* or earning chapters in *Profiles in Courage*. It is true, however, that the public has not warmed to the idea of military aid to the Contras. Partly this reluctance reflects the partisan debate that has been raging, where negative assessments of the Contras by many congressional Democrats are as common as positive assessments by the Reagan administration and congressional Republicans. Not surprisingly, on the specific question of military aid, the public has been organized to some degree on partisan lines. In the context of demographic correlates of aid support or opposition (on the whole these are exceedingly weak), political scientist Howard Reiter reports that "partisanship is a more important correlate of opinion on aid than any of the demographic variables."[3]

In large part, though, the persisting public reservations on military assistance to the Contras, attested to by the data on page 24, reflect an unease about foreign assistance programs generally. In the spring of 1980, for example, Louis Harris and Associates conducted a survey in which they asked respondents to evaluate spending on a list of twenty programs. Cuts in foreign economic (82 percent wanted it cut) and military aid (77 percent) "won" hands down, "beating" even welfare spending (69 percent wanted to cut it), subsidies to business (69 percent), and food stamps (65 percent). Since 1973, the National Opinion Research Center's (NORC) General Social Survey has asked cross-sections of the public whether they think we are spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on foreign aid. The proportion saying "too much" has never been lower than 66 percent and has averaged just over 70 percent. It was 70 percent in 1973 and 71 percent in 1987. In this context, the level of backing for Contra aid shown on page 24 is neither surprising nor particularly low.

These data appear to show conclusively that opposition to aid is general and recurring. Yet after reviewing virtually the entire body of relevant poll data, however, I conclude that it simply is not accurate to say that, overall, Americans are against foreign aid. Of course they are not going to demand it as they do social security benefits—but their assessments include many that support foreign assistance.[4]

Why don't the up-or-down spending questions show the bottom line? Often, pollsters ask one question and respondents answer another one: "Should spending for foreign aid be cut?" seems straightforward and unambiguous. It *is* for people who have a well-formed conception of foreign aid and who have given thought to the matter—but these conditions don't apply for many in the general public. Available

Table 1

THREAT POSED BY COMMUNISM IN NICARAGUA
CENTRAL AMERICA AND U.S. RESPONSE

1. Will Nicaragua provide Soviet bases? (CBS News/*New York Times*)

   Yes 59% No 16%

2. Sandinistas likely to provide Soviet outpost unless United States resists (Louis Harris and Associates)

   Agree 60% Disagree 29%

3. United States should aid rebels to stop Communist influence from spreading (*Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman)

   Agree 58% Disagree 29%

4. Pro-Soviet success in Central America would lead to further Communist advance in region (CBS News/*New York Times*)

   Yes 72% No 11% Depends (vol.) 5%

5. United States force needed to prevent Communism from expanding in Central America (ABC News/*Washington Post*)

   Agree 48% Disagree 42%

6. Greatest threat in Central America: United States getting into war or Communist gains? (CBS News/*New York Times*)

   War 36% Communists 46% Both (vol.) 5% Neither (vol.) 3%

7. Should United States eliminate Communism from Latin America, or no security threat? (CBS News/*New York Times*)

   Eliminate Communism 50% No threat 30%

Notes: "Don't know," "No opinion," "No answer" not shown here. For exact question wording for question 1 see Opinion Roundup, p. 23; Question 2, p. 23; Question 3, p. 24; Question 5, p. 21; and Question 7, p. 22. Question 6 is not displayed in Opinion Roundup. The wording of this question is "When it comes to the situation in Central America, are you more worried about the United States getting involved in a war there, or more worried about a Communist takeover in that area?" Wording for question 4 is: "If a movement influenced by the Soviet Union were to take over the government of a country in Central America, do you think other Central American countries would also fall under Soviet influence?"

data make it reasonable to conclude that the foreign aid spending questions come through to much of the public something like: "Do you think the United States is doing too much or too little in world affairs?" Looking at the experience since World War II, most Americans clearly feel that we have done our share and, in a sense, should seek to reduce our burden, not increase it. The response, *the U.S. is spending too much on foreign aid*, probably reflects this judgment far more than the assessment literally conveyed.

Persisting Tensions

If we look beyond the issue of foreign aid, we see that virtually every time in the last fifty years the public has been asked whether they want to see the United States become engaged in some foreign military conflict, they have said no. This is true of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and now Central America. This is hardly surprising, since becoming involved in a military conflict is not some intrinsic good. Americans are reluctant to see their country involved, but they are also reluctant to see it stand aside. Polls show a public that believes there are times when the costs of non-involvement are very great.

Poll questions are much like the blind man before the elephant: the questions reach out and "touch" something that can not be seen. We so readily assume that the part being touched in a given instance is the whole—and pay the price in confusion. Touching only upon their reluctance to have their country further engaged, Senator Richard Lugar, himself a Contra aid supporter, last February described the American people as opposed to Contra aid and wishing that Central American problems "would go away without the expenditure of a single penny or (having) a single American involved."[5] How would he explain the public's responses shown in table 1, especially the two-thirds support for Contra aid "to prevent Communist influence from spreading to other countries in Central America"? My view is that this question, unlike the more commonly asked ones on Contra aid, offers a rationale for assistance. "Gain without pain" has not been the bottom line of American opinion on foreign and defense issues for the last forty years—because of the depth and persistence of the public's concern over national security, given the Soviet challenge.

Public opinion today is pretty much what it has been, which means that it is characterized by crosscurrents and tensions. A large majority are at once reluctant to see the United States become deeply engaged in aiding the Contras—and opposed to our sitting back while a Soviet-serving regime is consolidated in Nicaragua.

Problems for Polling

In his review of public opinion data on U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, Howard Reiter notes that "different

(Continued on page 59)

PUBLIC OPINION ON NICARAGUA

THE CONTEXT

Question: For each of the following possible foreign policy goals, please say whether you think that it should be a very important goal, somewhat important, or not an important goal at all.



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, latest that of October 30-November 12, 1986.

Question: Do you think that President Carter has been too tough on the Soviets, not tough enough, or do you think he has set the right tone in his dealings with the Soviets?

Question: During the Reagan administration, do you think the president's policies in dealing with the Soviet Union have been too tough, not tough enough, or just about right?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/Wall Street Journal, latest that of September 20-22, 1986.

CONCERN ABOUT THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM

Question: Do you agree or disagree that the United States should take all steps including the use of force to prevent the spread of Communism in Central America?



Note: In an April 1986 Time/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman survey, 58% responded that the "U.S. should aid the rebels in Nicaragua to prevent Communist influence from spreading to other countries in Central America." Twenty-nine percent disagreed.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 6, 1986.

Question: Is the Communist threat in Central America serious enough to justify having U.S. military forces there?



Note: 9,174 voters as they left the polls.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, November 6, 1984.

NICARAGUA: A THREAT TO US AND OTHER

Question: How would you describe the importance of El Salvador and other Central American countries—like Guatemala and Nicaragua—to the defense interests of the United States?



Note: Sample size for April 1983 = 1,489; for June 1983 = 1,365.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of February 23-27, 1985.

Question: Would you say that the situation in Nicaragua is a threat to the security of the United States or not?



Note: Question wording varied slightly over time. A follow-up question was asked about whether Nicaragua was a major or minor threat to the security of the United States. The responses for "major threat" were, in chronological order shown above: 29%, 28%, 27%, 29%, 32%.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 24, 1987.

Question: Do you think the government of Nicaragua threatens the security of other Central American countries, or not?



Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, April 6-10, 1986.

Question: Do you think it's important to the security of the United States to eliminate Communism from Latin America, or can Communist governments exist in Latin America without threatening U.S. security?



Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, April 6-10, 1986.

CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS

Question: Now let me read you some statements about U.S. involvement in Central America. For each, tell me if you agree or disagree . . . The Sandinista government in Nicaragua will become another Communist outpost like Cuba unless the U.S. puts real pressure on them to either change radically or be overthrown.



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, March 2-5, 1985.

Question: Do you think Nicaragua will provide military bases for the Soviet Union?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 6-10, 1986.

GROWING PUBLIC AWARENESS

Question: Do you happen to know which side the U.S. is backing in Nicaragua, the rebels or the government?



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of August 3-5, 1987.

Question: Do you think the United States government should provide military assistance to the people trying to overthrow the government of Nicaragua, or not? (CBS/*New York Times*)

Question: Do you generally favor or oppose the U.S. (Congress) granting ($100 million in) military (and other) aid to the Nicaraguan rebels known as the "contras?" (ABC/*Washington Post*)

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the Reagan administration's support of the rebels in Nicaragua? (NBC/*Wall Street Journal*)

Question: Do you agree or disagree with these statements about U.S. policy in Nicaragua and Central America? The United States should aid the rebels in Nicaragua in order to prevent Communist influence from spreading to other countries in Central America.

CONTRARY ATTITUDES ON CONTRA AID



U.S. should aid the rebels in Nicaragua to prevent Communist influence from spreading to other countries in Central America



Source: Survey by Time/Yankelovich, Clancy, Shulman, April 15-17, 1986.

Note: * Registered voters. Wording varied slightly over the years.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of July 21-27, 1987; ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of August 3-5, 1987; NBC News/Wall Street Journal, latest that of July 12, 1987.

PUBLIC OPINION POTPOURRI

CONFIDENCE IN KEY INSTITUTIONS

Question: I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the *people running* these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them . . .?



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April, 1987.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

Question: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?



Question: In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?



Question: Is there any area right around here—that is, within a mile—where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?



ABORTION

Question: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if . . .

Woman should be able to obtain legal abortion if...





EXTRAMARITAL SEX

Question: What is your opinion about a married person having sexual relations with someone other than the marriage partner—is it always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

HOMOSEXUALITY

Question: What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April, 1987.

PORNOGRAPHY

Question: Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about pornography laws . . .?



THE WORK ETHIC

Question: If you were to get enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of your life, would you continue to work or would you stop working?

Would continue to work if you had enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of your life



Note: Sample = those working or temporarily out of work.

Question: Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?



SATISFACTION WITH WORK AND FINANCIAL SITUATION

Question: On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do—would you say you are very satisfied, moderately satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

Satisfied with the work you do



Note: "Satisfied" = very satisfied + moderately satisfied. Sample = those currently working or temporarily out of work or keeping house.

Question: We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, latest that of February-April, 1987.

THE ECONOMY: CONSUMERS



MICHIGAN INDEX OF CONSUMER SENTIMENT

The Index of Consumer Sentiment is a composite number that takes into account the answers to this series of questions:

1. Would you say that you and your family are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?
2. Now, looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you and your family will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same?
3. Now, turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during the next twelve months, we'll have good times financially or bad times, or what?
4. Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole, we'll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment, or depression, or what?
5. About the big things people buy for their homes—I mean furniture, home furnishings, refrigerator, stove, television, and things like that. In general, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to buy such household items?

Note: For data prior to 1962 the base is Fall 1956 = 100. In 1962 and later years, the base is February 1986 = 100, a date selected because the index value on the old base happened to be 100 in February 1986, thus linking the two sets of data.

Source: Surveys by Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, latest that of April-June 1987.

CONFERENCE BOARD CONSUMER CONFIDENCE INDEX

The Consumer Confidence Index is a composite number that takes into account the answers to this series of questions:

1. How would you rate the present general business conditions in your area? Good, normal, or bad?
2. Six months from now, do you think they will be better, same, or worse?
3. What would you say about available jobs in your area right now? Plenty, not so many, hard to get?
4. Six months from now will there be more, fewer or same?
5. How would you guess your total family income to be six months from now? Higher, the same, lower?

Note: Survey is a mail survey. 1985 = 100.

Source: Survey by the National Family Opinion, Inc. for the Conference Board, latest that of April-June 1987.

CAUTIOUSLY CONFIDENT





Question: We are interested in how people's financial situation may have changed. Would you say that you are financially better off now than you were a year ago, or are you financially worse off now?



Question: Looking ahead, do you expect that at this time next year you will be financially better off than now or worse off than now?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of June 8-14, 1987.

REAGAN'S APP

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?



	Gallup	ABC/Post	CBS/NYT
1/81	51/13		
2/81	55/18	68/15	
3/81	60/24	72/17	
4/81	67/19	73/19	67/18
5/81	68/21	66/25	
6/81	59/29		59/23
7/81	56/30	62/29	
8/81	60/29		
9/81	52/37	64/33	53/33
10/81	53/35	59/33	
11/81	49/40	52/38	
12/81	49/41	52/41	
1/82	47/42	52/39	49/38
2/82	47/43	48/46	
3/82	46/45	50/46	43/42
4/82	43/47	51/45	
5/82	45/44	46/45	43/44
6/82	44/46		42/45
7/82	42/46		
8/82	42/46	49/47	
9/82	42/48	46/50	42/44
10/82	42/48	49/44	48/42
11/82	43/47		
12/82	41/50	45/48	
1/83	35/56	42/54	41/47
2/83	40/50	45/50	
3/83	41/49		
4/83	41/49	49/47	43/45
5/83	46/43	53/42	
6/83	47/44	53/44	47/39
7/83	42//47	52/44	
8/83	43/46		
9/83	48/42	52/42	46/41
10/83	49/41	57/40	48/38
11/83	53/37	63/31	
12/83	54/38	59/37	
1/84	55/37	57/39	57/32
2/84	55/36	59/38	56/35
3/84	54/39		
4/84	52/37		
5/84	54/38	57/37	
6/84	54/36		57/33
7/84	52/37	54/41	
8/84	54/38		54/33
9/84	57/36	58/38	58/29
10/84	58/33		58/32
11/84	62/30		
12/84	59/32		
1/85	64/28	68/28	62/29
2/85	60/31	62/35	59/29
3/85	56/37	60/36	
4/85	52/37	54/42	
5/85	55/37	57/38	59/29
6/85		66/30	
7/85	63/28	65/31	65/24
8/85	65/26		
9/85	60/30	62/34	62/27
10/85	63/29	63/33	
11/85		67/28	65/26
12/85		66/27	
1/86	64/27		65/24
2/86		65/31	
3/86		65/32	
4/86	62/29	70/26	64/27
5/86		70/27	68/21
6/86			67/23
7/86	63/28		
8/86			62/25
9/86			63/27
10/86	63/29		67/25
11/86		57/40	46/45
12/86	48/43	49/47	47/40

Note: When survey organizations ask the approval question more than once in a month, we have used the latest polls in the month.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 10-12, 1987; CBS News/*New York Times* July 21-22, 1987, and ABC News/*Washington Post* August 3-5, 1987; NBC News July 12, 1987.

ROVAL RATINGS



	Gallup	ABC/Post	CBS/NYT
1/87	49/42	50/47	52/38
2/87	40/53	44/51	42/46
3/87	47/44	50/47	45/43
4/87	49/43		49/40
5/87		52/47	46/43
6/87	53/40	50/49	
7/87	51/41		51/39
8/87		50/47	

NBC News

	Excellent/Good	Only fair	Poor
2/85	59%	26%	13%
5/85	51	31	16
6/85	57	29	12
7/85	64	26	8
10/85	56	29	13
11/85	67	24	8
12/85	60	28	10
1/86	58	31	9
2/86	63	26	10
4/86	65	23	10
6/86	64	25	10
7/86	63	26	10
8/86	62	26	11
9/86	63	26	10
10/86	61	27	11
11/86	57	28	14
12/86	50	29	19
1/87	49	31	19
3/87	45	35	19
4/87	44	34	20
5/87	46	33	20
7/87	46	33	20

PARTY I.D.: COMPA R

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



Note: Wording varied slightly over the years.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 10-13, 1987.

Gallup

	Dem.	Rep.
1981		
January	42%	27%
February	42	29
March	41	28
April	39	29
May	42	26
June	43	29
July	40	27
August	40	29
September	47	26
October	43	29
1982		
February	44	26
May	46	26
August	45	27
November	45	26
1983		
January	45	24
February	46	24
May	46	23
July	45	25
October	43	28
November	43	26
December	41	26
1984		
January	42	27
February	39	29
March	43	27
April	43	28
May	43	26
June	40	30
July	37	29
August	40	33
September	39%	36%
October	39	35
November	38	35
December	38	33
1985		
January	36	35
February	39	35
March	37	34
April	37	32
May	35	35
June	40	31
July	36	34
October	43	35
1986		
January	39	33
April	41	32
May	38	32
June	38	32
July	40	32
August	42	31
September	39	28
October	39	33
December	40	30
1987		
January	39	32
March	41	28
April	39	31
July	42	31

The Roper Organization

	Dem.	Rep.
1981		
January	45%	25%
February	45	27
March	44	28
April	43	28
May	45	26
July	45	28
August	42	27
September	46	27
October	44	26
December	45	25
1982		
January	46	24
February	48	24
March	48	24
April	44	26
June	44	26
July	47	25
August	47	23
September	46	26
October	47	26
December	49	23
1983		
January	50	23
February	47	26
March	49	23
April	50	24
June	48	22
July	48	24
August	48	24
September	46	26
November	50	23
December	43	27
1984		
January	46%	24%
February	45	29
March	45	26
April	47	25
May	45	27
July	48	26
August	46	28
September	44	31
October	45	30
December	45	29
1985		
January	45	27
February	45	31
March	43	30
April	46	27
June	47	28
July	45	28
August	45	27
September	48	27
October	45	29
December	47	27
1986		
January	45	29
February	44	30
March	42	29
April	45	30
May	46	29
July	41	28
August	43	29
September	44	29
October	47	27
December	45	30
1987		
January	45	27
February	45	30
March	45	27
April	46	28
May	42	29

ING THE SURVEYS



Question: Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—a Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what?



Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Reports 87-6), latest that of May 16-30, 1987.

FEW CHANGES IN PARTY I.D.

Question: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or Independent?



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of August 3-5, 1987.

ABC News/*Washington Post*

	Dem.	Rep.
1981		
February	36%	28%
March	41	26
April	43	27
May	37	25
July	36	27
September	41	26
October	38	26
November	40	24
1982		
January	39	23
February	38	26
March	41	26
April	36	24
June	40	25
August	40	25
September	41	27
October	44	23
1983		
January	38	22
March	42	22
April	39	25
May	37	26
June	45	22
August	41	23
September	42	20
October	40	27
November	38	26
December	36	27
1984		
January	43%	27%
February	39	29
May	37	23
July	39	25
September	39	26
October	39	27
1985	**Dem.**	**Rep.**
January	34	29
March	41	30
May	38	28
June	37	28
July	37	31
September	35	29
October	34	31
November	35	30
December	36	29
1986		
March	35	32
April	33	28
June	37	32
September	34	33
October	35	29
1987		
January	39	27
May	37	28
June	33	28
July	36	26
August	38	29

Question: Are you a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?



Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich Skelly and White, latest that of November 1985; *Time*/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, latest that of July 9, 1987.

***Time*/**
Yankelovich Clancy Shulman

	Dem.	Rep.
1981		
January	51%	31%
May	53	28
September	52	30
1982		
March	52	30
June	52	30
October	52	32
December	51	31
1983		
March	52	30
June	51	31
September	51	31
December	48	32
1984		
January	48	32
August	50	32
September	47	33
October	46	34
December	45	34
1985	**Dem.**	**Rep.**
April	47%	34%
July	50	34
September	48	33
November	47	35
1986		
April	46	31
May	42	26
July	43	24
September	35	25
October	38	32
November	41	25
1987		
January	40	28
February	41	25
May	41	35
July	42	24

SINCE IRAN-CONTRA

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of July 21-22, 1987.

CBS News/*New York Times*

	Dem.	Rep.
1981		
January	39%	27%
April	36	28
June	38	27
September	38	26
1982		
January	39	23
March	40	25
May	40	23
September	42	26
1983		
January	40	28
April	40	26
June	40	24
1984		
September	40	29
October	39	29
November	37	29
1985	**Dem.**	**Rep.**
January	36	32
February	38	29
May	39	31
June	36	32
July	39	34
September	36	33
November	39	33
1986		
January	39%	31%
February	38	28
April	42	29
June	39	31
August	34	32
September	37	30
October	35	30
1987		
January	38	33
February	40	29
March	42	34
April	40	31
May	42	32
July	36	32

Question: In politics today, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/*Associated Press*, January 1981-September 1983; NBC News, January 1984-July 1985; NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, October 1985-July 12, 1987.

NBC News/*Associated Press*; NBC News; NBC News/ *Wall Street Journal*

	Dem.	Rep.
1981		
January	35%	29%
February	38	27
April	37	28
May	33	29
July	33	32
August	37	29
September	35	30
October	34	28
November	35	28
December	36	28
1982		
January	35	28
March	35	28
May	36	27
June	38	31
August	39	27
October	38	29
November	35	26
1983		
September	38	31
1984	**Dem.**	**Rep.**
January	40	29
February	37	29
March	37	28
June	35	28
July	34	28
August	34	27
September	32	29
1985		
February	31%	33%
May	35	35
June	37	34
July	36	36
October	33	35
November	34	31
December	35	34
1986		
January	34	32
February	32	32
April	34	34
June	34	35
July	34	35
August	33	33
September	31	36
October	31	35
November	35	31
December	34	28
1987		
January	34	32
March	38	34
May	33	32
July	32	33

CAMPAIGN '88: CANDIDATE STANDINGS

THE DEMOCRATIC FIELD

(Expressed in percentages)	Babbitt	Biden	Blanchard	Bentsen	T. Bradley	B. Bradley	Bumpers	Clinton	Coelho	Cuomo	Dukakis	Feinstein	Gephardt	Gore	Hart	Iacocca	Jackson	Kennedy	Nunn	Robb	Rockefeller	Schroeder	Simon	White
Arthur J. Finkelstein and Associates																								
2/7-10/86[1]	*	*	NA	x	NA	3	1	NA	NA	15	NA	NA	*	NA	24	NA	6	26	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
3/7-10[1]	1	*	NA	2	NA	7	x	NA	NA	16	NA	NA	2	NA	30	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/4-7[1]	x	1	NA	3	NA	6	0	NA	NA	13	NA	NA	2	NA	34	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/4-7[1]	*	1	NA	3	NA	5	1	NA	NA	12	NA	NA	*	NA	27	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/30-6/2[1]	*	x	NA	2	NA	8	1	NA	NA	13	NA	NA	1	NA	28	NA	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
7/3-6[1]	*	1	NA	3	NA	7	1	NA	NA	14	NA	NA	1	NA	30	NA	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
8/7-13[1]	x	*	NA	0	NA	5	3	NA	NA	11	NA	NA	0	NA	19	20	9	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA
9/1-5[1]	0	x	NA	0	NA	4	0	NA	NA	15	NA	NA	*	NA	20	13	10	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
10/4-6[1]	0	x	NA	1	NA	5	1	NA	NA	12	NA	NA	x	NA	20	14	11	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/19-27/87[1]	x	0	NA	0	NA	3	*	NA	NA	11	NA	NA	1	NA	26	10	9	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
6/19-22[1]	1	7	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	8	NA	4	4	NA	NA	14	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA
Gallup (1985 and 1986, first and second choices combined; 1987 first choice only.)																								
6/7-10/85[1]	1	1	NA	NA	5	4	2	NA	x	15	NA	2	NA	NA	31	11	14	46	1	3	3	x	NA	1
1/10-13/86[1]	1	1	NA	NA	8	8	2	NA	1	22	NA	3	2	NA	47	18	16	NA	3	3	6	1	NA	5
4/11-14[1]	1	1	NA	NA	7	6	2	NA	x	27	NA	4	1	NA	39	14	18	NA	2	5	6	2	NA	2
7/11-14[2]	‡	‡	NA	NA	7	7	‡	NA	‡	22	NA	3	‡	NA	34	26	17	NA	‡	3	6	‡	NA	‡
10/24-27[2]	‡	‡	NA	NA	7	8	‡	NA	‡	27	3	‡	‡	NA	32	26	14	NA	‡	3	6	‡	NA	3
1/16-19/87[2]	1	2	NA	NA	NA	11	4	NA	NA	23	3	NA	1	NA	53	29	21	NA	5	6	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/10-13[2]	4	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	NA	6	6	NA	NA	27	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	NA
5/6-7[2]	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	7	6	NA	NA	22	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA
6/8-14[2]	2	7	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	7	5	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	NA
7/10-13[2]	2	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	13	NA	3	8	NA	NA	17	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	NA
Harris (1985 is first and second choice combined. 1986 and 1987 are first choice only.)																								
4/1-3/85[1]	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	2	NA	NA	14	NA	NA	*	NA	20	NA	NA	31	2	3	NA	NA	NA	3
4/1-3[2]	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	2	NA	NA	14	NA	NA	1	NA	24	NA	NA	27	2	3	NA	NA	NA	4
2/22-3/3/86[1]	*	*	2	NA	NA	6	2	NA	NA	21	2	NA	2	NA	40	NA	NA	NA	3	3	NA	NA	NA	3
2/22-3/3[2]	1	*	2	NA	NA	8	2	NA	NA	19	3	NA	3	NA	37	NA	NA	NA	3	4	NA	NA	NA	3
10/29-11/1[2]	1	1	1	NA	NA	9	2	NA	NA	19	2	NA	1	NA	31	NA	NA	NA	3	4	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/10-15 and 5/8-12/87[15]	4	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	11	NA	8	8	NA	NA	19	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	8	NA
5/8-12[15]	2	2	NA	NA	NA	7	NA	2	NA	25	7	NA	5	6	NA	NA	12	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	4	NA
Los Angeles Times																								
2/20-25/86[1]	NA	1	NA	NA	2	3	NA	NA	NA	15	NA	0	NA	NA	23	10	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
2/20-23/87[1]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	2	NA	22	NA	8	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/7-8[8]	2	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	12	NA	6	6	NA	NA	7	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA
5/29-6/1[11]	2	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	21	6	NA	4	3	NA	NA	13	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	3	NA
ABC News/*Washington Post* (May/June 1987 = first choice. As of May/June, Nunn and Cuomo are volunteered.)																								
2/6-12/86[2]	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	19	NA	NA	1	NA	39	14	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/15-19[2]	*	1	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	16	NA	NA	2	NA	33	19	18	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/15-19/87[2]	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	1	NA	39	NA	13	NA	4	3	NA	NA	NA	NA
3/5-9[2]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	3	NA	46	NA	14	NA	4	2	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/4[2]	1	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	4	1	36	NA	12	NA	5	3	NA	NA	4	NA
5/28-6/1[2]	5	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	13	NA	11	6	NA	NA	22	NA	0	NA	NA	NA	13	NA
ABC News																								
5/4/87[1]	1	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	4	1	36	NA	12	NA	5	3	NA	NA	4	NA
Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time*																								
5/20-22/86[2]	1	*	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	NA	1	NA	34	18	13	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/5-7/87[2]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	14	NA	NA	1	NA	37	NA	13	NA	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/7[2]	2	2	NA	NA	NA	7	NA	NA	NA	18	7	NA	4	NA	26	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA
5/7[2]	2	2	NA	NA	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	20	8	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA

(Expressed in percentages)	Babbitt	Biden	Blanchard	Bentsen	T. Bradley	B. Bradley	Bumpers	Clinton	Coelho	Cuomo	Dukakis	Feinstein	Gephardt	Gore	Hart	Iacocca	Jackson	Kennedy	Nunn	Robb	Rockefeller	Schroeder	Simon	White
NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*																								
8/11-12/86[3]	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	15	NA	NA	NA	NA	32	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/22-23/87[9]	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	2	NA	31	NA	8	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
3/15-17[9]	2	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	2	NA	36	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/12-14[8]	1	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	4	3	41	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/6[8]	0	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	6	5	27	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/18-19[8]	3	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	10	NA	7	4	NA	NA	14	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA
CBS News/*New York Times*																								
11/4/86[1]	1	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	20	NA	NA	1	NA	26	NA	7	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
11/4/86[2]	1	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	17	NA	NA	1	NA	24	NA	7	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/18-21/87[8]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	17	1	NA	2	NA	33	NA	9	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
3/28-29[8]	3	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	3	NA	2	2	38	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
5/5-6[8]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	6	NA	4	1	32	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA
5/11-14[8]	3	1	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	2	NA	25	6	NA	3	4	NA	NA	12	NA	4	NA	NA	NA	5	NA
5/11-14[8]	2	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	11	NA	4	5	NA	NA	17	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA
Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network																								
12/9-11/86[1]	x	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	3	NA	32	NA	11	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
12/9-11[2]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	19	NA	NA	2	NA	31	NA	9	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Gordon S. Black Corporation for *USA Today*																								
5/8-10/87[11]	1	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	*	1	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	NA
Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*																								
5/6-7[2]	*	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	NA	4	5	40	NA	15	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA
5/6-7/87[2]	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	7	6	NA	NA	22	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA
Cambridge Reports, Inc. for the Cook Political Report and Government Research Corporation																								
5/16-6/1/87[9]	2	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	7	4	NA	NA	19	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	6	NA
KRC Research for WBZ-TV/*Boston Herald* in Iowa																								
4/21-27/87[13]	5	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	3	NA	6	1	47	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA
5/6[13]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	4	NA	5	0	47	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA
***Des Moines Register* and Tribune Company, "Iowa Poll"**																								
5/14-20/86[4]	1	0	NA	NA	NA	2	0	NA	NA	24	0	NA	1	NA	44	NA	2	NA	0	1	NA	NA	NA	1
12/8-16[6]	3	1	NA	NA	NA	5	1	NA	NA	13	1	NA	1	NA	56	NA	4	NA	1	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
1/26-2/4/87[1]	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	14	x	NA	3	NA	59	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/20-29[1]	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	7	1	65	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA
5/5[1]	3	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	9	x	56	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA
5/12-15[1]	6	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	11	NA	24	1	NA	NA	13	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA
Bannon Research in New Hampshire																								
5/8-11/86[5]	0	0	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	16	27	NA	0	NA	42	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA
9/86—10/86[7]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	26	NA	NA	1	NA	47	NA	6	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
9/86—10/86[7]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	19	27	NA	1	NA	33	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
University of New Hampshire Poll with WMUR-TV in New Hampshire (First choice)																								
1/24-2/1/87[2]	0	1	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	16	19	NA	0	NA	41	NA	4	NA	1	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
KRC Research for WBZ-TV/*Boston Herald* in New Hampshire																								
2/20-21/87[7]	0	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	NA	28	NA	1	NA	41	NA	3	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/21-27[7]	2	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	32	NA	2	1	32	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA
5/5[7]	2	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	27	NA	1	0	17	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA
Orren/Lemieux for *Boston Globe* in New Hampshire																								
3/19-27/87[2]	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	NA	41	NA	1	NA	38	NA	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Roper Organization for *Atlanta Constitution/Atlanta Journal* in 12 Southern states																								
2/27-3/8/87[10]	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	35	NA	21	NA	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

Note: 1=Self-described Democrats; 2=Democrats and Independents; 3=Registered and Leaning Democrats; 4=Registered Iowa voters; 5=Likely Democratic voters in New Hampshire; 6=Registered Iowa Democrats; 7=Likely Democratic primary voters in New Hampshire; 8=Likely Democratic primary voters; 9=Democratic-leaning likely voters; 10=Likely Democratic primary voters in 12 southern states; 11=Registered Democrats; 12=Adults of all parties in Missouri; 13=Potential Democratic caucus participants in Iowa; 14=Adult Democrats in Maricopa County, Arizona; 15=Democratic and Independent voters; 16=Democrats in Utah; 17=Adults in Kansas; 18=Democrats in Maryland; *=Less than 0.5%; x=Less than 1%; ‡=2% or less.

Footnotes refer to polls (many of which are not shown here) from the Public Opinion Campaign '88 file.

THE REPUBLICAN FIELD

(Expressed in percentages)	Armstrong	H. Baker	J. Baker	Brock	Bush	Domenici	E. Dole	R. Dole	du Pont	Ford	Gingrich	Haig	Helms	Kean	Kemp	Kirkpatrick	Laxalt	Lehrman	Lott	Lugar	Packwood	Robertson	Rumsfeld	Thompson	Thornburgh
Arthur J. Finkelstein and Associates																									
2/7-10/86[1]	1	8	NA	NA	44	NA	NA	7	1	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	5	4	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
3/7-10[1]	2	5	NA	NA	51	NA	NA	7	x	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	6	3	*	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
4/4-7[1]	2	10	NA	NA	38	NA	NA	9	0	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	10	5	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
5/4-7[1]	2	8	NA	NA	40	NA	NA	9	*	NA	NA	NA	1	NA	7	3	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
5/30-6/2[1]	2	5	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	7	0	NA	NA	2	0	NA	7	4	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
7/3-6[1]	1	8	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	9	0	NA	NA	1	0	NA	7	2	*	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
8/7-13[1]	0	4	NA	NA	42	NA	NA	9	0	NA	NA	2	2	NA	7	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
9/1-5[1]	0	8	NA	NA	38	NA	NA	9	1	NA	NA	5	1	NA	8	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
10/4-6[1]	1	8	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	11	2	NA	NA	4	1	NA	4	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
1/19-27/87[1]	0	5	NA	NA	39	NA	NA	12	1	NA	NA	6	1	NA	7	2	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
4/2[1]	NA	NA	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	20	1	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	9	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
6/19-22[1]	NA	NA	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	16	2	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	8	3	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
Gallup (1985 and 1986, first and second choices combined; 1987, first choice only.)																									
6/7-10/85[1]	NA	22	5	2	53	2	5	18	NA	NA	x	NA	4	2	10	9	2	2	x	1	1	NA	NA	3	3
4/11-14/86[1]	NA	17	4	1	51	2	2	21	1	NA	x	8	3	1	10	7	2	x	x	3	1	6	1	3	2
7/11-14[2]	‡	12	‡	‡	53	‡	3	16	‡	NA	NA	10	3	9	9	‡	‡	NA	NA	‡	‡	8	‡	‡	4
10/24-27[2]	‡	14	3	‡	57	‡	4	20	‡	NA	NA	9	4	‡	12	6	‡	NA	NA	3	‡	8	‡	‡	‡
1/16-19/87[2]	2	6	1	NA	34	NA	NA	15	1	NA	NA	4	NA	4	6	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	1	1	NA
4/10-13[2]	NA	NA	NA	NA	34	NA	NA	18	2	NA	NA	7	NA	2	9	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
6/8-14[2]	NA	NA	NA	NA	39	NA	NA	21	2	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	8	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
7/10-13[2]	NA	NA	NA	NA	40	NA	NA	18	3	NA	NA	7	NA	NA	10	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
Harris (1985 is first and second choice combined. 1986 and 1987 are first choice only.)																									
4/1-3/85[1]	NA	16	NA	NA	44	NA	1	11	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	1	9	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4/1-3[2]	NA	17	NA	NA	38	NA	2	12	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	2	9	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
2/22-3/3/86[1]	NA	13	NA	NA	31	NA	NA	18	NA	NA	NA	9	2	3	5	4	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
2/22-3/3[2]	NA	16	NA	NA	29	NA	NA	15	NA	NA	NA	8	3	3	6	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
10/29-11/1[2]	NA	9	NA	NA	38	NA	NA	15	1	NA	NA	6	NA	1	9	2	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	0	NA	NA
1/9-18/87[2]	NA	12	NA	NA	29	NA	NA	20	2	NA	NA	5	NA	3	7	5	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	1	NA	NA
1/9-18[1]	NA	9	NA	NA	38	NA	NA	20	2	NA	NA	5	NA	3	7	4	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	*	NA	NA
4/10-15 and 5/8-12[15]	NA	NA	NA	NA	31	NA	NA	27	2	NA	NA	9	NA	3	13	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
Los Angeles Times																									
2/20-25/86[1]	NA	8	NA	NA	39	NA	NA	5	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	0	NA	NA
2/20-23/87[1]	NA	10	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	13	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	4	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
5/7-8[11]	NA	NA	NA	NA	27	NA	NA	27	2	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	12	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
5/29-6/1[11]	NA	NA	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	22	2	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	8	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
ABC News/*Washington Post*																									
2/6-12/86[2]	NA	12	NA	NA	42	NA	NA	13	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	10	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	1	NA	NA
5/15-19[2]	NA	14	NA	NA	58	NA	NA	12	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	5	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
1/15-19/87[2]	NA	13	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	20	3	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
3/5-9[3]	NA	NA	NA	NA	42	NA	NA	30	2	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
5/28-6/1[2]	NA	NA	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	28	3	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	11	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	NA	NA	NA
Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time*																									
5/20-22/86[2]	NA	8	NA	NA	51	NA	NA	13	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	4	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
1/5-7/87[2]	NA	7	NA	NA	40	1	NA	20	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
5/7[2]	NA	NA	NA	NA	30	NA	NA	23	3	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	7	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
CBS News/*New York Times*																									
11/4/86[1]	NA	9	NA	NA	34	NA	NA	14	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
11/4/86[2]	NA	9	NA	NA	28	NA	NA	13	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	8	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
1/18-21/87[7]	NA	9	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	15	1	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	0	NA	NA
3/28-29[7]	NA	NA	NA	NA	33	NA	NA	19	1	NA	NA	7	NA	NA	5	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	0	NA	NA
5/5-7[7]	NA	NA	NA	NA	41	NA	NA	18	2	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	9	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
5/11-14[7]	NA	NA	NA	NA	35	NA	NA	19	2	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	8	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA
7/21-22[7]	NA	NA	NA	NA	34	NA	NA	23	6	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	10	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	NA

(Expressed in percentages)	Armstrong	H. Baker	J. Baker	Brock	Bush	Domenici	E. Dole	R. Dole	du Pont	Ford	Gingrich	Haig	Helms	Kean	Kemp	Kirkpatrick	Laxalt	Lehrman	Lott	Lugar	Packwood	Robertson	Rumsfeld	Thompson	Thornburgh
NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*																									
8/11-12/86[3]	NA	5	NA	NA	43	NA	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
1/22-23/87[8]	NA	9	NA	NA	32	NA	NA	17	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
3/15-17[8]	NA	NA	NA	NA	28	NA	NA	23	3	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
4/12-14[7]	NA	NA	NA	NA	31	NA	NA	25	2	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	12	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
5/6[8]	NA	NA	NA	NA	27	NA	NA	20	2	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	10	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
5/18-19[8]	NA	NA	NA	NA	30	NA	NA	20	2	NA	NA	6	NA	NA	9	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
Roper Organization for *U.S. News & World Report* and Cable News Network																									
12/9-11/86[1]	NA	12	NA	NA	29	NA	NA	20	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	NA	NA	NA
12/9-11[2]	NA	13	NA	NA	25	NA	NA	20	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	11	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
Gordon S. Black Corporation for *USA Today*																									
5/7-8/87[11]	NA	NA	NA	NA	24	NA	NA	4	4	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	4	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	NA
Cambridge Reports, Inc. for the Cook Political Report and Government Research Corporation																									
5/16-6/1/87[8]	NA	NA	NA	NA	40	NA	NA	23	1	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	8	NA	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
***Des Moines Register and Tribune Company*, "Iowa Poll"**																									
5/1-13/86[4]	NA	14	NA	NA	34	NA	NA	16	0	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	5	1	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	0	NA	NA
12/8-16[6]	NA	13	NA	NA	25	NA	1	28	1	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	8	3	2	NA	NA	NA	NA	4	1	NA	NA
1/26-2/4/87[1]	NA	10	NA	NA	28	NA	NA	33	2	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	0	NA	NA
4/20-29[1]	NA	NA	NA	NA	40	NA	NA	33	1	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	7	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	NA
KRC Research for WBZ-TV/*Boston Herald* in Iowa																									
4/21-27/87[12]	NA	NA	NA	NA	32	NA	NA	25	1	NA	NA	7	NA	NA	10	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA
WMUR-TV/University of New Hampshire poll (First choice)																									
1/24-2/1/87[2]	NA	9	NA	NA	40	NA	NA	14	2	NA	NA	3	NA	0	7	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	0	NA
4/30-5/4[3]	NA	NA	NA	NA	46	NA	NA	20	4	NA	NA	7	NA	NA	8	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
KRC Research for WBZ-TV/*Boston Herald* in New Hampshire																									
4/21-27/87[9]	NA	NA	NA	NA	45	NA	NA	16	2	NA	NA	5	NA	NA	7	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	NA	NA	NA
Orren/Lemieux for *Boston Globe* in New Hampshire																									
3/19-27/87[2]	NA	NA	NA	NA	49	NA	NA	12	1	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	8	NA	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	2	0	NA	NA
Roper Organization for *Atlanta Constitution*/*Atlanta Journal* in 12 Southern states																									
2/27-3/8/87[10]	NA	21	NA	NA	36	NA	NA	18	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	3	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	8	NA	NA	NA
2/27-3/8[10]	NA	NA	NA	NA	53	NA	NA	17	1	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	10	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	9	NA	NA	NA

Note: 1=Self-described Republicans; 2=Republicans and Independents; 3=Registered and Leaning Republicans; 4=Adults in Iowa; 5=Adult voters in Michigan; 6=Registered Iowa Republicans; 7=Republican primary voters; 8=Republican and Republican-leaning likely voters; 9=Republican likely voters in New Hampshire; 10=Likely Republican primary voters in 12 Southern states; 11=Registered Republicans; 12=Potential Republican caucus participants in Iowa; 13=Adults of all parties in Missouri; 14=Adult Republicans in Maricopa County, Arizona; 15=Republican and Independent voters; 16=Adults in Minnesota; 17=Adults in Kansas; 18=Republicans in Maryland; 19=Republicans in Utah; *=Less than 0.5%; x=Less than 1%; ‡=2% or less.

Footnotes refer to polls (many of which are not shown here) from the Public Opinion Campaign '88 file.

Graham Hueber, Assistant Editor of *Public Opinion*, compiles and maintains this list. Space does not permit publication of all the other state polls he has collected. They are available upon request.

REAGAN AND HIS PREDECESSORS

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as president?

Approval

	Truman (4/45)	Eisenhower (1/53)	Kennedy (1/61)	Johnson (11/63)	Nixon (1/69)	Ford (8/74)	Carter (1/77)	Reagan (1/81)
Month took office	—	—	—	—	59%	71%	—	51%
After 1st month	—	68%	—	79%	61	50	71%	55
After 2nd month	—	59	73%	80	63	55	72	60
After 3rd month	87%	74	83	75	61	48	63	67
After 4th month	—	74	76	73	65	42	64	68
After 5th month	—	—	74	77	63	39	63	58
After 6th month	—	71	71	75	65	39	67	60
After 7th month	75	—	73	74	62	37	66	60
After 8th month	—	75	75	—	58	39	59	52
After 9th month	—	65	76	—	56	51	51	56
After 10th month	63	—	77	—	68	52	56	54
After 11th month	—	60	78	—	59	—	57	49
After 12th month	50	68	77	69	61	46	52	47
After 13th month	—	71	78	69	56	47	50	47
After 14th month	—	68	79	71	53	44	48	46
After 15th month	43	—	77	—	56	41	41	44
After 16th month	—	64	73	69	59	39	43	45
After 17th month	—	61	71	67	55	46	42	44
After 18th month	32	—	69	64	55	48	39	41
After 19th month	—	71	66	70	56	50	43	42
After 20th month	—	65	67	69	—	48	48	42
After 21st month	35	64	62	65	58	47	49	42
After 22nd month	48	57	—	65	57	45	50	43
After 23rd month	60	63	74	63	52	—	51	41
After 24th month	—	69	76	64	56	—	43	35
After 25th month	—	71	70	63	50	—	37	40
After 26th month	54	66	67	61	50	—	42	41
After 27th month	—	68	66	56	50	—	40	41
After 28th month	—	69	64	57	49	53	32	46
After 29th month	55	—	61	54	48	—	29	47
After 30th month	—	72	61	51	50	—	29	42
After 31st month	—	71	63	48	49	—	32	43
After 32nd month	—	—	56	56	—	—	30	48
After 33rd month	—	—	58	47	52	—	31	46
After 34th month	—	77	58	46	49	—	38	53
After 35th month	—	75	—	44	50	—	54	54
After 36th month	36	77	—	49	50	—	58	55
After 37th month	—	76	—	44	52	—	55	55
After 38th month	39	72	—	46	53	—	39	54
After 39th month	—	69	—	45	—	—	39	52
After 40th month	—	—	—	45	62	—	38	54
After 41st month	—	—	—	49	57	—	31	54
After 42nd month	—	69	—	45	—	—	21	52
After 43rd month	—	67	—	51	—	—	32	54
After 44th month	—	—	—	47	—	—	—	57
After 45th month	69	—	—	39	—	—	—	58
After 46th month	—	75	—	38	62	—	—	61
After 47th month	57	79	—	38	59	—	34	59
After 48th month	—	73	—	42	67	—	—	64
After 49th month	—	72	—	46	65	—	—	60
After 50th month	57	72	—	49	—	—	—	56
After 51st month	—	67	—	41	48	—	—	52
After 52nd month	—	62	—	—	44	—	—	55



	Truman	Eisenhower	Kennedy	Johnson	Nixon	Ford	Carter	Reagan
After 53rd month	51	—	—	50	44	—	—	58
After 54th month	—	63	—	41	39	—	—	63
After 55th month	—	—	—	43	36	—	—	65
After 56th month	—	59	—	40	33	—	—	60
After 57th month	45	57	—	35	27	—	—	63
After 58th month	—	—	—	—	27	—	—	65
After 59th month	—	—	—	42	29	—	—	63
After 60th month	—	58	—	43	26	—	—	64
After 61st month	37	54	—	44	27	—	—	—
After 62nd month	37	50	—	59	26	—	—	63
After 63rd month	46	54	—	—	26	—	—	62
After 64th month	43	53	—	—	26	—	—	68
After 65th month	—	54	—	—	25	—	—	64
After 66th month	39	52	—	—	24	—	—	63
After 67th month	—	56	—	—	24	—	—	—
After 68th month	—	54	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 69th month	36	58	—	—	—	—	—	63
After 70th month	26	52	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 71st month	—	57	—	—	—	—	—	48
After 72nd month	28	57	—	—	—	—	—	49
After 73rd month	24	59	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 74th month	25	58	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 75th month	29	62	—	—	—	—	—	49
After 76th month	31	60	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 77th month	32	60	—	—	—	—	—	53
After 78th month	29	61	—	—	—	—	—	51
After 79th month	23	66	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 80th month	—	66	—	—	—	—	—	—
After 81st month	25	66	—	—	—	—	—	—

Note: In months in which more than one approval poll was conducted, the last results of the month are presented.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 10-12, 1987.

THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN 1988

by John R. Petrocik and Frederick T. Steeper

Our political landscape is not created anew with each election, though every four years an effort is made to make it seem so. Political pundits have found that describing the electorate in new ways adds a certain cachet to their profession. They are aided and abetted in this endeavor by the press, always an eager consumer and dispenser of the new. It's not a case of making things up, but of making too much of things. The 1980s have already produced working women, baby boomers, the religious right, Yuppies, Buppies (black urban professionals), and new collars—all described as new and important forces that have the potential to shift the political earth in 1988.

This analysis isn't concerned with potential. We will describe the emergence of three social divisions that *already* influence the voters: income, religiosity, and one's occupational ties to government programs. These divisions are less colorful than Yuppies and new collars, but they have profoundly changed the electorate that awaits the candidates in 1988. Novelty is not their hallmark. Income, for example, has always had some relationship to party preference and vote. The significant fact about these three categories is that they are more politically consequential today than they were a decade ago.

Plus Ça Change...?

Voting in 1988 will still differ by religion, region, race, and union membership—as it has since the New Deal party system emerged—but not as sharply as it once did.[1] Of the five core groups that comprise the New Deal coalition, only blacks show no evidence of weakening their Democratic partisanship (see table 1).[2] Indeed, blacks are more lopsidedly Democratic today than they were in the 1950s. Other groups have changed, some dramatically. Jews, for example, are less Democratic than twenty-five years ago although they remain uniquely liberal on many national issues. White southerners may have aligned with the Republicans, Catholics do not appear to be aligned with either party, and union members maintain only a semblance of their past Democratic partisanship. There are several ways to explain these changes, but we believe that the trends in table 1 reflect the declining partisan significance of union membership, Catholicism, and the South in favor of other divisions. Moreover, these new fault lines are not merely empirical; they have been triggered or intensified by the policies and symbolism of the Reagan presidency.

Table 1

PARTISANSHIP OF NEW DEAL GROUPS, 1952-1986

	1952-1960	1964-1968	1972-1976	1980	1984	1986
WASPs	28	18	20	15	26	26
White southerners	-48	-36	-20	-21	-2	18
Catholics	-32	-34	-33	-18	-9	0
Union members	-30	-37	-30	-22	-16	-7
Jews	-59	-68	-58	-76	-53	-35
Blacks	-37	-74	-74	-73	-67	-75

Note: Numbers Republican percentage minus Democratic percentage. Among WASPs in 1986, for example, Republicans enjoy a 26 percentage point edge.

Taxes and Spending

Reagan arrived in Washington convinced of the need to get the government off people's backs and to put more reliance on individual initiative and voluntarism.

Tax cuts, deregulation, and the shrinkage of many welfare programs were high on Reagan's agenda. The electorate responded swiftly. By early 1982 a clear majority found the Republicans not only less likely to "tax and spend," but also more likely to help the rich and less likely to aid the poor. As these perceptions spread through the electorate, party preference took on a status bias.

Historically class divisions in America have been weak. Nevertheless there has always been a relationship between class and partisanship. What is striking today is its magnitude and the preeminence of income among the various measures of socioeconomic status. While income, education, and occupation used to be roughly comparable measures of social status, that is no longer the case. Family income now stands out for the strength and consistency of its relationship to partisanship.[3]

In the 1950s and 1960s the poorer one-third of the white electorate was no more Democratic than the middle class, and upper-income voters were as likely to be Democrats as Republicans. Income had less to do with party preference than race, religion, union membership, or region. In the 1970s a stronger relationship between income and partisanship began to develop. It became visible by 1980 and continued through 1986 (see table 2). By 1986 upscale white voters shifted from being a marginally Democratic to a clearly Republican constituency; middle-class voters moved from an average 17 percentage point Democratic plurality to a 14 percent Republican plurality in 1986. In concert with a shift to the Republicans across all income levels, even lower-income voters became less Democratic. Even so the polarization of partisanship by income has become much greater.

Table 2

PARTISANSHIP OF INCOME GROUPS, 1952-1986

	1952-1960	1964-1968	1972-1976	1980	1984	1986
By income:						
Lower	-16	-25	-20	-25	-12	-6
Middle	-17	-23	-16	-7	0	14
Upper	-3	-5	6	15	20	25

The effect of income on the partisanship of three of the New Deal groups can be seen in table 3. The partisan consequences of income for union households and Catholics are significant, but they pale in comparison with income's effect on white southerners. When the New Deal Coalition was in its prime, most southerners were Democrats, and affluent southerners tended to be even more Democratic than their poorer neighbors. By the 1970s upper-income southerners were still Democratic but much less so than their less

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"Good day, sir. These gentlemen and I are representative of an entirely new breed of Republican, and we want to give you a lot of money, just for the hell of it."

• •

Drawing by Weber. © 1982 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

Table 3

PARTISANSHIP OF NEW DEAL GROUPS BY INCOME, 1986

	WASPs	Catholics	Union members	White southerners
By income:				
Lower	3	-31	-26	-16
Middle	31	-2	-18	25
Upper	37	17	12	31

well-off counterparts. The upper-income third of the South turned Republican in 1980 (a small 8 percent GOP plurality) and finally approached the northern norm in 1986 (31 percentage point GOP plurality). Changes among middle-class white southerners are more recent and perhaps more tenuous, but they are equally significant. Among middle-class white southerners, the Democrats enjoyed a 40 point plurality through 1968. It declined to a bare 5 point Democratic lead in 1984 and was transformed into a 22 point Republican plurality by 1986.

Clearly income-related differences eroded the Democratic loyalties of Catholics, union members, and white southerners, but the effect has not been the same for each group. Catholics and union members have been more resistant than southerners to the Republican effect of increased income. In 1986 white southerners turned Republican when their family incomes exceeded $15,000; Catholics and union members remained Democratic until their incomes surpassed $20,000 and $25,000, respectively. The increasing importance of income as a predictor of political preference is more impressive than the differences among the groups described above.

Public Sector Ties

Getting the government off people's backs was not appreciated by civil servants or others who are involved in the programs at which Reagan appeared to take aim. Government employees and those whose employment was linked to government programs* were sharply anti-Reagan and anti-Republican throughout the 1981-1986 period, almost without regard to their income. If this is not an entirely new phenomenon, it is certainly distinctive for its sharpness during the Reagan years. This group has not been part of the income polarization described above. For this reason, we keep them separate in our income classification of the rest of the electorate.

Saints and Sinners

Reagan and the Republicans didn't neglect the soul as they ministered to the body. While promoting lower taxes and less social spending, Reagan championed traditional morality and showed unabashed enthusiasm for American symbols and institutions: God, family, hard work, patriotism, and optimism about the future marked the Reagan culture. Americans who most cherished these values responded by rallying to the GOP banner. This effect has often been confused with religion itself. Reagan's traditional values and old-fashioned patriotism evoked a particularly strong response among practicing Christians, not because of their manifest religious content (though that played a role), but because conventionally religious Americans are the core of a constituency that believes traditional values and institutions must be revitalized.

The evangelicals and reborn Christians who have supported Reagan since 1980 are an expression of this phenomenon. But fundamentalists represent just one part of a constituency that is particularly sensitive to moral questions. Religiosity, expressed in terms of church attendance, has, as a result, become a determinant of party preference (see table 4). Before 1980 religiosity had little partisan significance. Regular churchgoers were actually slightly less likely to be Republican than occasional churchgoers. In 1980, for the first time, the Democrats did not have a plurality among the regular churchgoers; in 1984 the regular churchgoers provided an 11 percentage point Republican plurality. By 1986 they showed a 22 point Republican plurality. The occasional churchgoers have lagged one election behind the regulars: they displayed a 13 point Democratic plurality in 1980; parity in 1984; and a 14 percentage point Republican plurality in 1986. The non-church attenders have remained Democratic during the 1980s.

Table 4

PARTISANSHIP BY RELIGIOSITY, 1952-1986

	1952-1960	1964-1968	1972-1976	1980	1984	1986
By church attendance:						
Regular	-20	-15	-11	2	11	22
Occasional	-7	-18	-7	-13	1	14
Never	-21	-35	-18	-23	-8	-13

The effect of religiosity on the partisanship of the three New Deal Democratic groups and the historically Republican WASPs can be seen in table 5. As one moves from the secular to the religious voters within each group, the Democrats lose support. The relationship between church attendance and partisanship in

Table 5

PARTISANSHIP OF NEW DEAL GROUPS BY RELIGIOSITY, 1986

	WASPs	Catholics	Union members	White southerners
By church attendance:				
Regular	43	10	-5	25
Occasional	28	0	-4	19
Never	-9	-42	-20	-7

1986 was strongest among the Republicans' core group, northern WASPs. Even so religious polarization appears to have played an important part in weakening the Democrats' hold on their core New Deal supporters.

Coalitions in 1988

When we combine the forces of income and government ties *with* religious attendance, partisan coloration becomes even stronger (see table 6). Both factors are needed to describe the types of voters facing the candidates in 1988.[4]

On one side are the well-off religious and semi-religious voters and the religious middle-income group. We believe they will put a premium on individual responsibility and initiative and assert their absolute sense of right and wrong. They will be critical of intrusions by government either in the form of help they believe is undeserved or protection they believe is unwarranted.

Table 6

PARTISANSHIP OF OCCUPATIONAL/INCOME GROUPS BY RELIGIOSITY, 1986

	Government	By income: Lower	Middle	Upper
By church attendance:				
Regular	17	0	25	49
Occasional	-3	-1	26	30
Never	-26	-26	-15	-7

On the other side are the secular middle- and lower-income voters and those with public sector employment. Either as beneficiaries or benefactors, these groups find the government safety net of vital importance. They would also hesitate to make moral judgments about other groups and would be deeply suspicious of those who, they believe, want to impose one set of values on everyone.

In between are several groups that either are untouched by these forces—the semi-religious middle class—or share an attribute with both of the polarized groups—the religious poor and the secular affluent. The latter people are pulled in different directions in terms of their partisan preferences. How they resolve the conflict will depend on what issues are most important in 1988 and on the nature of the times.

The distribution of the electorate by the new groups resulting from the combination of the income and religiosity forces is given in table 7, along with the partisan tendency of each group based solely on these forces. Adding up the Republican and Democratic cells in the table gives a 47 percent to 25 percent Democratic advantage. But this is a too literal reading of this simplified summary, for reasons that are important to review. A literal reading assumes that the new forces are symmetrical— that the Democratic push from secularism is as strong as the Republican push from traditional values, and that the middle portions of the divisions are truly neutral. In reality, the components within the divisions may be far from symmetrical. Traditional values, for example, may provide twice the Republican push that secularism provides to the Democrats, or a low income may provide twice the Democratic push that a high income provides to the Republicans, and so on. Finally these forces themselves may not be equally important in 1988.

Table 7

PARTISANSHIP BY OCCUPATION/INCOME/RELIGIOSITY, 1986

	Religious (R) (37%)	Semi-religious(—) (40%)	Secular(D) (23%)
Lower income (D) (24%)	R/D 9.2%	D 10.1%	D 5.1%
Middle income (-) (17%)	R 6.8	— 7.0	D 3.1
Upper income (R) (23%)	R 8.7	R 9.6	R/D 4.9
Public Sector (D) (19%)	R/D 7.3	D 7.5	D 3.7
Other (D) (17%)	D* 5.5	D 5.5	D 6.0

Note: How to read this table: (R) = Republican force or cell. (D) = Democratic force or cell. (-) = Neutral force or cell. (R/D) = cell with Republican and Democratic forces acting upon it.

* = Religiosity does not have an effect with this group. Other = blacks, Jews, and Hispanics.

Our elections are no longer mainly contests in which the Democrats attempt to mobilize their traditional sources of support while the Republicans plot ways to ensure major defections. The Republicans now have their own sources of support and can be expected to be successful with them. The parties and candidates in 1988 face a more complex set of partisan divisions in the electorate. If the two parties do choose to put together contrasting coalitions in 1988, we will hear very different views of the country from them, and we will be offered stark choices in policies and programs for the future. ☑

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[1] For a definition of the New Deal groups and a history of recent changes see: John R. Petrocik, *Party Coalitions: Realignments and the Decline of the New Deal Party System* (University of Chicago Press, 1981); John R. Petrocik, "Realignment: New Party Coalitions and the Nationalization of the South," *Journal of Politics* (May 1987); and Frederick T. Steeper and John R. Petrocik, "Ratification of the Reagan Realignment: the 1986 Election," *Election Politics* (Winter 1986-1987).

[2] Partisanship is defined with the standard party identification questions and scale. Each party's "leaners" are included with outright identifiers.

[3] For another analysis of class differences in recent years, see Tom Edsall's *The New Politics of Inequality* (Norton, 1985).

[4] This conclusion is based on a statistical analysis which indicates that the two new forces are about equally important correlates of partisanship. The same analysis also indicates that, while the New Deal typology has declined in importance, it is still significant.

* This is a more diverse group, and thus attitudes vary more.

Note: *Most of the data for this article were supplied by the Inter University Consortium for Social and Political Research. Neither the Consortium nor the original investigators are responsible for the analysis conclusions here. The 1986 data are from two surveys conducted by Market Opinion Research in Detroit, Michigan.*

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Education Reform: We Have a Lot to Learn

by Terry Hartle

Education has been a growth industry for the past half century. In quantitative terms, Americans are getting more schooling than ever before and paying much more for it. Whether we are getting our money's worth is another question. Total spending on education increased from less than $4 billion in 1940 to almost $250 billion today (see table 1). Yet a number of reports in the last five years have criticized educational performance. Proposals to improve education are topic A in campaign speeches, conferences, and classrooms.

Table 1

GETTING MORE EDUCATION AND SPENDING MORE FOR IT

	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1985
Percent of adults with high school diplomas	24.5	34.3	41.1	55.2	68.6	73.9
Percent of adults with college degree	4.6	6.2	7.7	11.0	17.0	19.4
Percent of U.S. population engaged in education (student, teacher, administrator)	23	21	25	30	27	26
Expenditures for elementary secondary education (in billions of $)	3	6	17	43	103	149
Expenditures for higher education (in billions of $)	.6	3	7	25	62	98
Combined math and verbal scores on Scholastic Aptitude Test	—	970	975	948	890	906
Percent of Gross National Product devoted to education	3.5	3.4	4.8	7.1	6.6	6.6

Source: U.S. Department of Education, Census Bureau, Educational Testing Service

Test Results

Measuring education quality is a difficult task. The United States, unlike virtually every other industrialized nation, lacks a commonly accepted instrument for assessing the academic performance of its school children. The most widely used barometer, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), is not intended to be a national yardstick of educational quality, but, for lack of anything better, it is often used in precisely that fashion.

The results from the SAT are undeniably grim: between 1960 and 1980, the average scores on the verbal and math sections fell by 95 points. Since 1980, however, the total scores have risen 16 points, placing them at 1975 levels. No one knows if this slight increase reflects better education of the test takers or simply more widespread use of coaching to help students prepare for the test.

A broader and more appropriate measure, the federally sponsored National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) offers a somewhat more optimistic picture. According to NAEP data, students at ages nine, thirteen, and seventeen read better in 1984 than did students at those ages in 1971. Still, 6 percent of the nine year olds in 1984 could not do rudimentary exercises and were in danger of failing in school. Forty percent of thirteen year olds and 16 percent of seventeen year olds had not acquired "intermediate" reading skills and may have difficulty reading their school assignments. And finally, only 39 percent of seventeen year old students in the 1984 survey were able to perform at a generally acceptable level—what the test's designers called "adept." Very few had advanced skills.

A less flattering view comes from the National Assessment's 1985 effort to measure the literacy skills of adults between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five. NAEP measured skills in three areas: reading prose, reading documents, and calculation. To examine reading skills, participants were asked to read a newspaper column by Tom Wicker and summarize its main argument. Just 21 percent could do so. In reading documents, participants were given a bus schedule and asked to determine when a bus that left from one location would arrive at another. Only 20 percent could. To assess calculations skills, test takers were asked to order two items from a menu, determine the tip and then the change they would receive. Once again, just 20 percent could manage the task.

College graduates (from both two- and four-year schools) did better than the full sample in all three areas. The good news is that about 40 percent of them could understand the newspaper column, decipher the bus schedule, and calculate change. The bad news is that roughly 60 percent could not.

What Do We Know

Most Americans recognize that low or falling test scores mean our students are not learning as much as they should. But these indicators are sterile—how do we interpret a small gain or fall in SAT scores? A clearer picture may emerge by examining student performance on tests of "shared knowledge." Most adults, for example, know who Winston Churchill was or when the American Revolutionary War was fought. In his recent book, *Cultural Literacy*, however, E.D. Hirsch says that "more and more of our young people don't know things we used to assume they knew." Hirsch emphasizes that literacy cannot be understood without reference to a common body of knowledge—what he calls cultural literacy. In Hirsch's words:

> To be truly literate, citizens must be able to grasp the meaning of any piece of writing addressed to the general reader. . . . Books and newspapers assume a "common reader," that is, a person who knows the things known by other literate persons in the culture.

Literacy, Hirsch emphasizes, involves not just being able to decode what is written or observed, but being able to infer meanings not directly stated by the words of a text. Individuals who have little knowledge of culture, history, politics, geography, literature, or science will find themselves at a disadvantage even in reading a newspaper. Conversely, readers with broader knowledge will find it easier to read more complicated material.

Defining precisely the body of knowledge that all literate Americans should share is a difficult, probably impossible task. (Nonetheless, Hirsch and two colleagues have amassed a list of some 6,000 things a culturally literate person should know, including: absolute zero, 1066, Currier and Ives, Wyatt Earp, open shop, Remember Pearl Harbor, x-chromosome, and Zeitgeist.) Measuring how American adults stack up against others in this vein is even more difficult, but we do have evidence that the body of common knowledge shared by young Americans is embarrassingly small.

Some of the evidence is strictly anecdotal. Consider, for example, Ben Stein's description of youthful ignorance among Los Angeles students:

> I have not yet found one single student in Los Angeles, in either college or high school, who could tell me the years when World War II was fought. Nor have I found one who could tell me the years when World War I was fought. Nor have I found one who knew when the American Civil War was fought. . . .
>
> A few have known how many U.S. senators California has, but none has known how many Nevada or Oregon has (Really? Even though they are so small?). Only two could tell me where Chicago is, even in the vaguest terms. My particular favorite geography lesson was the junior at UCLA who thought that Toronto must be in Italy. My second favorite geography lesson is the junior at USC, a pre-law student, who thought that Washington, D.C. was in Washington State. . .

Beyond the anecdotal material, there is also some evidence to suggest that students are not accumulating as much factual knowledge as we might like them to. Much of it comes from the social sciences and the humanities—from achievement-oriented tests designed to measure knowledge or mastery of a concrete body of knowledge rather than aptitude tests like the SAT. In 1981-1982 the National Assessment of Educational Progress sought to measure young Americans' knowledge of citizenship and social studies. The analysis found that 80 percent realized they would be able to vote at age eighteen. But just 30 percent knew that a president cannot declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. Only half realized that the world's population grows in an exponential fashion. Sixty percent knew that a person could not be tried twice for the same crime. A mere 20 percent understood the significance of the Supreme Court's ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education*.

Geography is another area where young adults are conspicuously weak. In 1986, a Washington, D.C. television station gave 500 city and suburban high school students a geography quiz. Over a quarter—26 percent of the students—could *not* locate the United States on a world map. Fourteen percent did not know which country lay north of the United States. One student guessed Delaware. In a 1983 test given to students at the University of Miami, 55 percent could not find Chicago on a map, 42 percent missed London, and, believe it or not, 9 percent could not locate Miami.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of geographic ignorance comes from a study done by Richard Kopec of the University of North Carolina. Kopec gave a questionnaire to 2,200 North Carolina college students. For comparison, the study used many questions from a nationwide survey conducted in December 1950 by the *New York Times*. The results are not strictly comparable because different samples were used, but still the results are startling. On only three of the questions did today's college students outperform their parents' generation. On other questions the earlier generation averaged twenty-four points higher (see table 2).

Table 2

Questions	Percent Answering Correctly 1950 National Sample	 1984 North Carolina Sample
What is the approximate population of the U.S.	46%	8%
Name the 5 Great Lakes	46	12
List, in order of size, the four oceans of the world	26	20
In what country are these cities located:		
Lisbon	62	17
Dublin	82	53
Budapest	61	24
Manila	84	27
Munich	82	49
Capetown	72	23
What 3 European countries still have dependencies in the Caribbean area?	40	14
In what country are the following rivers found:		
Seine	72	34
Amazon	78	27
Ob	30	6
In what state is the Grand Canyon?	39	41

In reporting the 1950 results, the *New York Times* noted "American college students know shockingly little about the geography of their country. They know even less about the world. American or world geography is a forgotten subject." The 1984 results do not suggest that we are making much progress.

A more comprehensive analysis of a student's factual knowledge comes from the Foundations of Literacy project, which asked seventeen year olds specific questions about history and literature. The results, as reported by Diane Ravitch and Chester E. Finn, Jr., in *What Do Our Seventeen Year Olds Know?* (Harper and Row, forthcoming), are dismal. Three-fourths of the high school seniors can't identify the names "Walt Whitman" or "Henry David Thoreau" or the term "Reconstruction." Two-thirds can't date the Civil War within fifty years. Half are equally uncertain about World War I and do not recognize Joseph Stalin.

Explanations for the Problem

The most important explanation for these disturbing results may be the general thrust of education policy in the twentieth century. The progressive education movement, built largely on the writings of John Dewey, focused on the child-centered school and a distrust of "bookish" learning. More specifically, as Diane Ravitch notes in *The Troubled Crusade*, Dewey rejected the lockstep practices—the uniformity of curriculum, the stress on passivity, the reliance on rote memorization and drill—that characterized the public schools in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In their place, schools were to emphasize experiences and activities that would lead the student to higher levels of cultural, social, and intellectual meaning.

This view of education became embodied in many schools throughout the middle years of the twentieth century. In 1956 Harvard University president James Conant wrote *The American High School Today*, which urged the development of the comprehensive high school. Conant rejected uniform standards, and argued that high school should have "programs that correspond to the educational needs of *all* the youths in the community." Good high schools, he said, had three tasks: to provide a good education for *all* the pupils, to offer non-college-bound students good nonacademic courses, and to provide academically talented students with advanced courses.

In the 1960s educators began to take an even more benign view of specific standards. Widespread concern about the inability of disadvantaged students to succeed in the classroom and the commonplace view that schooling should be "relevant" led educators to abandon what standards remained. Agreement about the focus of secondary school education and the demands that should be placed on students became impossible. Not surprisingly, the academic performance of secondary school students fell steadily.

By the 1970s secondary schools had become institutions of incredible diversity. One recent report concluded that "the word 'curriculum' does not do justice to the astonishing number of courses that are available." Many schools offer academic courses as well as courses in sports, hobbies, and even a services curriculum. Most of the offerings can be for academic credit.

Remedies

It's hard to swim against the tide of fifty years of educational philosophy and social policy. Schools of thought that have dominated educational policy may be more difficult to change than students' thoughts in schools. Entrenched educational bureaucracies and interest groups respond slowly. False choices are often presented to frustrate reformers. Ravitch and Finn note, for example, that too often debates over the schools are posed as a "concepts or facts" dichotomy. Do concepts matter more than facts, as many educators argue? Memorizing facts simply to obtain factual knowledge is an empty exercise. But studying concepts without knowledge of specific situations in which the concepts can be tested is an equally empty undertaking. Ravitch and Finn argue that the two must be blended, that it is not necessary to choose between them.

True enough. But how do we move from such general agreement to more specific actions to ensure that students have some knowledge about both facts and concepts? Ravitch and Finn offer a concrete set of recommendations: greater emphasis on history and literature in the schools, better instructional materials, more literature and history experts as teachers, and better ties between schools and libraries and museums and higher education institutions. Hirsch offers a more general (and ambitious) list: teach reading by relying more on factual information and traditional lore, have educators and publishers reach an accord about the contents of the national vocabulary and a good sequence for presenting it, and develop a model grade-by-grade sequence of core information.

Both sets of recommendations are complicated and will be difficult to implement. But the bottom line is simple: Americans get the schools they want, whether or not they are the schools they deserve. Unlike many foreign countries where a national curriculum can be set by the national government, local school systems in the United States have traditionally had great flexibility to offer the courses they want in the sequence they choose. If the schools give equal weight to advanced mathematics and driver's education, it's because the local citizens want them to do so or aren't paying attention. The citizens can change that.

The recent education reform movement in the United States has, in most states, focused on tightening the curriculum and academic standards. Almost every state requires more academic coursework now than it did five years ago. Still, states can only do so much. They can mandate education reforms, but local school systems must put them in place. Education policy specialists are divided about local schools' ability to meet ambitious new targets.

But about one thing there is no dispute: as a result of these reforms, Americans will be buying more education than ever before. Whether they will get more for the increased investment remains to be seen. ☑

Terry W. Hartle, formerly a resident fellow and director of social policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, is the chief education adviser to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.



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Left Turn in Canada?

by Thomas S. Axworthy

What on earth is going on in Canada? Is it possible that the Conservative party, which won 50 percent of the vote and the greatest number of seats in Canadian history in the 1984 federal election, might finish third in the next? Could it be that the Liberal party—so dominant for so many generations that commentators wearily referred to it as the "national governing party"—might be on the road to oblivion? Most stunning, is there a chance that the social democratic New Democratic Party (NDP), traditionally a minority party of regional protest, might actually form the next government of Canada? The answer to all the above is—yes.

On July 20, 1987, an NDP sweep of three federal by-elections in Newfoundland, Ontario, and the Yukon confirmed what public opinion polls have been forecasting since the spring: the NDP is now the most popular political movement in Canada. A Gallup poll taken prior to the by-elections showed that 41 percent of voters who had made up their minds favored the NDP, compared to 35 percent for the Liberals and only 23 percent for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's Conservatives. The NDP went on to gain two seats from the Conservatives and hold on to one of their own. The NDP won 44.8 percent of the combined vote, contrasted with 28.3 percent for the Liberals and 25.7 percent for the Conservatives. Canada may be on the verge of a historic political realignment.

The Post-Trudeau Era

To understand the extreme volatility of Canadian politics, with one party surging ahead only to be replaced by another six months later, one must start with Pierre Trudeau. For sixteen years as prime minister of Canada, Trudeau dominated his political generation as thoroughly as Franklin Roosevelt did the depression era of the United States. But the coalition Trudeau brought together could not survive his absence. The recent turmoil in Canada is the inevitable result of his departure in 1984.

Like Roosevelt's New Deal, the Trudeau coalition was composed of a curious amalgam of diverse elements. Quebec, long a Liberal fortress, became even more so under Trudeau. In his last election in 1980, for example, the Liberal party won 68 percent of the vote in that province, taking seventy-four of seventy-five seats. With Quebec alone providing half the seats required for a majority government, the Trudeau Liberals needed only a three-way split in English-speaking Canada with their Conservative and NDP competitors to win election after election.

In addition to appealing to Quebec as a native son, Trudeau transformed his party by attracting an almost classic social democratic core of ethnic supporters, women, the young, and the disadvantaged. He advocated extension of the welfare state, an activist national government, anti-nuclear military policies, promotion of a Canadian Bill of Rights, and a series of measures to encourage greater Canadian ownership of the economy. All this helped make the Liberals a powerful electoral force. Even though such policies led the affluent, especially members of the business community, to desert the Liberal party in droves by the mid-1980s, Trudeau had strengthened the Liberals and weakened the NDP.

Since 1984 the subterranean theme of Canadian politics has been the dissolution of the Trudeau coalition. The Conservative party, led for the first time by a Quebecer, Brian Mulroney, attacked one pillar of Liberal support by winning fifty-eight Quebec seats in the 1984 election. The New Democrats, led by Edward Broadbent, are now assaulting the second bastion of Liberal strength by taking away the social democratic base. Like the Roman Empire, the Liberal party in the era of Trudeau seemed to be impregnable, but, as in Rome's fall, what is truly remarkable is the speed of the collapse once its outer defenses were breached.

The Tory Plunge

On September 4, 1984, after sixteen years of Trudeau's stormy leadership, Canadians voted for a change. The new Conservative leader, Brian Mulroney, won 211 seats—Canada's greatest election victory. But the Tories collapsed just as quickly as they rose. Table 1 demonstrates the rapidity of the Conservative decline. It took the Liberals only a little over a year to surpass the government in popularity and a year longer for the NDP to push the Conservatives to third place. With the Liberals stalling early in the new year, the NDP made

Table 1

CANADIAN CANDIDATE PREFERENCES

Question: If a federal election were held today, which party's candidate do you think you would favor?

	Progressive Conservative	Liberal	NDP	Other
Election Results (Sept. 4, 1984)	50%	28%	19%	3%
Dec. 5-7, 1985	37	38	24	1
Dec. 3-6, 1986	30	45	25	1
Jan. 7-10, 1987	28	41	30	1
June 3-6, 1987	24	39	35	2
July 8-11, 1987	23	35	41	1

Source: Gallup Canada, Inc.

its move. Halfway through Mulroney's first term, the message of the July 1987 elections was, in the words of a jubilant Newfoundlander, "Brian, pack your bags!"

Lack of esteem for Prime Minister Mulroney is the principal source of the Tory decline: Canadians agree with many Conservative positions on the issues, and the economy has generally performed well under the new government. Three factors weaken Mulroney's appeal: two are self-inflicted wounds and the third results from bad luck.

First, the Conservatives threw away their first year and a half in office. Unlike Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher, Mulroney did not come to office with a coherent plan. The finance minister was forced to retreat on his plan to cut old-age pensions, the statements of the external affairs minister were often contradicted by the prime minister, and the contract system for government procurement was warped to fit regional political needs. By their second year in office, the Tories had set an agenda—tax reform, free trade with the United States, decentralization of power to the provinces—but Mulroney's image as an indecisive wheeler-dealer was fixed in the public's mind.

These initial Tory stumbles can be explained by inexperience, but not so the second main difficulty: the Conservatives have flagrantly broken with one of their main election themes of 1984. The Conservatives had attacked Liberals for excessive patronage and favors to their friends, and Mulroney had dramatically emphasized the point in a televison debate. But soon after taking office, a series of scandals overwhelmed the government: the minister of small business resigned over allegations of improper real estate deals, the minister of industry resigned over allegations of conflict of interest, and a Conservative member of Parliament was charged with influence peddling. The list goes on. Venality was added to the image of indecison.

Third, Mr. Mulroney had consistently been embarrassed by a protectionist United States Congress. A former CEO of Iron Ore of Canada, a Canadian subdivision of Hanna Mining of Cleveland, Mr. Mulroney came to office determined to give "the benefit of the doubt to the United States." Relegated to the back sections of the business news in the American media, U.S. countervailing duties against Canadian imports of fish, steel, and timber have been front-page sensations in Canada. A June 1987 survey by Goldfarb Consultants reveals that 61 percent of Canadians believe that Mulroney's government has not been tough enough in its dealings with the United States. An image of subservience only adds to the Mulroney government woes. Ironically, U.S. trade policy may be a large factor in defeating the most pro-American prime minister in Canadian history.

Liberals in Limbo

John Turner, a former finance minister in the Trudeau government, won the leadership of the Liberal party in June 1984 and promptly called the election that proved the party's undoing. Turner had resigned in 1975 to practice corporate law in Toronto, and his return in 1984 was hailed by many in his party who had never been reconciled to Trudeau activism.

Turner's attempt to distance himself from the Trudeau heritage failed. The disaffected business class from which Turner sprang voted Conservative, and the effort to repudiate the past merely upset the traditional supporters of the party. The NDP made corresponding gains.

Division haunts the Liberal party. The leader leans toward the right, but his parliamentary caucus continually hauls him toward the left. Confusion reigns. Turner's leadership was confirmed by his party in a convincing fashion in November 1986, but he has a major task in developing a credible policy consensus. Meanwhile, like Mulroney's, his personal reputation suffers.

NDP Ascendant

In March 1984 surviving, not governing, was the goal of the NDP. With only 11 percent support in the polls at the time, there was a real chance that the party would fail to win the twelve seats needed to qualify for party status in the House of Commons. What a difference three years make!

The Liberals' choice of John Turner gave NDP leader Edward Broadbent his opening. Painting Mulroney and Turner as two conservative peas in a pod, Broadbent won 19 percent of the vote in the 1984 election. Since that date, he has followed a consistent

Table 2

IMPRESSIONS OF CANADIAN CANDIDATES

Question: Overall, would you say you are impressed, a little impressed, or not at all impressed with. . .

	Mulroney	Turner	Broadbent
Impressed	18%	25%	50%
A little impressed	26	26	21
Not impressed at all	53	44	22

Source: Goldfarb Consultants, June 1987 strategy of taking advantage of his opponents' mistakes while avoiding radical pronouncements. The center of the road is getting very crowded in Canada.

Broadbent's strengths are the converse of his opponents' weaknesses: never having held office, he appears more virtuous than Mulroney; heir to a social democratic tradition, he appears more consistent than Turner. Table 2 shows Broadbent's dominance in the leadership stakes.

Born in the Depression Prairies—the most devastated areas—the NDP has always had a base in Canada's West and with the Canadian labor movement. The party's dizzying success of late is largely due to a breakthrough in Quebec: voters there left their Liberal roots in 1984 to vote for a Conservative native son. The public is disappointed with Brian Mulroney, and the polls show that the NDP is the preeminent party in Quebec. But the social democrats have no organization in Quebec; will they be able to translate support in the polls into votes at the ballot box? That answer will determine the future of Canadian politics.

The NDP constellation also revolves around the sun of Edward Broadbent. It is Broadbent's personal dominance in comparison to Mulroney and Turner that is responsible for the NDP rise. Canadians have not suddenly become socialists: they are simply disappointed with the current leadership choice. Several NDP policy positions are anathema to Canadians. The party favors a Canadian withdrawal from NATO and NORAD, for example. But according to a May 1986 Gallup poll, by a margin of two to one, many Canadians disagree with this proposal (56 percent opposed to 25 percent in favor.)

It may be that the NDP has peaked too soon. Prime Minister Mulroney does not have to call an election until the fall of 1989, and with time to examine the NDP platform, many Canadians may develop doubts. Should either the Liberals or the Conservatives clearly emerge as the free enterprise alternative to the NDP, the next election will be a referendum on socialism. The NDP will have difficulty winning such a contest.

Continuing political instability is the most likely prospect. The Conservatives could lose 100 seats but still be the largest party in Parliament. The Liberals have enough of a tradition in Quebec to regain the affections of that province. And although the NDP may not maintain its predominant position, it will certainly do very well. My bet is that the next election will produce a hung Parliament with each of the parties having between 70 and 100 seats.

Canada is a nation of minorities: perhaps it is only fitting that it should have a Parliament of minorities, too. ☑

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Shapiro

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Bork's opponents and the Democratic party generally during the Senate hearings.

The Democrats' Dilemma

Robert Bork is not Ollie North, but he may well create the North effect. Having been vilified as a rigid conservative ideologue opposed to freedom of choice, freedom of speech, and racial equality, he is going to appear at the hearings as a man of complex judicial philosophy whose substantive views on constitutional questions are a mixture of positions normally labeled conservative and liberal, and who has changed his mind or modified his positions from time to time. Challenged about "framers' intent," he is going to reply that judges ought to pay attention to the words of the Constitution, not invent them as they go along, but that some flexible and broad interpretation of those words is necessary and proper. Above all, challenged on abortion, school prayer, and other such questions, he is going to respond that his personal views are not really so important. What he believes as a judge, he will say, is that democratically elected legislatures, not appointed courts, should make the decisions about these things. It is not going to be easy for senators to make a bad guy out of someone who responds to tough policy questions by wrapping himself in the democratic flag, looking his questioner in the eye, and responding, "You, Senator, are elected by the American people. It is you and other legislators, not a life-tenured, nonelected judge, who should make these basic decisions."

Here lies a danger for the Democratic party. The Republican party has been delighted to identify itself as conservative, anti-abortion, anti-affirmative action, and as the true representative of traditional American life styles. The Democrats have sought to straddle the abortion question and soft pedal affirmative action issues because of the current state of public opinion generally, and because of division within the party itself. The party has allowed itself to be portrayed as the champion of unconventional life styles, and this has been an electoral disadvantage. At the hearings it is going to be difficult for Democrats to pin down Bork's bad judicial character. If, instead, they have to emphasize results—that his elevation to the Court will lead to changes in the outcomes of cases—they run the risk of firmly labeling the Democratic party as strongly liberal, pro-abortion, pro-affirmative action, and anti-school prayer, which will not sit well with popular opinion. Emphasis on results may well, in the end, defeat the Bork nomination, but at the cost of increasing the chances of a Democratic defeat in the next presidential election. ☑

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pollsters asked questions in different ways, and question wording can affect the responses given by the public." Still, he concludes that issues of question wording need not loom very large in research on the subject: "We can spend a great deal of time worrying about which question gets at the issue best, so as a rule of thumb we will avoid such speculation and wherever possible use *reasonably framed questions* that have been asked again and again with the same wording. This will enable us to spot trends and infer the effects of certain events."[6]

Unfortunately, a proper methodology cannot stop with securing "reasonably framed questions." No matter how "fair" the question, it is likely to "feel" only one part of the elephant when the public is ambivalent. And no matter how many times the blind man touches the elephant's trunk and describes it precisely, he still will not have learned what an elephant is like. Consider these two questions:

> "Ronald Reagan says the United States should help the people in Nicaragua who are trying to overthrow the pro-Soviet government there. Other people say that even if our country does not like the government in Nicaragua, we should not help overthrow it. Do you think we should help the people trying to overthrow the government in Nicaragua, or should we not help them?"[7]

> "Ronald Reagan says the United States should help the people in Nicaragua who are trying to prevent the Communist government there from firmly establishing its power. Other people say that even if our country does not like the government in Nicaragua, it should not help those who are fighting against it. Do you think we should help the people trying to prevent the establishment of the Communist government in Nicaragua, or should we not help them?"

The first question, from the CBS News/*New York Times* poll, is technically sound and fair. This hardly means, though, that it reveals "what the public really thinks." The second question is also technically sound and fair —but almost certainly it would yield a different response. Americans favor measures to prevent a pro-Soviet regime from gaining permanent, Castro-like dominion in Managua, but they are reluctant to endorse the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. As in other instances where alternate wordings yield sharply different results—for example, asking about spending to "help the poor and needy," compared to spending on "welfare"—the different answers reveal a complex set of colliding values and assessments. The elephant *really is* a trunk and a leg—and a whole lot more.

Public Inattention

The cross-pulling of public attitudes on Contra aid presents a challenge to survey research on the subject. This challenge is heightened by an inattentiveness among much of the population to even highly salient details bearing on U.S. policy. Recent data show a change, but in April 1984, 73 percent of those asked in national polls whether the U.S. government supports the Nicaraguan government or those fighting against it, responded that they really did not know enough to say.[8] As late as April 1986, 43 percent of those surveyed said the Reagan administration "has been supporting the government of Nicaragua," while another 25 percent said they were not sure who the administration supported. Only 32 percent answered that the administration was not behind the Nicaraguan government.[9]

This low level of attention makes it hard to frame questions that make us reasonably confident the public's answers mean what they appear to mean. That the Reagan administration has been at once supporting the government in El Salvador and those fighting against the government in Nicaragua has obviously presented polling problems that would be funny were they not in fact quite serious.

In some instances we simply don't know what many respondents intended to say. In September 1983, 60 percent of those polled nationally told Harris interviewers that they were against "the U.S. arming and supporting the rebels in Nicaragua who are trying to overthrow the Sandinista government in that country"; only 24 percent said they favored such U.S. support. But another survey, by NBC News, taken at exactly the same time, found 45 percent believing that the Reagan administration was supporting the Nicaraguan government, only 19 percent that it was not supporting that government, while 36 percent said they didn't know who Reagan was backing.[10] The point isn't that the heads of "We the People" are full of Jell-O and that their views on the issue should be ignored. The public brings to the controversy some basic values and expectations that are firm enough. But surely findings relating to public opinion on the specifics of Central American policy should be handled with care.

What Is the Political Bottom Line?

Data presented in the Opinion Roundup section of this issue (pages 21-24) show that professed public support for Contra aid has risen, according to all available surveys, from the months preceding Oliver North's televised testimony to just after it. This turnaround, undoubtedly in response to the appeal of a man who began his testimony very much in the doghouse, is really quite extraordinary. The thrust of this article, though, is that the whole elephant of public opinion on what the United States should do in Central America is highly unlikely to have been much changed. It is too big and solid for that.

Polls show an ambivalent American public—one wanting disparate and even contradictory things. And that is as far as the opinion polls can take us. Public opinion is not neatly in favor of, or opposed to, aiding the Contras.

If the negotiations that have begun promote the end Americans unambiguously favor—curbing advances by pro-Soviet forces in Central America and extending democracy without armed conflict—the political controversy that has fed off public ambivalence on matters relating to Contra aid will be defused. But if negotiations don't lead to this result, the controversy will certainly continue. Politicians wanting to know what the political bottom line is—whether a vote for Contra aid, or one against it, is the more costly in the coin of public opinion—won't get a clear answer from the polls. There is simply no way that the cross-pulls described here are going to receive an emphatic "yea or nay" resolution in the context of an opinion survey.

This doesn't mean that there isn't a resolution—only that it comes through elections as voters feed their amorphous conclusions from the Central America debate into larger judgments about candidates and the parties. Ultimately, someone wins and someone loses; if it is impossible to say how much the Central America debate counts amidst all the other electoral stimuli, there can be little doubt that it does add to voters' impressions of the parties that are composites of many related stands.

Politicians form judgments of how issues ultimately cut at the ballot box. Since the evidence for their conclusions is typically very soft, sharp disagreements are the rule. An observer can't *know* who is right, but he can get some sense of things by examining the composition of the contending camps and what they are saying.

Perhaps the most interesting thing about the argument over the electoral impact of the contending partisans' stands on foreign and defense issues is that it is going on almost entirely within one political party—the Democratic party. Republicans like Rudman, Lugar, and House Minority Leader Robert Michel periodically complain that the people aren't sending the signals needed to sustain a firm policy of Contra assistance, but no wing of the party worries that the GOP will suffer electorally from its clear identification with Contra support. More generally, few Republicans think that their Reagan-years approach on defense and national security issues is a net political liability. Among the Democrats, though, a heated debate has gone on since the Vietnam war years and Lyndon Johnson's presidency.

The case for the Democrats' "worried minority" factions was presented recently by former Carter policy advisor Stuart Eizenstat in a *New York Times* op-ed piece. Liberal or left-of-center parties have been having a hard time recently in a number of major industrial democracies—notably the United States, Britain, and West Germany—Eizenstat argued, in large part "because they were perceived as weak on national security issues. . . While no Democratic presidential hopeful has come close to taking such [comparable to the German Social Democrats or British Labour] a radical stance. . .a decade after Vietnam the party is at risk of being perceived as today's neo-isolationist party—a reversal of role from its internationalist attitude, which dates from the days of Woodrow Wilson."[11]

The core of this argument is simple: (1) A broad change in elite opinion, rooted in principle, has occurred almost simultaneously in a number of liberal or left democratic parties, which (2) has left them straining against their respective countries' nationalisms, because they appear weak on national security issues, which (3) has made them vulnerable electorally. All the elements of this interpretation are hotly contested, of course, and their validity simply cannot be proved or disproved in the normal sense of those terms.

Yet, however hard Eizenstat's argument is to grapple with, it cannot be avoided if the political bottom line on Contra aid is to be assessed. If it is basically wrong, the Democrats are unlikely to have a problem electorally accruing from the Nicaragua controversy. If it is largely right, however, they may well have a Nicaragua problem. The contending claims raised by Contra aid leave many Americans in a state of splendid ambivalence. But if a large swing group in the public has formed a view, however vague, of Democrats as squishy on national security issues, that assessment could draw further nourishment from the party's approach on Central America. ☑

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[1] From the hearings of the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, July 13, 1987, as published in *Taking the Stand: The Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North* (New York: Pocket Books, 1987), p. 650.

[2] Rudman made these comments to reporters following the fourth day of North's testimony before the Iran-Contra committees. See Associated Press, "Casey Favored Secret Fund," *Portland Press Herald*, July 11, 1987, p. 1, 5.

[3] Howard L. Reiter, "U.S. Public Opinion of the Nicaragua War and the Implications for Political Strategy," paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5, 1987.

[4] Everett C. Ladd, *American Opinion on Issues of Foreign Assistance*, report written for the World Bank, 1985. The report is available through the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, P.O. Box 440, Storrs, CT 06268.

[5] Quoted in John Felton, "New Standoff Shaping Up Over Contra Aid," *National Journal*, February 7, 1987, p. 237.

[6] Reiter, "U.S. Public Opinion on the Nicaragua War . . .," p.3. Emphasis added.

[7] When CBS News and the *New York Times* asked this question in a May 29-June 2, 1985 survey, 32 percent said we should help in the attempted overthrow, 53 percent that we should not help, while 15 percent had no opinion.

[8] Survey by CBS News and the *New York Times*, April 23-26, 1984. "Which side does the U.S. government support in Nicaragua—the current government, the people fighting against the government, or have you been following this closely enough to say?" Current government: 8 percent; people fighting the government, 19 percent; haven't been following, 63 percent; no opinion, 11 percent.

[9] Survey by NBC News and the *Wall Street Journal*, April 28-29, 1986. "In thinking about Central America, would you say that the Reagan administration has been supporting the government of Nicaragua, or not?"

[10] The Harris survey was done September 9-14, 1983; that by NBC News September 19-20, 1983.

[11] Stuart Eizenstat, "Will the Democrats Go British Labor's Route?" The *New York Times*, June 18, 1987, p. A31.

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